Re: [Foucault-L] Taylor/Habermas vs. Foucault

An old reply to Taylor is William E. Connolly’s “Taylor, Foucault and Otherness,” Political Theory, 13.3 (1985).



Best wishes,



Nathan



Prof. Nathan Widder

Professor of Political Theory

Department of Politics and International Relations

Royal Holloway, University of London

Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX

United Kingdom
Staff webpage<http://pure.rhul.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/nathan-widder_2dbed1de-b1f5-4a4b-a6a9-6758b1677469.html>
Genealogies of Difference<http://www.press.uillinois.edu/s02/widder.html>
Reflections on Time and Politics<http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/978-0-271-03394-5.html>
Political Theory after Deleuze<http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/political-theory-after-deleuze-9781441150882/>






-----Original Message-----
From: foucault-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:foucault-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Mark Kelly
Sent: 27 January 2015 10:35
To: Mailing-list; Nathaniel Roberts
Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Taylor/Habermas vs. Foucault



Dear Nate,



I'm not sure if it's the source you're thinking of, but I do run an argument of this type in Chapter 6 of *The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault*.



Best,

Mark



Dr Mark Kelly



Senior Lecturer and ARC Future Fellow



School of Humanities and Communication Arts University of Western Sydney



https://uws.academia.edu/Kelly



On 27 January 2015 at 21:14, Nathaniel Roberts <npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:



> Dear List,

>

> Both Charles Taylor and J. Habermas have criticized Foucault. They

> allege that F's critical analyses of modern forms of power are flawed

> because he does not provide a positive alternative, or a normative

> foundation, in relation to which these forms of power are found

> wanting. Charles Taylor (if I am recalling his argument correctly)

> makes the further claim that Foucault *does* in fact have an

> unacknowledged normative framework, but that he does not make it

> explicit, and that if he did he'd find that F's critical analyses are

> contradictory, because they depend as premises on the very set-up he is criticizing.

>

> I have always seen these criticisms of Foucault as misplaced. One does

> not need to specify a positive alternative to say one finds something

> "intolerable," as F says of popular initiatives by prisoner and others

> who resist power (in Language, Counter-memory, Practice, p. 216). F

> claims his own analyses are guided, in part, by actually existing

> instances of resistance, but it would be equally coherent, I argue,

> for him simply to say that "I find this intolerable." (I believe he

> actually speaks in the first person like this somewhere, but I can't

> find the quote---I thought it was in D&P.)

>

> Anyway, coming to my question: does anyone know of a secondary work

> that discusses this issue, and contests Taylor's/Habermas' claim that

> criticism must be premised on some normative framework or positive

> conception of the good? I feel sure I've seen such an argument

> developed somewhere, but I can't recall where.

>

> The closest thing I've found is Raymond Geuss' essay "Must Criticism

> Be Constructive?" (in "A World without Why"). But this does not

> specifically mention the Foucault or the Taylor/Habermas criticism.

>

> Best,

> Nate

>

> --

> Dr. Nathaniel Roberts

> <

> http://www.mmg.mpg.de/departments/religious-diversity/scientific-staff

> /dr-nathaniel-roberts/

> >

> Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

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> 37073 Göttingen

> Germany

> +49 (0) 551-4956-0

>

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Replies
[Foucault-L] Taylor/Habermas vs. Foucault, Nathaniel Roberts
Re: [Foucault-L] Taylor/Habermas vs. Foucault, Mark Kelly
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