Hi.
This is in response to the post that claimed that the existence of an
actual past has been accepted by all. Of course, one always concedes that
some kind of "actual past" must exist or have existed in order for things
today to be the way they are. But, as I said, history is not a catalogue,
and history is not "memory". History is an active (act of) construction.
In order to understand this, I think, one has to take into account
Foucault's notion of discourse not as some abstract space in which ideas
compete, but rather as a surface with a finite content. He is not
interested in what discourse *says* - he is interested in what discourse
*does*. Thus, from a Foucauldian perspective, the correspondence of a
history to the "actual past" is, even if possible, entirely secondary to
*how the narrative rhetorically functions within a field of
power-relations*. I question its methodological possibility, though,
because to say that a given set of historiographic criteria corresponds
more or less accurately to the "past" implies a previous determination of
the "real" shape and meaning of that past - one must have access to the
"truth" of history in order to say that one historiography is truer than
another. Now, how would one acquire such a picture except through a set
of historiographic criteria? Thus, the assessment of truth or falsity of
historical claims begs many questions: how do you arrive at the "true"
set of historiographic criteria? by assessing their adequacy and accuracy
against "history itself". how do you arrive at this "history itself"?
through historiographic criteria.
Also, alot of this discussion seems to take the notion of "evidence" as
realtively unproblematic. Thus, someone said the reason they believe the
holocaust occurred is because there is so much evidence for its
occurrence. Now my question is: how is it that one decides what counts as
evidence? what appears as evidence to one person will not count for
another. Neo-nazis do not see the vast archives of documentary material
as "evidence". Why not? because of their political identification. Now, I
*do* see them as evidence. Why? because of mine.
People are not convinced of things because of evidence, and they are
certainly not convinced of things through rational argument. This
presupposes criteria of evidence as self-evident (snicker snicker). Thus
the evidence for the holocaust counts as evidence for you and me not
because it is "so overwhelming" - otherwise there would be no possibility
of denying it (but some people obviously do) - but because *we are not
Nazis*. Also, I beg to differ with the claim that holocaust denial *can
never achieve mass acceptance because of the evidence*. This is
dangerously naive. One can't rely on the "evidence" to make one's
arguments for one. Simply because evidence does not an argument make.
Now, the appropriate strategy in dealing with holocaust denial is not to
seek recourse in historiographic criteria and hope and against hope that
rational argument can prevent Naziism. The appropriate strategy is to
kill Nazis.
Thus, I am not arguing that people are willing to sacrifice rational
thought and critical ability to politics. I am arguing, rather, that what
counts as rational thought and critical ability follow from politics.
Finally, vis-a-vis the "subject(lessness)" of Foucault's history, a quote
>from "The Confession of the Flesh" in _Power/Knowledge_:
"Let's take an example. From around 1825 to 1830 one finds the local and
perfectly explicit appearance of definite strategies for fixing the
workers in the first heavy industries at their work-places. At Mulhouse
and in France various tactics are elaborated: pressuring people to marry,
providing houses, building cites ouvrieres, practicing that sly form of
credit-slavery that Marx talks about, consisting in enforcing advance
payment of rents while wages are paid only at the end of the month. Then
there are savings-bank systems, the truck-system with grocers and
wine-merchants who act for the bosses, and so on. Around all this there
is formed little by little a discourse, the discourse of philanthropy and
the moralization of the working class. The the experiments become
generalized by way of the institutions and societies consciously
advocating programmes for the moralization of the working class. Then on
top of that there is superimposed the problem of womens' work, the
schooling of children and the relations between the two issues. Between
the schooling of children, which is a centralized, Parliamentary measure,
and this or that purely local initiative dealing with workers' housing,
for example, one finds all sorts of support mechanisms (unions of
employers, chambers of commerce, etc.) which invent, modify and readjust,
according to the circumstances of the moment and the place - so that you
get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer
possible to identify a person who conceived it." (page 203)
A bit earlier:
"Take the example of imprisonment, that apparatus which had the effect of
making measures of detention appear to be the most efficient and rational
that could be applied to the phenomenon of criminality. What did this
apparatus produce? An entirely unforeseen effect which had nothing to do
with any kind of strategic ruse on the part of some meta- or
trans-historic subject conceiving and willing it. This effect was the
constitution of a delinquent milieu..." (195)
and so on and so on.
bye for now. fight the power.
malcolm
This is in response to the post that claimed that the existence of an
actual past has been accepted by all. Of course, one always concedes that
some kind of "actual past" must exist or have existed in order for things
today to be the way they are. But, as I said, history is not a catalogue,
and history is not "memory". History is an active (act of) construction.
In order to understand this, I think, one has to take into account
Foucault's notion of discourse not as some abstract space in which ideas
compete, but rather as a surface with a finite content. He is not
interested in what discourse *says* - he is interested in what discourse
*does*. Thus, from a Foucauldian perspective, the correspondence of a
history to the "actual past" is, even if possible, entirely secondary to
*how the narrative rhetorically functions within a field of
power-relations*. I question its methodological possibility, though,
because to say that a given set of historiographic criteria corresponds
more or less accurately to the "past" implies a previous determination of
the "real" shape and meaning of that past - one must have access to the
"truth" of history in order to say that one historiography is truer than
another. Now, how would one acquire such a picture except through a set
of historiographic criteria? Thus, the assessment of truth or falsity of
historical claims begs many questions: how do you arrive at the "true"
set of historiographic criteria? by assessing their adequacy and accuracy
against "history itself". how do you arrive at this "history itself"?
through historiographic criteria.
Also, alot of this discussion seems to take the notion of "evidence" as
realtively unproblematic. Thus, someone said the reason they believe the
holocaust occurred is because there is so much evidence for its
occurrence. Now my question is: how is it that one decides what counts as
evidence? what appears as evidence to one person will not count for
another. Neo-nazis do not see the vast archives of documentary material
as "evidence". Why not? because of their political identification. Now, I
*do* see them as evidence. Why? because of mine.
People are not convinced of things because of evidence, and they are
certainly not convinced of things through rational argument. This
presupposes criteria of evidence as self-evident (snicker snicker). Thus
the evidence for the holocaust counts as evidence for you and me not
because it is "so overwhelming" - otherwise there would be no possibility
of denying it (but some people obviously do) - but because *we are not
Nazis*. Also, I beg to differ with the claim that holocaust denial *can
never achieve mass acceptance because of the evidence*. This is
dangerously naive. One can't rely on the "evidence" to make one's
arguments for one. Simply because evidence does not an argument make.
Now, the appropriate strategy in dealing with holocaust denial is not to
seek recourse in historiographic criteria and hope and against hope that
rational argument can prevent Naziism. The appropriate strategy is to
kill Nazis.
Thus, I am not arguing that people are willing to sacrifice rational
thought and critical ability to politics. I am arguing, rather, that what
counts as rational thought and critical ability follow from politics.
Finally, vis-a-vis the "subject(lessness)" of Foucault's history, a quote
>from "The Confession of the Flesh" in _Power/Knowledge_:
"Let's take an example. From around 1825 to 1830 one finds the local and
perfectly explicit appearance of definite strategies for fixing the
workers in the first heavy industries at their work-places. At Mulhouse
and in France various tactics are elaborated: pressuring people to marry,
providing houses, building cites ouvrieres, practicing that sly form of
credit-slavery that Marx talks about, consisting in enforcing advance
payment of rents while wages are paid only at the end of the month. Then
there are savings-bank systems, the truck-system with grocers and
wine-merchants who act for the bosses, and so on. Around all this there
is formed little by little a discourse, the discourse of philanthropy and
the moralization of the working class. The the experiments become
generalized by way of the institutions and societies consciously
advocating programmes for the moralization of the working class. Then on
top of that there is superimposed the problem of womens' work, the
schooling of children and the relations between the two issues. Between
the schooling of children, which is a centralized, Parliamentary measure,
and this or that purely local initiative dealing with workers' housing,
for example, one finds all sorts of support mechanisms (unions of
employers, chambers of commerce, etc.) which invent, modify and readjust,
according to the circumstances of the moment and the place - so that you
get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer
possible to identify a person who conceived it." (page 203)
A bit earlier:
"Take the example of imprisonment, that apparatus which had the effect of
making measures of detention appear to be the most efficient and rational
that could be applied to the phenomenon of criminality. What did this
apparatus produce? An entirely unforeseen effect which had nothing to do
with any kind of strategic ruse on the part of some meta- or
trans-historic subject conceiving and willing it. This effect was the
constitution of a delinquent milieu..." (195)
and so on and so on.
bye for now. fight the power.
malcolm