I agree that evidence and what is considered evidence can never have an
absolute hold, but I would argue with Malcom's reduction to ideology or
political investment. I know I've changed my mind about some issues
because someone has pointed out that if I believe X I can only disbelieve
in Y with an inconsistency. In a case like this (sorry for the
abstraction) it is part of my self-image not to entertain a certain kind
of inconsistency. While this self-image has political consequences, it
is not in the service of a narrow ideology in any direct sort of way.
Most forms of teaching in the humanities also follow this strategy:
getting students to extend their core of beliefs into new realms, or
using new perspectives that they will not reject to encourage them to
revise this core of beliefs, etc... One of the things I like about
Foucault is that his theories operate according to Power/knowledge but
his arguments and his rhetorical approach assume that people can be
convinced, that they can re-see and reconceive of things. There is a
tension, here, but one that Foucault works with very nicely.
Erik
On Mon, 29 Apr 1996, Nicholas Dronen wrote:
> Malcolm Dunnachie Thompson wrote:
>
> > A lot of this discussion seems to take the notion of "evidence" as
> > realtively unproblematic. Thus, someone said the reason they believe the
> > holocaust occurred is because there is so much evidence for its
> > occurrence. Now my question is: how is it that one decides what counts as
> > evidence? what appears as evidence to one person will not count for
> > another. Neo-nazis do not see the vast archives of documentary material
> > as "evidence". Why not? because of their political identification. Now, I
> > *do* see them as evidence. Why? because of mine.
> >
> > People are not convinced of things because of evidence, and they are
> > certainly not convinced of things through rational argument. This
> > presupposes criteria of evidence as self-evident (snicker snicker). Thus
> > the evidence for the holocaust counts as evidence for you and me not
> > because it is "so overwhelming" - otherwise there would be no possibility
> > of denying it (but some people obviously do) - but because *we are not
> > Nazis*. Also, I beg to differ with the claim that holocaust denial *can
> > never achieve mass acceptance because of the evidence*. This is
> > dangerously naive. One can't rely on the "evidence" to make one's
> > arguments for one. Simply because evidence does not an argument make.
> > Now, the appropriate strategy in dealing with holocaust denial is not to
> > seek recourse in historiographic criteria and hope and against hope that
> > rational argument can prevent Naziism. The appropriate strategy is to
> > kill Nazis.
> >
> > Thus, I am not arguing that people are willing to sacrifice rational
> > thought and critical ability to politics. I am arguing, rather, that what
> > counts as rational thought and critical ability follow from politics.
>
> Two issues are of concern here. One is the degree to which political
> investiture affects one's ability to consider what we call evidence of events in the
> past. The other is the epistemic criteria by which one determines what qualifies as
> evidence.
>
> To stay with the example: clearly, Neo-Nazis disregard evidence for the
> Holocaust's having occurred out of their profound hatred for Jews. (And we all know
> that Neo-Nazi's hate Jews.) And Jews have their own version of the story to uphold, for
> obvious reasons. (Am I presuming that the Holocaust actually hapened?)
>
> But what about people who are not politically invested in the dispute? Cannot
> they consider the evidence--the documents, photographs, films, personal accounts, other
> physical evidence, and the character of the parties involved--and arrive at a *fair*
> description of what happened?
>
> Of course, the description of what happened that these disinterested persons may
> arrive at would only be *fair*, not perfect. To descry all claims to historical truth
> simply because doing history is a messy business is to expect too much from the world.
>
> ********************************************************
> Nicholas Dronen
> Carpe Ya-ya.
> ********************************************************
>
Erik D. Lindberg
Dept. of English and Comparative Lit.
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Milwaukee, WI 53211
email: edl@xxxxxxxxxxx
absolute hold, but I would argue with Malcom's reduction to ideology or
political investment. I know I've changed my mind about some issues
because someone has pointed out that if I believe X I can only disbelieve
in Y with an inconsistency. In a case like this (sorry for the
abstraction) it is part of my self-image not to entertain a certain kind
of inconsistency. While this self-image has political consequences, it
is not in the service of a narrow ideology in any direct sort of way.
Most forms of teaching in the humanities also follow this strategy:
getting students to extend their core of beliefs into new realms, or
using new perspectives that they will not reject to encourage them to
revise this core of beliefs, etc... One of the things I like about
Foucault is that his theories operate according to Power/knowledge but
his arguments and his rhetorical approach assume that people can be
convinced, that they can re-see and reconceive of things. There is a
tension, here, but one that Foucault works with very nicely.
Erik
On Mon, 29 Apr 1996, Nicholas Dronen wrote:
> Malcolm Dunnachie Thompson wrote:
>
> > A lot of this discussion seems to take the notion of "evidence" as
> > realtively unproblematic. Thus, someone said the reason they believe the
> > holocaust occurred is because there is so much evidence for its
> > occurrence. Now my question is: how is it that one decides what counts as
> > evidence? what appears as evidence to one person will not count for
> > another. Neo-nazis do not see the vast archives of documentary material
> > as "evidence". Why not? because of their political identification. Now, I
> > *do* see them as evidence. Why? because of mine.
> >
> > People are not convinced of things because of evidence, and they are
> > certainly not convinced of things through rational argument. This
> > presupposes criteria of evidence as self-evident (snicker snicker). Thus
> > the evidence for the holocaust counts as evidence for you and me not
> > because it is "so overwhelming" - otherwise there would be no possibility
> > of denying it (but some people obviously do) - but because *we are not
> > Nazis*. Also, I beg to differ with the claim that holocaust denial *can
> > never achieve mass acceptance because of the evidence*. This is
> > dangerously naive. One can't rely on the "evidence" to make one's
> > arguments for one. Simply because evidence does not an argument make.
> > Now, the appropriate strategy in dealing with holocaust denial is not to
> > seek recourse in historiographic criteria and hope and against hope that
> > rational argument can prevent Naziism. The appropriate strategy is to
> > kill Nazis.
> >
> > Thus, I am not arguing that people are willing to sacrifice rational
> > thought and critical ability to politics. I am arguing, rather, that what
> > counts as rational thought and critical ability follow from politics.
>
> Two issues are of concern here. One is the degree to which political
> investiture affects one's ability to consider what we call evidence of events in the
> past. The other is the epistemic criteria by which one determines what qualifies as
> evidence.
>
> To stay with the example: clearly, Neo-Nazis disregard evidence for the
> Holocaust's having occurred out of their profound hatred for Jews. (And we all know
> that Neo-Nazi's hate Jews.) And Jews have their own version of the story to uphold, for
> obvious reasons. (Am I presuming that the Holocaust actually hapened?)
>
> But what about people who are not politically invested in the dispute? Cannot
> they consider the evidence--the documents, photographs, films, personal accounts, other
> physical evidence, and the character of the parties involved--and arrive at a *fair*
> description of what happened?
>
> Of course, the description of what happened that these disinterested persons may
> arrive at would only be *fair*, not perfect. To descry all claims to historical truth
> simply because doing history is a messy business is to expect too much from the world.
>
> ********************************************************
> Nicholas Dronen
> Carpe Ya-ya.
> ********************************************************
>
Erik D. Lindberg
Dept. of English and Comparative Lit.
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Milwaukee, WI 53211
email: edl@xxxxxxxxxxx