Antoine wrote:
The problem then
>arises when in claiming to restrict rationality to scientific discourse,
>there are people who apply that standard as meanign simply,
>intersubkectivbely verifiable, or in principle intersubjectively
>verifiable. The only kind of claims that are in principle excluded by
>such a standard are those claims that are essentially private.
>To argue for allowing as rational claims that do not meet the standard of
>at least in principle intersubjectively verifiable, is to give in to the
>enthusiasm that Kant was very concerned to rule out as the basis of any
>justificaiton, whther epistemic or moral.
>Antoine
Let me see if I follow you. Some people restrict rationality to mean
scientific discourse- Habermas, for example, and basically Kant from what I
understand. Then somebody- I'm not sure who from your response- interprets
this restriction to mean intersubjectively verifiable- and you say this is
a problem, but thenI'm not sure what you see is the problem or even if
there is a problem- I'm really confused here.
What I think is happening is this. People see science as rationality, and
by sicence they mean intersubjectively verifiable. This is the
"reproducibility" feature of any scientific experiment. Any result must be
reproducible and therefore verifiable by others.
Now you claim that (I think, or are you only reporting Kant's views- if so,
then wat is your view) the only claims not intersubjectively verifiable are
"essentially private claims." What are these? Are they just subjective
thoughts like "I see red now."
I'm not sure how to approach this claim. If you mean by
intersubjectively verifiable- intersubjectively by those "subjects" in my
langauge game, culture, etc., this is one thing. But if you mean as
Habermas does intersubjectively as verifiable by anyone anytime anyplace,
this is a much stronger statement. Both statements may be false, but the
latter is more obviously false then the former.
Considering the latter case where any claim must be verifivable by any
person, this forces others to accept one standard of rationality. There
are different cultures and different times. Foucault holds that there is
some incommensurability between epistemes. This must mean that claims
cannot be intersubjectively verifiable in the strong sense. Lyotard is
very strong on the incommensurability of langauge games and would reject
any such notion of rationality (I think). The idea that we must come to
some consensus, which is what the strong form of intersubjective
verifiability leads to, seems very totalitarian, as stated before. It
forces everyone to accept one dominant "rationality" one dominant mode of
thinking. Why should my claims need to be verifiable by you or anyone else
in order to be rational claims?
The second weaker understanding seems more plausible, thought it seems to
imply that my claims must be verifiable by those in my own culture/society.
Is this necessary for rationality. What if I am Robinson Cruesoe (sp?)?
In either case, what I am trying to say is that to reduce rationality to
intersubjectively verifiable seems to mean that eveyrthing must conform to
the "rationality" of science. But this is really implasible? Science is
relatively a young field, with a very limited subject matter- notice the
logical positivists who rejected everything which was not verfiable. It
seems like another Vulcan.
(I hope my thoughts make sense here, I'm tired).
JLN
jlnich1@xxxxxxxxxxx
Department of Philosophy
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY. 40509
------------------
The problem then
>arises when in claiming to restrict rationality to scientific discourse,
>there are people who apply that standard as meanign simply,
>intersubkectivbely verifiable, or in principle intersubjectively
>verifiable. The only kind of claims that are in principle excluded by
>such a standard are those claims that are essentially private.
>To argue for allowing as rational claims that do not meet the standard of
>at least in principle intersubjectively verifiable, is to give in to the
>enthusiasm that Kant was very concerned to rule out as the basis of any
>justificaiton, whther epistemic or moral.
>Antoine
Let me see if I follow you. Some people restrict rationality to mean
scientific discourse- Habermas, for example, and basically Kant from what I
understand. Then somebody- I'm not sure who from your response- interprets
this restriction to mean intersubjectively verifiable- and you say this is
a problem, but thenI'm not sure what you see is the problem or even if
there is a problem- I'm really confused here.
What I think is happening is this. People see science as rationality, and
by sicence they mean intersubjectively verifiable. This is the
"reproducibility" feature of any scientific experiment. Any result must be
reproducible and therefore verifiable by others.
Now you claim that (I think, or are you only reporting Kant's views- if so,
then wat is your view) the only claims not intersubjectively verifiable are
"essentially private claims." What are these? Are they just subjective
thoughts like "I see red now."
I'm not sure how to approach this claim. If you mean by
intersubjectively verifiable- intersubjectively by those "subjects" in my
langauge game, culture, etc., this is one thing. But if you mean as
Habermas does intersubjectively as verifiable by anyone anytime anyplace,
this is a much stronger statement. Both statements may be false, but the
latter is more obviously false then the former.
Considering the latter case where any claim must be verifivable by any
person, this forces others to accept one standard of rationality. There
are different cultures and different times. Foucault holds that there is
some incommensurability between epistemes. This must mean that claims
cannot be intersubjectively verifiable in the strong sense. Lyotard is
very strong on the incommensurability of langauge games and would reject
any such notion of rationality (I think). The idea that we must come to
some consensus, which is what the strong form of intersubjective
verifiability leads to, seems very totalitarian, as stated before. It
forces everyone to accept one dominant "rationality" one dominant mode of
thinking. Why should my claims need to be verifiable by you or anyone else
in order to be rational claims?
The second weaker understanding seems more plausible, thought it seems to
imply that my claims must be verifiable by those in my own culture/society.
Is this necessary for rationality. What if I am Robinson Cruesoe (sp?)?
In either case, what I am trying to say is that to reduce rationality to
intersubjectively verifiable seems to mean that eveyrthing must conform to
the "rationality" of science. But this is really implasible? Science is
relatively a young field, with a very limited subject matter- notice the
logical positivists who rejected everything which was not verfiable. It
seems like another Vulcan.
(I hope my thoughts make sense here, I'm tired).
JLN
jlnich1@xxxxxxxxxxx
Department of Philosophy
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY. 40509
------------------