I would like to respond to the notion of order as a primary
state, first of all, and to the earlier question
cocnerning scientific change and the "shifting" of the
underlying structures, by mentioning a few concerns brought
up in the English edition. Foucault mentions three problems
he seeks to address: the problem of change, the problem of
causality, and the problem of hte subject (xii, xiii).
Change, in some sense (and not a causal one) is the
'subject' matter of his investigation. What he has to say
about change rules out the idea that his subject matter lies
in anyhting like an 'underlying structure": "It seemed to
me, therefore, that all these changes should not be treated
at the same level, or be made to culminate at a single
point, as is sometimes done, or be attributed to the genius
of an individual, or a new collective spirit, or even to teh
fecundity of a single discovery."(xii)
Concerning the issue of causality, F. is thinking in terms
of what causes changes: "it is not always easy to determine
what has causes a specific change in a science"(xiii) -- and
he sidesteps the issue: "I left the problem of causes to one
side"(xiii). Nonehteless, his subject matter is the
transformation of these 3 sciences through a comparative
description: "This book must be read as a comparative, and
not a symptomatological study"(x).
The comparative method enables him to sidestep the
metaphysical and ontological problems which usually result
from "causal" or biographical accounts of scientific change.
The third problem , that of the 'subject'(xiii) is
intriguing. Here, he presents a problem for a view of the
orders of things as being a kind of materia prima; he claims
that he is writing his accounts "from the point of view of
the rules that come into play in the very existence of such
discourses"(xiv).
Something needs to be said about this, I think. What the
hell does it mean to write from the point of view of the
rules of discourse? It's this odd methodology he employs,
from this odd persective, that enables him to sidestep any
type of metaphysical explanation of scientific change. he
seems to have just left those questions alone. I guess we
have to ask ourselves whether those questions are important
anyway; and whether it wouldn't be worthwhile to employ teh
method of comparative analysis, though its products may be
uncertain, to treat the problem of change without a
metaphysics of change.
------------------
state, first of all, and to the earlier question
cocnerning scientific change and the "shifting" of the
underlying structures, by mentioning a few concerns brought
up in the English edition. Foucault mentions three problems
he seeks to address: the problem of change, the problem of
causality, and the problem of hte subject (xii, xiii).
Change, in some sense (and not a causal one) is the
'subject' matter of his investigation. What he has to say
about change rules out the idea that his subject matter lies
in anyhting like an 'underlying structure": "It seemed to
me, therefore, that all these changes should not be treated
at the same level, or be made to culminate at a single
point, as is sometimes done, or be attributed to the genius
of an individual, or a new collective spirit, or even to teh
fecundity of a single discovery."(xii)
Concerning the issue of causality, F. is thinking in terms
of what causes changes: "it is not always easy to determine
what has causes a specific change in a science"(xiii) -- and
he sidesteps the issue: "I left the problem of causes to one
side"(xiii). Nonehteless, his subject matter is the
transformation of these 3 sciences through a comparative
description: "This book must be read as a comparative, and
not a symptomatological study"(x).
The comparative method enables him to sidestep the
metaphysical and ontological problems which usually result
from "causal" or biographical accounts of scientific change.
The third problem , that of the 'subject'(xiii) is
intriguing. Here, he presents a problem for a view of the
orders of things as being a kind of materia prima; he claims
that he is writing his accounts "from the point of view of
the rules that come into play in the very existence of such
discourses"(xiv).
Something needs to be said about this, I think. What the
hell does it mean to write from the point of view of the
rules of discourse? It's this odd methodology he employs,
from this odd persective, that enables him to sidestep any
type of metaphysical explanation of scientific change. he
seems to have just left those questions alone. I guess we
have to ask ourselves whether those questions are important
anyway; and whether it wouldn't be worthwhile to employ teh
method of comparative analysis, though its products may be
uncertain, to treat the problem of change without a
metaphysics of change.
------------------