I guess it's not - but I do like the way you've put it -
"the disciplinary matrix of the internet"; I like the idea
of masks, too. There just seems to be a trend to refer to
one another on this line as though we were real human beings
with real human identities. It seems to me that the
"dsicplinary matrix" forbids this, too (even if it were
possible in some other way). The necessity of displaying an
address, we could even say, is a masking device of teh
discplinary matrix, sicne it fosters the illusion that we
have one.
I guess I have never looked for others' addresses, but now
will feel compelled. Anyway, sicne we had such a long and
interesting discussion over language use, why not bring a
discussion about the "author function" into play? Why, in
other words, is it necessary to refer to one another by
name? Here, we have some sort of a chance not to.
Somewhere in Wittgenstein's work, he refers to the notion of
an act without a subject - with no Kantian ego hiding behind
teh act - such as "falling off a ladder". One of the
animals in the Chinese encyclopedia is "taxonomized" (by
Borges through the use of a,b,c,d...) as "having just broken
the water pitcher". There is just action - no animus.
Why can't description be description of just action? In
soem ways, teh 'epistemological space' of act-description is
one of those "intermediary spaces" lying in "the non-place
of language". Without the agent, teh "INwherethe things
enumerated would be divided up"(xvii) is no longer possible.
------------------
"the disciplinary matrix of the internet"; I like the idea
of masks, too. There just seems to be a trend to refer to
one another on this line as though we were real human beings
with real human identities. It seems to me that the
"dsicplinary matrix" forbids this, too (even if it were
possible in some other way). The necessity of displaying an
address, we could even say, is a masking device of teh
discplinary matrix, sicne it fosters the illusion that we
have one.
I guess I have never looked for others' addresses, but now
will feel compelled. Anyway, sicne we had such a long and
interesting discussion over language use, why not bring a
discussion about the "author function" into play? Why, in
other words, is it necessary to refer to one another by
name? Here, we have some sort of a chance not to.
Somewhere in Wittgenstein's work, he refers to the notion of
an act without a subject - with no Kantian ego hiding behind
teh act - such as "falling off a ladder". One of the
animals in the Chinese encyclopedia is "taxonomized" (by
Borges through the use of a,b,c,d...) as "having just broken
the water pitcher". There is just action - no animus.
Why can't description be description of just action? In
soem ways, teh 'epistemological space' of act-description is
one of those "intermediary spaces" lying in "the non-place
of language". Without the agent, teh "INwherethe things
enumerated would be divided up"(xvii) is no longer possible.
------------------