sb wrote:
> YOur historical take on the marxian legacy is impressive, but is it really
> adequate to the original question? This question, i believe, concerned the
> inherent inadequacy of marx's theory of power (which, I think, remains to
> be defined for the purposes of this discussion) and Foucault's corrective
> to that defect.
>
> I would insist on the inadequacy of that opposition. Marx and Foucault are
> interested in two kinds of power which operate on entirely different
> levels. Or more accurately, foucault's normalizing effects infiltrate and
> operate through the productive relations Marx describes. IN D&P, Foucault
> writes: "At the emergence of large-scale industry, one finds, beneath the
> division of the production process, the individualizing fragmentation of
> labor power..." (145), and elsewhere "...behind the great abstraction of
> exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful
> forces". As production co-ordinates activity it regulates and exercises
> the bodies of workers. This difference is fundamental to understanding the
> part played by productive relations in Foucault's theory of power, and on a
> more general level his relationship to Western Marxism.
>
> sb
If the idea here is that the sum total of interesting and sometimes
important things that Marx said about labour and production does not
exhaust these topics, and that there are other interesting and
sometimes important things to be said about these matters, and that,
moreover, some of these other things have been said by Foucault, or
could be said from a "Foucauldian" perspective (etc.), then I
completely agree. I would only add that the phenomenon of labour
discipline (in general terms) was certainly a topic of serious
discussion by Marx (notably in CAPITAL), and since then by other
Marxists (notably Braverman and James Rhinehart).
As for the concept of "power," I think that that which Foucault
discusses under the name of "power relations" is often discussed by
Marx under different names. When, for example, Marx talks about the
proletariat being "forced to sell its labour-power," he clearly has in
mind an instance of what Foucault calls "government" in "The Subject
and Power." In the latter text Foucault discusses power (relations)
in very general terms (certainly not reducible to, say, "discipline").
And it seems to me that "acting upon the possibilities for action", or
whatever, is something that Marxists of all kinds, including Marx,
have certainly discussed in other terms: e.g., in termms of
"strategy," "struggle," "the balance of class forces," "class rule,"
"oppression," and so on. But, again, I agree that there are other
things to add to this early effort to discern instances of coercion
where the so-called "dominant ideology" sees only "the consent of the
governed" and freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.
My own opinion is that the "Marxism" of Marx has only three elements:
first, an "analytics" of social evolution (or a quasi-theory thereof,
which can only be rendered truly informative by historical analysis of
a particular social formation); second, a system of "hermeneutic"
norms for interpreting social phenomena in a demystified way; and
third, an application of these interpretative norms to the
demystification of the "wealth of nations," i.e., the object of the
ideologically tainted social science of political economy. Marx
called these: (1) "the materialist conception of history," (2) "the
dialectical method", and (3) "the critique of political economy."
If that accurately describes "Marxism" AS A BODY OF THEORY articulated
BY MARX (which is distinct from "Marxism" as a political tradition or
a current(s) in the workers' movement and so on), then Marxism leaves
open all kinds of questions in the realm of social theory (and even
more questions in the realm of, e.g., metaphysics, epistemology,
ethics, philosophy of language, etc.).
There is an idea, popular among Marxists, but not (it seems to me)
found in Marx, that Marxism entails "a comprehensive world-outlook."
Engels seemed to hint at such a possibility. But he was at least
clear that such a project would have to involve integrating ideas from
non-Marxist theoretical traditions (for example, Darwin's biology,
Morgan's anthropology, the latest findings in physics and chemistry
and so on). By Lenin's time, this perspective expanded into the idea
that Marxism itself could actually SETTLE debates within these
non-Marxist traditions (for example, that Marxists could actually
offer a "dialectical materialist" critique of Einstein's theory of
relativity!). By Stalin's time, things had degenerated even further.
Here the idea was that Marxism ALREADY contained answers to every
question that could possibly come up in the various social and natural
sciences, such that the only thing needed was textual exegesis aimed
at clarifying the truths that were already contained in a body of
authoritative texts written by Marx, Engels and Lenin (and Stalin
himself, of course).
I think that Marxism can only gain from repudiating this whole
trajectory of thought, and recognizing it as a theoretical (and
political) dead end. But that is something different from rejecting
Marxism as a whole, simply because there are some aspects of the
social world that it is unable adequately to characterize in its own
terms.
Foucault is very good at analyzing the "problematisation" of
sexuality; Marx is very good at analyzing the class struggle. Where
their ideas contradict one another we should choose between them (or
reject both). But where they simply add to each others accounts, we
should feel no obligation to reject either of them (unless, of course,
we have reason to think that they are mistaken). Any "Foucauldian"
who thought that it was necessary to say everything about society in
genealogical or archaeological terms would be barking up the same
wrong tree as Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and suffering from the same
misguided aspiration to comprehensiveness. Genealogists should admit
that Foucault's conceptual tools (F's "analytics of power," etc.) are
ill-suited for some purposes, including the characterization of mass
working class struggles against the effects of capitalism. To say,
for example, that Foucault can tell us as much about mass strikes as
can Rosa Luxembourg would be ridiculous! Nevertheless, mass strikes
are sometimes worth talking about. Why on earth would Foucauldians
refuse to make use of Luxembourg on occasions when they wish to say
something about mass strikes? Likewise, why on earth should Marxists
refrain from using Foucault when they want to speak about the
problematization of "perverse" sexuality, etc.? I see no reason in
either case for such delusions of anytical or theoretical
self-sufficiency.
Steve
Toronto.
> YOur historical take on the marxian legacy is impressive, but is it really
> adequate to the original question? This question, i believe, concerned the
> inherent inadequacy of marx's theory of power (which, I think, remains to
> be defined for the purposes of this discussion) and Foucault's corrective
> to that defect.
>
> I would insist on the inadequacy of that opposition. Marx and Foucault are
> interested in two kinds of power which operate on entirely different
> levels. Or more accurately, foucault's normalizing effects infiltrate and
> operate through the productive relations Marx describes. IN D&P, Foucault
> writes: "At the emergence of large-scale industry, one finds, beneath the
> division of the production process, the individualizing fragmentation of
> labor power..." (145), and elsewhere "...behind the great abstraction of
> exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful
> forces". As production co-ordinates activity it regulates and exercises
> the bodies of workers. This difference is fundamental to understanding the
> part played by productive relations in Foucault's theory of power, and on a
> more general level his relationship to Western Marxism.
>
> sb
If the idea here is that the sum total of interesting and sometimes
important things that Marx said about labour and production does not
exhaust these topics, and that there are other interesting and
sometimes important things to be said about these matters, and that,
moreover, some of these other things have been said by Foucault, or
could be said from a "Foucauldian" perspective (etc.), then I
completely agree. I would only add that the phenomenon of labour
discipline (in general terms) was certainly a topic of serious
discussion by Marx (notably in CAPITAL), and since then by other
Marxists (notably Braverman and James Rhinehart).
As for the concept of "power," I think that that which Foucault
discusses under the name of "power relations" is often discussed by
Marx under different names. When, for example, Marx talks about the
proletariat being "forced to sell its labour-power," he clearly has in
mind an instance of what Foucault calls "government" in "The Subject
and Power." In the latter text Foucault discusses power (relations)
in very general terms (certainly not reducible to, say, "discipline").
And it seems to me that "acting upon the possibilities for action", or
whatever, is something that Marxists of all kinds, including Marx,
have certainly discussed in other terms: e.g., in termms of
"strategy," "struggle," "the balance of class forces," "class rule,"
"oppression," and so on. But, again, I agree that there are other
things to add to this early effort to discern instances of coercion
where the so-called "dominant ideology" sees only "the consent of the
governed" and freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.
My own opinion is that the "Marxism" of Marx has only three elements:
first, an "analytics" of social evolution (or a quasi-theory thereof,
which can only be rendered truly informative by historical analysis of
a particular social formation); second, a system of "hermeneutic"
norms for interpreting social phenomena in a demystified way; and
third, an application of these interpretative norms to the
demystification of the "wealth of nations," i.e., the object of the
ideologically tainted social science of political economy. Marx
called these: (1) "the materialist conception of history," (2) "the
dialectical method", and (3) "the critique of political economy."
If that accurately describes "Marxism" AS A BODY OF THEORY articulated
BY MARX (which is distinct from "Marxism" as a political tradition or
a current(s) in the workers' movement and so on), then Marxism leaves
open all kinds of questions in the realm of social theory (and even
more questions in the realm of, e.g., metaphysics, epistemology,
ethics, philosophy of language, etc.).
There is an idea, popular among Marxists, but not (it seems to me)
found in Marx, that Marxism entails "a comprehensive world-outlook."
Engels seemed to hint at such a possibility. But he was at least
clear that such a project would have to involve integrating ideas from
non-Marxist theoretical traditions (for example, Darwin's biology,
Morgan's anthropology, the latest findings in physics and chemistry
and so on). By Lenin's time, this perspective expanded into the idea
that Marxism itself could actually SETTLE debates within these
non-Marxist traditions (for example, that Marxists could actually
offer a "dialectical materialist" critique of Einstein's theory of
relativity!). By Stalin's time, things had degenerated even further.
Here the idea was that Marxism ALREADY contained answers to every
question that could possibly come up in the various social and natural
sciences, such that the only thing needed was textual exegesis aimed
at clarifying the truths that were already contained in a body of
authoritative texts written by Marx, Engels and Lenin (and Stalin
himself, of course).
I think that Marxism can only gain from repudiating this whole
trajectory of thought, and recognizing it as a theoretical (and
political) dead end. But that is something different from rejecting
Marxism as a whole, simply because there are some aspects of the
social world that it is unable adequately to characterize in its own
terms.
Foucault is very good at analyzing the "problematisation" of
sexuality; Marx is very good at analyzing the class struggle. Where
their ideas contradict one another we should choose between them (or
reject both). But where they simply add to each others accounts, we
should feel no obligation to reject either of them (unless, of course,
we have reason to think that they are mistaken). Any "Foucauldian"
who thought that it was necessary to say everything about society in
genealogical or archaeological terms would be barking up the same
wrong tree as Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and suffering from the same
misguided aspiration to comprehensiveness. Genealogists should admit
that Foucault's conceptual tools (F's "analytics of power," etc.) are
ill-suited for some purposes, including the characterization of mass
working class struggles against the effects of capitalism. To say,
for example, that Foucault can tell us as much about mass strikes as
can Rosa Luxembourg would be ridiculous! Nevertheless, mass strikes
are sometimes worth talking about. Why on earth would Foucauldians
refuse to make use of Luxembourg on occasions when they wish to say
something about mass strikes? Likewise, why on earth should Marxists
refrain from using Foucault when they want to speak about the
problematization of "perverse" sexuality, etc.? I see no reason in
either case for such delusions of anytical or theoretical
self-sufficiency.
Steve
Toronto.