Hello again, Thomas.
> My thoughts are that you are absolutely correct to distinguish the
> difference in "permission" which results when one chooses one
> epistemological or methodological position or approach over another. I used
> the term "privilege" because I identify the term with the distribution of
> value that results from rule construction and maintenance, but "permission"
> is equally acceptable.
>
> So it is definitely a question of "both/and" when we speak
> metatheoretically, but when an epistemological position is chosen and a
> method is exacted, the permission of observation is given to either the
> social formation (agency) or the formation of the social (structure), one is
> ontologically privileged over the other.
So perhaps the solution is to not once and for all choose a position
and stick to it. Perhaps some methodological fluidity is called for.
Along the same lines as my signature (see below), Protagoras says
somewhere that "two opposite claims can be made about any subject,
both of which are true". This is not the flagrantly anti-logical
claim it may seem - it is a recognition that "truth" about any set of
claims is contextual, and will vary with one's position vis-a-vis the
subject, one's interests in approaching it, what one hopes to gain by
doing so, one's methodological choices (and I use this term in a
very wide sense), etc. I don't see why we have to decide for all time
on whether the practice or the rules come first. (BTW, this is
another ambiguity - the term discourse: set of discursive elements or
social practice?) It seems to me, if I might be permitted to import a
hienously Marxist term here, that both exist in the same "moment",
and that neither exists without the other, neither comes "first".
But since it seems to be impossible to analyse the two terms
simultaneously, as *one* moment, why not, just for the fun of it, try
one arrangement of priority first and then the other? Oh, sophistry.
> I cannot accept your description of the term "discursive formation" because
> I am not certain you GROUND "methodological unity." Unity of method is not
> a "title" exactly, but it is much like a "shorthand." More concretely,
> unity of method is grounded in the rules of discourse. The formation of
> discourse is a process structured by rules, and its product is the structure
> of rules and norms which (in)form discourse.
First of all, I didn't mean "unity of method" - I meant "a unity of
elements drawn together according to some principle or other, this
principle being an effect of a methodological choice". Second, your
last sentence seems tautological - perhaps it isn't - I do have a
cold right now, so my thinking is kind of muddy, so I apologize if it
is not, but isn't it? "This process that is structured by rules and
norms produces a structure of rules and norms"? I thought the product
of discourse was the set of social effects that issue from
discourse's implication in a social field (effects of power, effects
of consubstantiality, whatever)?
Bleh. I need to go blow my nose. Bye for now.
malcolm
******************************************************
All affirmations are true in some sense,
false in some sense, true and false in some
sense, true and meaningless in some sense,
and true and false and meaningless in some
sense.
-Sri Syadasti
******************************************************
> My thoughts are that you are absolutely correct to distinguish the
> difference in "permission" which results when one chooses one
> epistemological or methodological position or approach over another. I used
> the term "privilege" because I identify the term with the distribution of
> value that results from rule construction and maintenance, but "permission"
> is equally acceptable.
>
> So it is definitely a question of "both/and" when we speak
> metatheoretically, but when an epistemological position is chosen and a
> method is exacted, the permission of observation is given to either the
> social formation (agency) or the formation of the social (structure), one is
> ontologically privileged over the other.
So perhaps the solution is to not once and for all choose a position
and stick to it. Perhaps some methodological fluidity is called for.
Along the same lines as my signature (see below), Protagoras says
somewhere that "two opposite claims can be made about any subject,
both of which are true". This is not the flagrantly anti-logical
claim it may seem - it is a recognition that "truth" about any set of
claims is contextual, and will vary with one's position vis-a-vis the
subject, one's interests in approaching it, what one hopes to gain by
doing so, one's methodological choices (and I use this term in a
very wide sense), etc. I don't see why we have to decide for all time
on whether the practice or the rules come first. (BTW, this is
another ambiguity - the term discourse: set of discursive elements or
social practice?) It seems to me, if I might be permitted to import a
hienously Marxist term here, that both exist in the same "moment",
and that neither exists without the other, neither comes "first".
But since it seems to be impossible to analyse the two terms
simultaneously, as *one* moment, why not, just for the fun of it, try
one arrangement of priority first and then the other? Oh, sophistry.
> I cannot accept your description of the term "discursive formation" because
> I am not certain you GROUND "methodological unity." Unity of method is not
> a "title" exactly, but it is much like a "shorthand." More concretely,
> unity of method is grounded in the rules of discourse. The formation of
> discourse is a process structured by rules, and its product is the structure
> of rules and norms which (in)form discourse.
First of all, I didn't mean "unity of method" - I meant "a unity of
elements drawn together according to some principle or other, this
principle being an effect of a methodological choice". Second, your
last sentence seems tautological - perhaps it isn't - I do have a
cold right now, so my thinking is kind of muddy, so I apologize if it
is not, but isn't it? "This process that is structured by rules and
norms produces a structure of rules and norms"? I thought the product
of discourse was the set of social effects that issue from
discourse's implication in a social field (effects of power, effects
of consubstantiality, whatever)?
Bleh. I need to go blow my nose. Bye for now.
malcolm
******************************************************
All affirmations are true in some sense,
false in some sense, true and false in some
sense, true and meaningless in some sense,
and true and false and meaningless in some
sense.
-Sri Syadasti
******************************************************