> So the history of the present would be
> the effort to say something about what we
> are that we couldn't otherwise say as constituted
> subjects. Through this our subjectivities are
> transformed.
Blaine and Sean,
This is a very interesting discussion.
(BTW, I must announce that I finished my semester
and have slept!)
I think one of the most irritating confusions in
Foucault can be found in his handling of the
terms subject and object. So, I am perhaps a bit
confused about them. Let me launch my general
impression and see where I am wrong in your eyes.
This is not to disagree with anything the two of
you have previously said, though!
I don't think Foucault is denying the
phenomenological account that an individual
could give of his experiences, or that this
perspective is limited to that person's experience.
I think that he sees far too many confusions
arising from handling a phenomenological
account, though. So, he avoids it.
I have the impression that Foucault is saying
that we have objectified the person, causing a
privelege of individuality which masks the powers
which it relates to. THis is a discontinuity that
is assumed, when power is a continuous
function.
I also have the impression that he is saying that
our belief in our interior space continues to be
deepened and refined by disicplinary practices
which do much to construct the individual as
an object which then assumes a priveleged
state that is really an illusionary way of
being, or a kind of masked tactic or strategy.
All of his talk about power seems to indicate that
once we understand the relationships, then we
will recognize the continuity. I think that his task
has been to show how we became objects, and
to not cry about this, but rather, recognize that
the subject is somewhat of a dead point.
I don't think that a constituted subject exists
in his ontology, does it? I'm feeling like I'm
missing something here. But, power functions
in a function, as he puts it, and so I keep
thinking that he is saying we are in fact
objectified by this relation, even if we would
like to think, or claim, some sort of subjectivity
as a privileged point--such as author -ship/-ity,
etc.
Wouldn't it be a constituted object?
I'm sooooo confused!!!
Eric Nelson Shook mailto:enshook@xxxxxxxxxxx
Student of Philosophy & Cultural Anthropology
"Alienation hasn't enough sense to deliberate
over circumstances. It has no sense of humor."
> the effort to say something about what we
> are that we couldn't otherwise say as constituted
> subjects. Through this our subjectivities are
> transformed.
Blaine and Sean,
This is a very interesting discussion.
(BTW, I must announce that I finished my semester
and have slept!)
I think one of the most irritating confusions in
Foucault can be found in his handling of the
terms subject and object. So, I am perhaps a bit
confused about them. Let me launch my general
impression and see where I am wrong in your eyes.
This is not to disagree with anything the two of
you have previously said, though!
I don't think Foucault is denying the
phenomenological account that an individual
could give of his experiences, or that this
perspective is limited to that person's experience.
I think that he sees far too many confusions
arising from handling a phenomenological
account, though. So, he avoids it.
I have the impression that Foucault is saying
that we have objectified the person, causing a
privelege of individuality which masks the powers
which it relates to. THis is a discontinuity that
is assumed, when power is a continuous
function.
I also have the impression that he is saying that
our belief in our interior space continues to be
deepened and refined by disicplinary practices
which do much to construct the individual as
an object which then assumes a priveleged
state that is really an illusionary way of
being, or a kind of masked tactic or strategy.
All of his talk about power seems to indicate that
once we understand the relationships, then we
will recognize the continuity. I think that his task
has been to show how we became objects, and
to not cry about this, but rather, recognize that
the subject is somewhat of a dead point.
I don't think that a constituted subject exists
in his ontology, does it? I'm feeling like I'm
missing something here. But, power functions
in a function, as he puts it, and so I keep
thinking that he is saying we are in fact
objectified by this relation, even if we would
like to think, or claim, some sort of subjectivity
as a privileged point--such as author -ship/-ity,
etc.
Wouldn't it be a constituted object?
I'm sooooo confused!!!
Eric Nelson Shook mailto:enshook@xxxxxxxxxxx
Student of Philosophy & Cultural Anthropology
"Alienation hasn't enough sense to deliberate
over circumstances. It has no sense of humor."