Eric writes:
>
>I don't think Foucault is denying the
>phenomenological account that an individual
>could give of his experiences, or that this
>perspective is limited to that person's experience.
>I think that he sees far too many confusions
>arising from handling a phenomenological
>account, though. So, he avoids it.
>
Exactly. It is a problem, but one that persists. Which I think (and
perhaps I'm way off here?) is part of his impetus towards a continual
"reactivation of a critical attitude."
>I have the impression that Foucault is saying
>that we have objectified the person, causing a
>privelege of individuality which masks the powers
>which it relates to. THis is a discontinuity that
>is assumed, when power is a continuous
>function.
>
>I also have the impression that he is saying that
>our belief in our interior space continues to be
>deepened and refined by disicplinary practices
>which do much to construct the individual as
>an object which then assumes a priveleged
>state that is really an illusionary way of
>being, or a kind of masked tactic or strategy.
>
>All of his talk about power seems to indicate that
>once we understand the relationships, then we
>will recognize the continuity. I think that his task
>has been to show how we became objects, and
>to not cry about this, but rather, recognize that
>the subject is somewhat of a dead point.
>
A dead point when it doesn't recognize itself as produced as a historical
object. Without this recognition, the subject will blindly reproduce those
practices which have been internalized or "inscribed" upon it, yet it
thinks that it acts according to its own free thought. I don't know if
that makes sense.
>I don't think that a constituted subject exists
>in his ontology, does it? I'm feeling like I'm
>missing something here. But, power functions
>in a function, as he puts it, and so I keep
>thinking that he is saying we are in fact
>objectified by this relation, even if we would
>like to think, or claim, some sort of subjectivity
>as a privileged point--such as author -ship/-ity,
>etc.
Right. I'm skeptical about this notion of "ontology" that Blaine mentions,
(I haven't read his response to my last post abouth that) although I think
he's using it provisionally. I take Foucault as showing us how we are
produced as subjectified objects within specific social, historical and
cultural practices. Yet, what is required of subjects in reproducing these
practices, also enables them to resist some practices which become
problematic. Even so, such genealogical analyses which would enable
resistance could never possibly exhaust the complexities with which we are
objectified. I don't see any confusion in your account.
Thanks for this excellent discussion.
Sean
>
>I don't think Foucault is denying the
>phenomenological account that an individual
>could give of his experiences, or that this
>perspective is limited to that person's experience.
>I think that he sees far too many confusions
>arising from handling a phenomenological
>account, though. So, he avoids it.
>
Exactly. It is a problem, but one that persists. Which I think (and
perhaps I'm way off here?) is part of his impetus towards a continual
"reactivation of a critical attitude."
>I have the impression that Foucault is saying
>that we have objectified the person, causing a
>privelege of individuality which masks the powers
>which it relates to. THis is a discontinuity that
>is assumed, when power is a continuous
>function.
>
>I also have the impression that he is saying that
>our belief in our interior space continues to be
>deepened and refined by disicplinary practices
>which do much to construct the individual as
>an object which then assumes a priveleged
>state that is really an illusionary way of
>being, or a kind of masked tactic or strategy.
>
>All of his talk about power seems to indicate that
>once we understand the relationships, then we
>will recognize the continuity. I think that his task
>has been to show how we became objects, and
>to not cry about this, but rather, recognize that
>the subject is somewhat of a dead point.
>
A dead point when it doesn't recognize itself as produced as a historical
object. Without this recognition, the subject will blindly reproduce those
practices which have been internalized or "inscribed" upon it, yet it
thinks that it acts according to its own free thought. I don't know if
that makes sense.
>I don't think that a constituted subject exists
>in his ontology, does it? I'm feeling like I'm
>missing something here. But, power functions
>in a function, as he puts it, and so I keep
>thinking that he is saying we are in fact
>objectified by this relation, even if we would
>like to think, or claim, some sort of subjectivity
>as a privileged point--such as author -ship/-ity,
>etc.
Right. I'm skeptical about this notion of "ontology" that Blaine mentions,
(I haven't read his response to my last post abouth that) although I think
he's using it provisionally. I take Foucault as showing us how we are
produced as subjectified objects within specific social, historical and
cultural practices. Yet, what is required of subjects in reproducing these
practices, also enables them to resist some practices which become
problematic. Even so, such genealogical analyses which would enable
resistance could never possibly exhaust the complexities with which we are
objectified. I don't see any confusion in your account.
Thanks for this excellent discussion.
Sean