Blaine writes:
>I think you are correct, too, when you point out the object/subject
>distinction. Foucault's worry is that subjects understand themselves as
>the objects about which there are truths to be found: in finding these
>"truths," the apparent contradiction arrises, since as free-thinking
>knowers, as you mention, a subject needs to be free of historical
>limitations, yet its aim is to determine exactly that, its
>historically-produced limitations (identities, etc). That - as I
>understand it! - is why becoming a subject means subjecting oneself and
>being subjected by others under the limits and constraints
>of rules for determining truths. That's the limitation of being a
>subject - being constrained by the rules for producing truth/falsity.
>The limitation of being an object is being constrained by individual
>truths themselves. (Ummmm, I think.)
Exactly. And the rules by which a subject can determine itself as an
object of possible knowledge are not unhistorical but are defined by
specific periods and cultures. In other words, given a certain epoch the
rules for objectively knowing oneself (and others) are limited to that
historical juncture. As Foucault has shown, these epochal rules are
discontinuous in relation to other periods, despite a period's reflection
on its rules for knowing as unhistorical, essential, etc.
>
>Hmmmm. The two questions of subjectivity...
>
>They are to a large extent tied up with all of the above, I think. I was
>suggesting that philosophers have been concerned with an ontological
>question and an epistemological question. The ontological question
>concerns the nature of the subject: who/what am I? The epistemological
>question is about knowledge, of course: what/how can I know?
>
>My understanding of Foucault's importance is that in stressing
>subjectivity, he in a sense elides the distinction between these two
>questions, such that the question to ask is: who am I *as* a knowing
>subject? In a sense, Foucault is pointing out that we tend to think of
>who we are precisely in terms of what and how we know, and that this
>production of our understanding of ourselves (what I, idiosyncratically,
>like to call "epistemic constructivism") characterizes
>post-enlightenment subjects.
You put this well: not the more traditional "Who/what am I?" which assumes
human nature (which Foucault avoids), but "who/what am I as a knowing
subject?", meaning the question is always limited to the historical context
within which the subject exists, and according to the rules defined by that
context. The more traditional view of transparent access to the nature of
the subject is limited by the very historical rules used in the search for
itself as object. (Which as you say began with Kant, but not taken far
enough.)
But what I'm wondering, following Foucault, does the "what is...?" question
make any sense now? If Foucault shows that the rules for knowing the
knowing subject are limted by the historical period in which both exist,
then transparent access to the unhistorical subject (or Kant's trans. ego?)
would seem impossible because the notion of the unhistorical would already
(and could only) be defined historically. (Is this already Kantian?) Each
epoch therefore implicitly defines its own ontology. Ontology, for
Foucault, becomes "history of ontology", truth, a "history of truth,"
etc....But now I'm really confused.
>
>I'm sure I haven't explained these thoughts well at all. But maybe its a
>start. Feel free to push a bit and make some critical points, by all
>means. Maybe I can begin to develop these thoughts for myself, too!
Your points are extremely helpful here. I can't seem to find any
disagreements with your view. What you've said is a great help. But I do
have a question: Do you think there is an ontology in Foucault, or would
that question in F's view be comparable to "enlightenment blackmail"?
thanks,
Sean
>I think you are correct, too, when you point out the object/subject
>distinction. Foucault's worry is that subjects understand themselves as
>the objects about which there are truths to be found: in finding these
>"truths," the apparent contradiction arrises, since as free-thinking
>knowers, as you mention, a subject needs to be free of historical
>limitations, yet its aim is to determine exactly that, its
>historically-produced limitations (identities, etc). That - as I
>understand it! - is why becoming a subject means subjecting oneself and
>being subjected by others under the limits and constraints
>of rules for determining truths. That's the limitation of being a
>subject - being constrained by the rules for producing truth/falsity.
>The limitation of being an object is being constrained by individual
>truths themselves. (Ummmm, I think.)
Exactly. And the rules by which a subject can determine itself as an
object of possible knowledge are not unhistorical but are defined by
specific periods and cultures. In other words, given a certain epoch the
rules for objectively knowing oneself (and others) are limited to that
historical juncture. As Foucault has shown, these epochal rules are
discontinuous in relation to other periods, despite a period's reflection
on its rules for knowing as unhistorical, essential, etc.
>
>Hmmmm. The two questions of subjectivity...
>
>They are to a large extent tied up with all of the above, I think. I was
>suggesting that philosophers have been concerned with an ontological
>question and an epistemological question. The ontological question
>concerns the nature of the subject: who/what am I? The epistemological
>question is about knowledge, of course: what/how can I know?
>
>My understanding of Foucault's importance is that in stressing
>subjectivity, he in a sense elides the distinction between these two
>questions, such that the question to ask is: who am I *as* a knowing
>subject? In a sense, Foucault is pointing out that we tend to think of
>who we are precisely in terms of what and how we know, and that this
>production of our understanding of ourselves (what I, idiosyncratically,
>like to call "epistemic constructivism") characterizes
>post-enlightenment subjects.
You put this well: not the more traditional "Who/what am I?" which assumes
human nature (which Foucault avoids), but "who/what am I as a knowing
subject?", meaning the question is always limited to the historical context
within which the subject exists, and according to the rules defined by that
context. The more traditional view of transparent access to the nature of
the subject is limited by the very historical rules used in the search for
itself as object. (Which as you say began with Kant, but not taken far
enough.)
But what I'm wondering, following Foucault, does the "what is...?" question
make any sense now? If Foucault shows that the rules for knowing the
knowing subject are limted by the historical period in which both exist,
then transparent access to the unhistorical subject (or Kant's trans. ego?)
would seem impossible because the notion of the unhistorical would already
(and could only) be defined historically. (Is this already Kantian?) Each
epoch therefore implicitly defines its own ontology. Ontology, for
Foucault, becomes "history of ontology", truth, a "history of truth,"
etc....But now I'm really confused.
>
>I'm sure I haven't explained these thoughts well at all. But maybe its a
>start. Feel free to push a bit and make some critical points, by all
>means. Maybe I can begin to develop these thoughts for myself, too!
Your points are extremely helpful here. I can't seem to find any
disagreements with your view. What you've said is a great help. But I do
have a question: Do you think there is an ontology in Foucault, or would
that question in F's view be comparable to "enlightenment blackmail"?
thanks,
Sean