Sean said:
"Basically, his...conditioning human subjects as a sort
of impotent residue undermined his own theory."
See, this is the odd thing about Foucault. There is soooo
much room to disagree.
I don't get this "impotent" reading out of Foucault anymore.
This was my first reading, but after reading broadly amongst
his works, I think it is obvious that his method was to
restrict certain terms since they were dustbins for ambiguity,
such as humanism, ideology, free will, phenomenology, etc.
I think he associated these types of words with a masking
of power. It is clear in many of his interviews that his goal
was to set us on a path towards action, not to declare that
the human is impotent.
As Deleuze put it:
?Spinoza said that there was no telling what the human
body might achieve, once freed from human discipline.
To which Foucault replies that there is no telling what
man might achieve as a living being, as the set of forces
that resist?. (Deleuze, p.93)
Deleuze, Gilles. (1988) Foucault. Translated by Sean Hand,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
I don't think he is denying that humans have a subjective
and personal experience, but that we have to admit to the
rules of the game before we are fully aware of what
choices we have. Therefore, freedom in his work is a set
of actions one may choose from. We are less free if we
know less about how power operates, and more free if
we have a greater realization of how we are determined.
As for autonomy, if one means radical free will, then no,
it isn't possible. But Foucault was a type of compatibilist,
seeing freedom as a possibility, underneath it all. So, I
whince whenever I read about how he boffed his own intent
by describing humans as docile bodies, and such.
It should be given that Foucault is really looking towards
the death of man in the sense that he's looking for the
appearance of a type of the ubermensch/"super" man.
More from Sean:
"The introduction of "power" in his thought is more like an
interpretive tool which he uses to reveal that the human
subject is never entirely trapped within power relations so
it is never able to act."
This is a bit ambiguous. I'm not sure which you meant.
However, on the topic of his conceptualization of power,
it's a philosophical use of the term. It is very similar to
a semiotic idea of action as a relation. No doubt he takes
this from Saussure. I was recently reading some Peirce
and noted that this was the same type of relational idea.
Sean:
"I agree that he never could tell us what power is, but I
don't think that was his concern."
Power in Foucault is a functional relationship. I don't think he
needs to tell us much more than that. What else would there
be to define it? It is actually a very elegant and scientifically
minimal description from which he then examines the
way this balances out, becoming many different effects,
producing truth, etc. Since we normally like to think
of power as a thing or essence, the biggest mistakes in
reading Foucault are centered on a misunderstanding of
this key concept in his works. The force of it lies at the heart
of most everything he has to say about the body, really.
Sean:
"In any case, he is more concerned with notions such as
'power', 'discourse', 'subjectivity', etc., and how they function for
us, upon us, and through us today, rather than reveal their
hidden ontological truth, which he would leave for others to do."
I'm very unclear on what would be a hidden ontological truth
for these things. In fact, I'm kind of mystified by this thought.
Could you explain it for me, because I'm thinking that Foucault's
ontology is considerable rather than substantial. I don't think
that he thought that there was a larger sense of being which
he had left out of the picture, or one that lies beneath. After
all, his intent was to reveal what is masked by discipline.
Cheers!
Eric Nelson Shook mailto:enshook@xxxxxxxxxxx
Student of Philosophy & Cultural Anthropology
"Alienation hasn't enough sense to deliberate
over circumstances. It has no sense of humor."
"Basically, his...conditioning human subjects as a sort
of impotent residue undermined his own theory."
See, this is the odd thing about Foucault. There is soooo
much room to disagree.
I don't get this "impotent" reading out of Foucault anymore.
This was my first reading, but after reading broadly amongst
his works, I think it is obvious that his method was to
restrict certain terms since they were dustbins for ambiguity,
such as humanism, ideology, free will, phenomenology, etc.
I think he associated these types of words with a masking
of power. It is clear in many of his interviews that his goal
was to set us on a path towards action, not to declare that
the human is impotent.
As Deleuze put it:
?Spinoza said that there was no telling what the human
body might achieve, once freed from human discipline.
To which Foucault replies that there is no telling what
man might achieve as a living being, as the set of forces
that resist?. (Deleuze, p.93)
Deleuze, Gilles. (1988) Foucault. Translated by Sean Hand,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
I don't think he is denying that humans have a subjective
and personal experience, but that we have to admit to the
rules of the game before we are fully aware of what
choices we have. Therefore, freedom in his work is a set
of actions one may choose from. We are less free if we
know less about how power operates, and more free if
we have a greater realization of how we are determined.
As for autonomy, if one means radical free will, then no,
it isn't possible. But Foucault was a type of compatibilist,
seeing freedom as a possibility, underneath it all. So, I
whince whenever I read about how he boffed his own intent
by describing humans as docile bodies, and such.
It should be given that Foucault is really looking towards
the death of man in the sense that he's looking for the
appearance of a type of the ubermensch/"super" man.
More from Sean:
"The introduction of "power" in his thought is more like an
interpretive tool which he uses to reveal that the human
subject is never entirely trapped within power relations so
it is never able to act."
This is a bit ambiguous. I'm not sure which you meant.
However, on the topic of his conceptualization of power,
it's a philosophical use of the term. It is very similar to
a semiotic idea of action as a relation. No doubt he takes
this from Saussure. I was recently reading some Peirce
and noted that this was the same type of relational idea.
Sean:
"I agree that he never could tell us what power is, but I
don't think that was his concern."
Power in Foucault is a functional relationship. I don't think he
needs to tell us much more than that. What else would there
be to define it? It is actually a very elegant and scientifically
minimal description from which he then examines the
way this balances out, becoming many different effects,
producing truth, etc. Since we normally like to think
of power as a thing or essence, the biggest mistakes in
reading Foucault are centered on a misunderstanding of
this key concept in his works. The force of it lies at the heart
of most everything he has to say about the body, really.
Sean:
"In any case, he is more concerned with notions such as
'power', 'discourse', 'subjectivity', etc., and how they function for
us, upon us, and through us today, rather than reveal their
hidden ontological truth, which he would leave for others to do."
I'm very unclear on what would be a hidden ontological truth
for these things. In fact, I'm kind of mystified by this thought.
Could you explain it for me, because I'm thinking that Foucault's
ontology is considerable rather than substantial. I don't think
that he thought that there was a larger sense of being which
he had left out of the picture, or one that lies beneath. After
all, his intent was to reveal what is masked by discipline.
Cheers!
Eric Nelson Shook mailto:enshook@xxxxxxxxxxx
Student of Philosophy & Cultural Anthropology
"Alienation hasn't enough sense to deliberate
over circumstances. It has no sense of humor."