Doug H. wrote:
> what I said. I'd like to hear someone offer some way of distinguishing
> among transgressive practices - why infant sacrifice, for example, is not
> an approved kind of transgression.
>
> Obviously, my suspicion is that people who claim to be free of humanist
> prejudices and master narratives aren't. But I want to hear why it's ok to
> cross some borders but not others.
>
> Doug
* * * * * * * *
I think much of this discussion must be seen as misguided once we
actually look at what Foucault says about the moral and political
issues surrounding transgression. I am therefore going to perform the
service of recounting Foucault's main ideas on the topic.
I feel the need to begin by reminding anyone who may have forgotten
that "Preface to Transgression" is not a political writing or a work
of moral philosophy. Moreover, it was written in 1963, when Foucault
was not especially interested in political theory or practice.
Later on, by contrast, Foucault did take up politics and ethics as key
themes of his work. Indeed, he articulated a moral/political
philosophy of "transgression" in his late work, "What is
Enlightenment?"
Hence, anyone wishing to find out what Foucault thought about the
political issues surrounding the concept of "transgression" should
simply read "What is Enlightenment?" In fact, Foucault's definitive
statement on "humanism" (arguably) is also contained in the same text.
Basically, Foucault tries to take over from the Enlightenment
tradition (esp. Kant) an "attitude" which embodies "a way of
philosophizing that has not been without its importance or
effectiveness during the last two centuries." He names this modified
Enlightenment attitude "the critical ontology of ourselves," about
which he makes the following remark: "the critique of what we are is
at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that
are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going
beyond [i.e., transgressing] them."
He distinguishes his own mode of critique from Kantian critique by
saying that, whereas the latter sought to define unsurpassable limits,
the former "will separate out, from the contingency that has made us
what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking
what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a
metaphysics that has finally become a science [as did Kant]; it is
seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the
undefined work of freedom." In that sense, it looks not for
unsurpassable limits but, on the contrary, superfluous limits, i.e.,
the sort of limit that "is not or is no longer indispensable for the
constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects."
"The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the
form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the
form of a possible transgression."
He points out that limit-transgressing is itself always an activity
with limits of its own, and so is in each case subject to the same
critical contestability as the limits it transgresses ("[T]he
theoretical and practical experience that we have of our limits and of
the possibility of moving beyond them is always limited and
determined; thus we are always in the position of beginning again".)
As a result, Enlightenment is not an achievement that one accomplishes
but a "permanent reactivation of an attitude."
He further specifies that "this work done at the limits of ourselves
must...put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality,
both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and
to determine the precise form this change should take."
How, then, is one supposed to determine "where change is desirable"
and "the precise form this change should take"?
This, he suggests, is not a matter of finding out a piece of
information (such as a "moral fact" or a fact about "human nature").
This is the wrong approach because the Enlightenment mode of critique
that he advocates tells us only what we DO NOT HAVE TO DO. We come
away from it faced only with a certain openness: "the undefined work
of freedom." Foucault associates this with Sartre's "theoretical
insight," namely, that he "avoids the idea of the self as something
which is given to us." In identifying "possible transgressions," we
find out only that some of what we think, say or do , is not
necessary.
Foucault concludes: "From the idea that the self is not given to us, I
think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create
ourselves as a work of art."
Foucault says many other things that are relevant, of course. But
these are some of the key points.
Perhaps Doug (or someone else) could suggest a criticism or two of
this real-life account, that Foucault actually gives, of the political
and ethical significance of the idea of "transgression."
(These last few quotations, concerning creating one's self as a work
of art, are from "On the Genealogy of Ethics." The others are all
>from "What is Enlightenment?" Both works appear in THE FOUCAULT
READER, ed. P. Rabinow.)
Steve D
Toronto
> what I said. I'd like to hear someone offer some way of distinguishing
> among transgressive practices - why infant sacrifice, for example, is not
> an approved kind of transgression.
>
> Obviously, my suspicion is that people who claim to be free of humanist
> prejudices and master narratives aren't. But I want to hear why it's ok to
> cross some borders but not others.
>
> Doug
* * * * * * * *
I think much of this discussion must be seen as misguided once we
actually look at what Foucault says about the moral and political
issues surrounding transgression. I am therefore going to perform the
service of recounting Foucault's main ideas on the topic.
I feel the need to begin by reminding anyone who may have forgotten
that "Preface to Transgression" is not a political writing or a work
of moral philosophy. Moreover, it was written in 1963, when Foucault
was not especially interested in political theory or practice.
Later on, by contrast, Foucault did take up politics and ethics as key
themes of his work. Indeed, he articulated a moral/political
philosophy of "transgression" in his late work, "What is
Enlightenment?"
Hence, anyone wishing to find out what Foucault thought about the
political issues surrounding the concept of "transgression" should
simply read "What is Enlightenment?" In fact, Foucault's definitive
statement on "humanism" (arguably) is also contained in the same text.
Basically, Foucault tries to take over from the Enlightenment
tradition (esp. Kant) an "attitude" which embodies "a way of
philosophizing that has not been without its importance or
effectiveness during the last two centuries." He names this modified
Enlightenment attitude "the critical ontology of ourselves," about
which he makes the following remark: "the critique of what we are is
at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that
are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going
beyond [i.e., transgressing] them."
He distinguishes his own mode of critique from Kantian critique by
saying that, whereas the latter sought to define unsurpassable limits,
the former "will separate out, from the contingency that has made us
what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking
what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a
metaphysics that has finally become a science [as did Kant]; it is
seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the
undefined work of freedom." In that sense, it looks not for
unsurpassable limits but, on the contrary, superfluous limits, i.e.,
the sort of limit that "is not or is no longer indispensable for the
constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects."
"The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the
form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the
form of a possible transgression."
He points out that limit-transgressing is itself always an activity
with limits of its own, and so is in each case subject to the same
critical contestability as the limits it transgresses ("[T]he
theoretical and practical experience that we have of our limits and of
the possibility of moving beyond them is always limited and
determined; thus we are always in the position of beginning again".)
As a result, Enlightenment is not an achievement that one accomplishes
but a "permanent reactivation of an attitude."
He further specifies that "this work done at the limits of ourselves
must...put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality,
both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and
to determine the precise form this change should take."
How, then, is one supposed to determine "where change is desirable"
and "the precise form this change should take"?
This, he suggests, is not a matter of finding out a piece of
information (such as a "moral fact" or a fact about "human nature").
This is the wrong approach because the Enlightenment mode of critique
that he advocates tells us only what we DO NOT HAVE TO DO. We come
away from it faced only with a certain openness: "the undefined work
of freedom." Foucault associates this with Sartre's "theoretical
insight," namely, that he "avoids the idea of the self as something
which is given to us." In identifying "possible transgressions," we
find out only that some of what we think, say or do , is not
necessary.
Foucault concludes: "From the idea that the self is not given to us, I
think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create
ourselves as a work of art."
Foucault says many other things that are relevant, of course. But
these are some of the key points.
Perhaps Doug (or someone else) could suggest a criticism or two of
this real-life account, that Foucault actually gives, of the political
and ethical significance of the idea of "transgression."
(These last few quotations, concerning creating one's self as a work
of art, are from "On the Genealogy of Ethics." The others are all
>from "What is Enlightenment?" Both works appear in THE FOUCAULT
READER, ed. P. Rabinow.)
Steve D
Toronto