Malgosia writes that, in effect, he is not convinced that "Preface to
Transgression is a an ethical or political text. John replies that it
is. But note how John's case rests on quotations from a text written
"two decades later." I agree that the text from the mid-1980's is an
ethical/political text. But it is a mistake, I think, to read
Foucault's political concerns (of his post-archaeological period --
1971-84) back into texts written when he was not, in short, a very
political person, and had still not shown any interest in ethics
(which only begins in the late 1970's or so). Am I wrong about this?
Does anyone read The Order of Things or Birth of the Clinic or The
Archaeology of Knowledge as containing some open or hidden political
agenda? If so, why? In either case, shouldn't we admit that his
treatment of ethics and politics before the 1970's was -- if it
existed at all -- not very concrete or sophisticated?
Isn't the political uselessness of archaeology partly the motivation
for moving on to genealogy, and isn't the ethical silence of genealogy
what necessitated the eventual thematization of ethics in the 80's?
In any case, by way of responding to Malgosia's question concerning
whether F recommended transgression, I reproduce below my early March
argument on this list that F did not articulate a coherent politics of
transgression until the 1980's. In that sense, all of John's
citations from "What is Enlightenment?" (1984) are to the point, as
long as we are not talking about what Foucault believed in the early
1960's.
> I feel the need to begin by reminding anyone who may have forgotten
> that "Preface to Transgression" is not a political writing or a work
> of moral philosophy. Moreover, it was written in 1963, when Foucault
> was not especially interested in political theory or practice.
>
> Later on, by contrast, Foucault did take up politics and ethics as key
> themes of his work. Indeed, he articulated a moral/political
> philosophy of "transgression" in his late work, "What is
> Enlightenment?"
>
> Hence, anyone wishing to find out what Foucault thought about the
> political issues surrounding the concept of "transgression" should
> simply read "What is Enlightenment?" In fact, Foucault's definitive
> statement on "humanism" (arguably) is also contained in the same text.
>
> Basically, Foucault tries to take over from the Enlightenment
> tradition (esp. Kant) an "attitude" which embodies "a way of
> philosophizing that has not been without its importance or
> effectiveness during the last two centuries." He names this modified
> Enlightenment attitude "the critical ontology of ourselves," about
> which he makes the following remark: "the critique of what we are is
> at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that
> are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going
> beyond [i.e., transgressing] them."
>
> He distinguishes his own mode of critique from Kantian critique by
> saying that, whereas the latter sought to define unsurpassable limits,
> the former "will separate out, from the contingency that has made us
> what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking
> what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a
> metaphysics that has finally become a science [as did Kant]; it is
> seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the
> undefined work of freedom." In that sense, it looks not for
> unsurpassable limits but, on the contrary, superfluous limits, i.e.,
> the sort of limit that "is not or is no longer indispensable for the
> constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects."
>
> "The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the
> form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the
> form of a possible transgression."
>
> He points out that limit-transgressing is itself always an activity
> with limits of its own, and so is in each case subject to the same
> critical contestability as the limits it transgresses ("[T]he
> theoretical and practical experience that we have of our limits and of
> the possibility of moving beyond them is always limited and
> determined; thus we are always in the position of beginning again".)
> As a result, Enlightenment is not an achievement that one accomplishes
> but a "permanent reactivation of an attitude."
>
> He further specifies that "this work done at the limits of ourselves
> must...put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality,
> both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and
> to determine the precise form this change should take."
>
> How, then, is one supposed to determine "where change is desirable"
> and "the precise form this change should take"?
>
> This, he suggests, is not a matter of finding out a piece of
> information (such as a "moral fact" or a fact about "human nature").
> This is the wrong approach because the Enlightenment mode of critique
> that he advocates tells us only what we DO NOT HAVE TO DO. We come
> away from it faced only with a certain openness: "the undefined work
> of freedom." Foucault associates this with Sartre's "theoretical
> insight," namely, that he "avoids the idea of the self as something
> which is given to us." In identifying "possible transgressions," we
> find out only that some of what we think, say or do , is not
> necessary.
>
> Foucault concludes: "From the idea that the self is not given to us, I
> think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create
> ourselves as a work of art."
>
> Foucault says many other things that are relevant, of course. But
> these are some of the key points.
>
> Perhaps Doug (or someone else) could suggest a criticism or two of
> this real-life account, that Foucault actually gives, of the political
> and ethical significance of the idea of "transgression."
>
> (These last few quotations, concerning creating one's self as a work
> of art, are from "On the Genealogy of Ethics." The others are all
> from "What is Enlightenment?" Both works appear in THE FOUCAULT
> READER, ed. P. Rabinow.)
>
>
> Steve D
> Toronto
>
Transgression is a an ethical or political text. John replies that it
is. But note how John's case rests on quotations from a text written
"two decades later." I agree that the text from the mid-1980's is an
ethical/political text. But it is a mistake, I think, to read
Foucault's political concerns (of his post-archaeological period --
1971-84) back into texts written when he was not, in short, a very
political person, and had still not shown any interest in ethics
(which only begins in the late 1970's or so). Am I wrong about this?
Does anyone read The Order of Things or Birth of the Clinic or The
Archaeology of Knowledge as containing some open or hidden political
agenda? If so, why? In either case, shouldn't we admit that his
treatment of ethics and politics before the 1970's was -- if it
existed at all -- not very concrete or sophisticated?
Isn't the political uselessness of archaeology partly the motivation
for moving on to genealogy, and isn't the ethical silence of genealogy
what necessitated the eventual thematization of ethics in the 80's?
In any case, by way of responding to Malgosia's question concerning
whether F recommended transgression, I reproduce below my early March
argument on this list that F did not articulate a coherent politics of
transgression until the 1980's. In that sense, all of John's
citations from "What is Enlightenment?" (1984) are to the point, as
long as we are not talking about what Foucault believed in the early
1960's.
> I feel the need to begin by reminding anyone who may have forgotten
> that "Preface to Transgression" is not a political writing or a work
> of moral philosophy. Moreover, it was written in 1963, when Foucault
> was not especially interested in political theory or practice.
>
> Later on, by contrast, Foucault did take up politics and ethics as key
> themes of his work. Indeed, he articulated a moral/political
> philosophy of "transgression" in his late work, "What is
> Enlightenment?"
>
> Hence, anyone wishing to find out what Foucault thought about the
> political issues surrounding the concept of "transgression" should
> simply read "What is Enlightenment?" In fact, Foucault's definitive
> statement on "humanism" (arguably) is also contained in the same text.
>
> Basically, Foucault tries to take over from the Enlightenment
> tradition (esp. Kant) an "attitude" which embodies "a way of
> philosophizing that has not been without its importance or
> effectiveness during the last two centuries." He names this modified
> Enlightenment attitude "the critical ontology of ourselves," about
> which he makes the following remark: "the critique of what we are is
> at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that
> are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going
> beyond [i.e., transgressing] them."
>
> He distinguishes his own mode of critique from Kantian critique by
> saying that, whereas the latter sought to define unsurpassable limits,
> the former "will separate out, from the contingency that has made us
> what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking
> what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a
> metaphysics that has finally become a science [as did Kant]; it is
> seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the
> undefined work of freedom." In that sense, it looks not for
> unsurpassable limits but, on the contrary, superfluous limits, i.e.,
> the sort of limit that "is not or is no longer indispensable for the
> constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects."
>
> "The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the
> form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the
> form of a possible transgression."
>
> He points out that limit-transgressing is itself always an activity
> with limits of its own, and so is in each case subject to the same
> critical contestability as the limits it transgresses ("[T]he
> theoretical and practical experience that we have of our limits and of
> the possibility of moving beyond them is always limited and
> determined; thus we are always in the position of beginning again".)
> As a result, Enlightenment is not an achievement that one accomplishes
> but a "permanent reactivation of an attitude."
>
> He further specifies that "this work done at the limits of ourselves
> must...put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality,
> both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and
> to determine the precise form this change should take."
>
> How, then, is one supposed to determine "where change is desirable"
> and "the precise form this change should take"?
>
> This, he suggests, is not a matter of finding out a piece of
> information (such as a "moral fact" or a fact about "human nature").
> This is the wrong approach because the Enlightenment mode of critique
> that he advocates tells us only what we DO NOT HAVE TO DO. We come
> away from it faced only with a certain openness: "the undefined work
> of freedom." Foucault associates this with Sartre's "theoretical
> insight," namely, that he "avoids the idea of the self as something
> which is given to us." In identifying "possible transgressions," we
> find out only that some of what we think, say or do , is not
> necessary.
>
> Foucault concludes: "From the idea that the self is not given to us, I
> think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create
> ourselves as a work of art."
>
> Foucault says many other things that are relevant, of course. But
> these are some of the key points.
>
> Perhaps Doug (or someone else) could suggest a criticism or two of
> this real-life account, that Foucault actually gives, of the political
> and ethical significance of the idea of "transgression."
>
> (These last few quotations, concerning creating one's self as a work
> of art, are from "On the Genealogy of Ethics." The others are all
> from "What is Enlightenment?" Both works appear in THE FOUCAULT
> READER, ed. P. Rabinow.)
>
>
> Steve D
> Toronto
>