Re: Against vulgar theories of truth

One can't help but be amazed at the power play that hides behind the vulgar
labelling that pervades Steve's post. Instead of trying to refute a poistion
try and elaborate one please. However, this post is indeed striking for it
inability to grasp the ontological nettle and this becomes manifest when its
ontologically monovalent view of the world surfaces. I have no problem is
arguing that we do indeed refer to real determinate non-being. Absence is an
ontological category.

Hence:

>
>"Unicorns do not exist."

Is true as far as we know, but of course, all truth claims (epistemological)
are fallible and are only made so by the fact that unicorns may indeed exist
somewhere (an ontological notion of truth).

>
>"The next president of the United States will be either a Democrat or
>a Republican."

is patently neither true nor false. I was never much enamoured with the idea
of prediction in the social sciences. Steve obviously seems to like the
idea. The next president could well be an independent.
>
>"Nothing happened here yesterday."

Is this true? this statement has no content with which to determine its
truth content. What is meant by nothing? What is meant by happened? What is
meant by here?

Also why construe my position as vulgar realism? Whta do you know of my
position? Epistemic violence ring any bells?

implies that the connection between truth and ontology:
>must be more subtle than vulgar realism admits.

This of course is my argument, although I come to by arguing against vulgar
ant-realism, but it at least implies that the issue is one of a
_relationship_ between things.. After all, if truth is but a set of
linguistic gymnastics, we could say anything we liked and it would be true.
After all John wrote:

>"It is >true that my cat sleeps fourteen hours a day."

But, what might I ask makes this statement true? If it is not in part
determined by the fact that his cat does indeed sleep for 14 hrs a day then
what?

>In short, the philosophical issues surrounding truth have been
>discussed quite extensively by philosophers since the time of
>Aristotle, so the discussion has proceeded beyond the point where
>simple word/thing correlations (between the snow on the ground and
>the word "snow") can successfully masquerade as a "theory" of truth.

This assumes such a lot. For one, it assumes that we now know the truth
about truth and that philosophers have settled the issue. I personally
wouldn't feel obliged to defend a monovalent notion of truth such as the
correspondence theory (which suppose is what you are alluding to with the
reference to snow), but then again, I wouldn't reject it out of hand either.

In the final analysis, an ontological notion of truth is vital, as Russell
pointed out, because it is probably the only thing that stops us humanoids
from getting really arogant.

Thanks,

P.S. There are many forms of realism out there by the way, and one shoudn't
think that they are all as easily refutable as the vulgar realism that many
think is the only possible form of realism. However, i don't expect many of
the Foucault crowd to know of these other aproaches because in my experience
Foucault readers tend not to stray too far beyond what confirms their world
view. Just a personal opinion though, and of course it may not be true, but
then again, what would make it not true?


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Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA

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