Hi,
The only truths we can claim to exist are scientific ones, such as "the
world is round", and not flat. I'm not an empericist, nor a die-hard
rationalist, however, I think truths exist between these categories, such
that if you want something to be true for you, you can believe it as
such, but then ... it is only a belief and not a truth. The world is full
of belief systems, so to agonise over whether any of them are truer than
the next, is futile, because that is not an issue. Ideological beliefs
are not truths, merely claims to truth. I believe in God, however I can
still accept that my belief is no truer than an atheist's position... and
not agonise over it. I can perhaps posit a convincing enough argument
because I have
rationalised through, whether God exists or not, (nothing to do with
Descartes, ...
just my own way of reasoning out things), and for me it makes sense that
God exists. Not because it is merely a comforting knowledge (that may be
part of it), but because that is how it is for me. Belief therefore is
subjective ... So called truth's such as Capitalism is the answer to
progress, and not Socialism ... are constructed truths... which makes one
ask the question. Is the nature of truth, such that it is immanent, or
not ??? Your views ... ????
Lubna
On Thu, 29 May 1997, COLIN WIGHT wrote:
> One can't help but be amazed at the power play that hides behind the vulgar
> labelling that pervades Steve's post. Instead of trying to refute a poistion
> try and elaborate one please. However, this post is indeed striking for it
> inability to grasp the ontological nettle and this becomes manifest when its
> ontologically monovalent view of the world surfaces. I have no problem is
> arguing that we do indeed refer to real determinate non-being. Absence is an
> ontological category.
>
> Hence:
>
> >
> >"Unicorns do not exist."
>
> Is true as far as we know, but of course, all truth claims (epistemological)
> are fallible and are only made so by the fact that unicorns may indeed exist
> somewhere (an ontological notion of truth).
>
> >
> >"The next president of the United States will be either a Democrat or
> >a Republican."
>
> is patently neither true nor false. I was never much enamoured with the idea
> of prediction in the social sciences. Steve obviously seems to like the
> idea. The next president could well be an independent.
> >
> >"Nothing happened here yesterday."
>
> Is this true? this statement has no content with which to determine its
> truth content. What is meant by nothing? What is meant by happened? What is
> meant by here?
>
> Also why construe my position as vulgar realism? Whta do you know of my
> position? Epistemic violence ring any bells?
>
> implies that the connection between truth and ontology:
> >must be more subtle than vulgar realism admits.
>
> This of course is my argument, although I come to by arguing against vulgar
> ant-realism, but it at least implies that the issue is one of a
> _relationship_ between things.. After all, if truth is but a set of
> linguistic gymnastics, we could say anything we liked and it would be true.
> After all John wrote:
>
> >"It is >true that my cat sleeps fourteen hours a day."
>
> But, what might I ask makes this statement true? If it is not in part
> determined by the fact that his cat does indeed sleep for 14 hrs a day then
> what?
>
> >In short, the philosophical issues surrounding truth have been
> >discussed quite extensively by philosophers since the time of
> >Aristotle, so the discussion has proceeded beyond the point where
> >simple word/thing correlations (between the snow on the ground and
> >the word "snow") can successfully masquerade as a "theory" of truth.
>
> This assumes such a lot. For one, it assumes that we now know the truth
> about truth and that philosophers have settled the issue. I personally
> wouldn't feel obliged to defend a monovalent notion of truth such as the
> correspondence theory (which suppose is what you are alluding to with the
> reference to snow), but then again, I wouldn't reject it out of hand either.
>
> In the final analysis, an ontological notion of truth is vital, as Russell
> pointed out, because it is probably the only thing that stops us humanoids
> from getting really arogant.
>
> Thanks,
>
> P.S. There are many forms of realism out there by the way, and one shoudn't
> think that they are all as easily refutable as the vulgar realism that many
> think is the only possible form of realism. However, i don't expect many of
> the Foucault crowd to know of these other aproaches because in my experience
> Foucault readers tend not to stray too far beyond what confirms their world
> view. Just a personal opinion though, and of course it may not be true, but
> then again, what would make it not true?
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> -----
>
> Colin Wight
> Department of International Politics
> University of Wales, Aberystwyth
> Aberystwyth
> SY23 3DA
>
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
>