On Fri, 30 May 1997, COLIN WIGHT wrote (with intermittent quotations from
Stephen D'Arcy):
> >
> >I couldn't agree more. Except that I would add that characterizing it
> >as a "power play" is also a power play.
>
> Which of course is another power play ad infinitum. Why don't we just get
> really intellectual here. You started this first. No I didn't. Yes you did.
> NO I DIDN'T! DID. DIDN'T.........
>
>
> >Moreover, I agree with Foucault that truth is only possible in
> >contexts where power is being or has been excercized.
>
> Back to square one I suppose. I don't even think this is the best, or only
> reading of Foucualt's notion of truth. But if it is, does this mean that the
> powerful possess the most truths? And if not why not?
No doubt, the powerful possess and create lots of truths. These
truths then get challenged, rearranged, re-"coded," submitted to,
and so on, by people subjected to them. Power and the truths associated
with them "circulate."
The fact that truth (along with individuals, and so on) is *produced*
rather than *discovered* does not mean (and really, why would it?) that
truth can't be struggled over and in general treated very seriously.
Here's an example: (I won't use my cat as an example, because I know there
are some people on this list with an irrational hatred of cats.) The
psycho-normative-institutional circuit of power-knowledge, at a certain
point, says: "Here's what a homosexual person is like: a certain set of
voice patterns, hand gestures, this and that psychological profile." That
is a truth, but a "produced" truth. It's produced in the sense that a
determinate P/K circuit came up with it. It's true in the sense that it
does "correspond" to the behavior of significant numbers of individuals.
Initially, the psycho-normative-institutional power-knowledge circuit
wanted to do more than simply describe the homosexual. They wanted to
"value" the homosexual in a certain way; namely, as "sick." And for a
while a lot of homosexuals walked around feeling guilty about being sick,
hiding it from others, going to see a psychiatrist -- we all know the
story.
But then at another point, individuals and groups began to reject the
negative valuation associated with the term "homosexual." Again, we all
know that story. But all of this was done within a power relation. "Power"
is indeed a vague and abstract term, and like such terms, it covers a lot
of ground, and no doubt at a certain point it stops telling us very much
precisely due to all the ground it covers. But F's account of power's
functioning in the creation of truths about homosexuality does seem
nontrivially and usefully true (where "true" in this context means "an
account of the phenomena productive of rich insights into their features
and dynamics")
>
> >In fact, I
> >think that Foucault and others (notably Joseph Rouse) have shown
> >convincingly that it is not possible even to believe anything outside
> >of power relations, much less to say anything, and least of all to say
> >anything that is true, outside of such relations.
>
> Well then we are all finished then aren't we.
I don't see why we're finished. Finished doing what? Certainly not
finished criticizing, fighting back, agreeing, negotiating -- everything
we've done before, we can do now!
> Habermas has equally argued
> that it is not possible to communicate such a thought without truth being
> inscribed in the act of communication. Is this true, what would make it
> true? Yes the social world is pervaded by power relations and yes truths are
> constructed in virtue of them. But no, truth, ontological truth is not a
> function of those power plays. Otherwise, you have elided the distinction
> between lies and truth. After all, is anything that Foucault says true, and
> if so, what makes it thus?
Foucault says true things, but those things are not based on the
distinction between "lies" and "truth."
Is it possible that we're miscommunicating over the word "ontological"?
(Or perhaps this is just my problem.)
You say that if ontological truth is merely a function of power plays, we
will elide the distinction between lies and truth. But notice with the
example of the treatment of the homosexual: the battle there isn't between
lies and truth. And the fact that the battle there isn't between lies and
truth does not lead, as a consequence, to no one being able to say
anything critical or do anything oppositional. It's not that the
psycho-normativists are "lying" when they say homosexuals are
such-and-such and this-and-that; nor do the homosexuals who seek to
reverse the valuation "sick" have access to some deeper, non-lying version
of truth.
The psycho-normativists and the homosexuals are struggling over truth.
They both take it *very* seriously! The fact that the "truth" has been
manufactured doesn't mean it's toothless or whimsical or arbitrary!
> >To give two even more blatant examples: citing a passage from
> >Foucault's work on a Foucault list is a power play, as is appealing to
> >the name of Bertrand Russell.
>
> This reminds me of the discussion we had on epistemic violence some time
> ago. It seems to me that in both instances _some_ people were working with a
> dreadfully undifferentiated notion of violence, then, and now power. After
> all, there is a difference between the power play that denies a woman, or a
> person of a certain colour a job because she is a woman, or they are
> coloured, and that of throwing in an off-hand note from Russell. Anyway, is
> what Russell says true, that's the real question? If you are going to call
> everything a power-play then everything is ipso facto a power-play. Doesn't
> help much though does it?
>
>
> >
> >Having said that, I want to address the unsubstantiated implication
> >that there was something wrong with me using the phrase "vulgar
> >realism." First of all, the phrase "vulgar realism", far from
> >implying that all realism must be "vulgar," implies the opposite: that
> >there are distinctions to be made between the sort of realism (the
> >vulgar sort) that some people who identify with the Anti-postmodernism
> >Industry have been known to disseminate, and other (more nuanced and
> >plausible) sorts of realism.
>
> Oh good, but again I think you are again guilty of overextending, are all
> realist critics of postmodernism vulgar realists?
I must tell you honestly, they all read pretty vulgar to me.
> I mean look, Foucault
> (yes, yes, it is a power play) when asked about postmodernism basically said
> that yes Habermas was right in a sense and that we cannot afford to give up
> on rationality and of course he basically went on to reiterate the Kantian
> point that this does not mean that we should never not be critical of
> rationality (sorry about the double neg, hope it makes sense). I agree with
> this, but the point is that we can be critical of rationality but we can't
> do it by being irrational. That is we have no choice but to use our
> rationality to critique our rationality and the uses to which it is put.
Have you noticed that Habermas has completely given up on a radical
critique of Western society? He's basically turned himself into a German
Rawls. And I know there are a lot of people who will say, "Well, if
Habermas has managed that, good for him! 'Bout time!" But for me, this
turn toward liberalism in Continental thought by one of its most starred
representatives reveals the futility of a reliance on the opposition
between "truth" and "falsity" for critical thought.
--John
Stephen D'Arcy):
> >
> >I couldn't agree more. Except that I would add that characterizing it
> >as a "power play" is also a power play.
>
> Which of course is another power play ad infinitum. Why don't we just get
> really intellectual here. You started this first. No I didn't. Yes you did.
> NO I DIDN'T! DID. DIDN'T.........
>
>
> >Moreover, I agree with Foucault that truth is only possible in
> >contexts where power is being or has been excercized.
>
> Back to square one I suppose. I don't even think this is the best, or only
> reading of Foucualt's notion of truth. But if it is, does this mean that the
> powerful possess the most truths? And if not why not?
No doubt, the powerful possess and create lots of truths. These
truths then get challenged, rearranged, re-"coded," submitted to,
and so on, by people subjected to them. Power and the truths associated
with them "circulate."
The fact that truth (along with individuals, and so on) is *produced*
rather than *discovered* does not mean (and really, why would it?) that
truth can't be struggled over and in general treated very seriously.
Here's an example: (I won't use my cat as an example, because I know there
are some people on this list with an irrational hatred of cats.) The
psycho-normative-institutional circuit of power-knowledge, at a certain
point, says: "Here's what a homosexual person is like: a certain set of
voice patterns, hand gestures, this and that psychological profile." That
is a truth, but a "produced" truth. It's produced in the sense that a
determinate P/K circuit came up with it. It's true in the sense that it
does "correspond" to the behavior of significant numbers of individuals.
Initially, the psycho-normative-institutional power-knowledge circuit
wanted to do more than simply describe the homosexual. They wanted to
"value" the homosexual in a certain way; namely, as "sick." And for a
while a lot of homosexuals walked around feeling guilty about being sick,
hiding it from others, going to see a psychiatrist -- we all know the
story.
But then at another point, individuals and groups began to reject the
negative valuation associated with the term "homosexual." Again, we all
know that story. But all of this was done within a power relation. "Power"
is indeed a vague and abstract term, and like such terms, it covers a lot
of ground, and no doubt at a certain point it stops telling us very much
precisely due to all the ground it covers. But F's account of power's
functioning in the creation of truths about homosexuality does seem
nontrivially and usefully true (where "true" in this context means "an
account of the phenomena productive of rich insights into their features
and dynamics")
>
> >In fact, I
> >think that Foucault and others (notably Joseph Rouse) have shown
> >convincingly that it is not possible even to believe anything outside
> >of power relations, much less to say anything, and least of all to say
> >anything that is true, outside of such relations.
>
> Well then we are all finished then aren't we.
I don't see why we're finished. Finished doing what? Certainly not
finished criticizing, fighting back, agreeing, negotiating -- everything
we've done before, we can do now!
> Habermas has equally argued
> that it is not possible to communicate such a thought without truth being
> inscribed in the act of communication. Is this true, what would make it
> true? Yes the social world is pervaded by power relations and yes truths are
> constructed in virtue of them. But no, truth, ontological truth is not a
> function of those power plays. Otherwise, you have elided the distinction
> between lies and truth. After all, is anything that Foucault says true, and
> if so, what makes it thus?
Foucault says true things, but those things are not based on the
distinction between "lies" and "truth."
Is it possible that we're miscommunicating over the word "ontological"?
(Or perhaps this is just my problem.)
You say that if ontological truth is merely a function of power plays, we
will elide the distinction between lies and truth. But notice with the
example of the treatment of the homosexual: the battle there isn't between
lies and truth. And the fact that the battle there isn't between lies and
truth does not lead, as a consequence, to no one being able to say
anything critical or do anything oppositional. It's not that the
psycho-normativists are "lying" when they say homosexuals are
such-and-such and this-and-that; nor do the homosexuals who seek to
reverse the valuation "sick" have access to some deeper, non-lying version
of truth.
The psycho-normativists and the homosexuals are struggling over truth.
They both take it *very* seriously! The fact that the "truth" has been
manufactured doesn't mean it's toothless or whimsical or arbitrary!
> >To give two even more blatant examples: citing a passage from
> >Foucault's work on a Foucault list is a power play, as is appealing to
> >the name of Bertrand Russell.
>
> This reminds me of the discussion we had on epistemic violence some time
> ago. It seems to me that in both instances _some_ people were working with a
> dreadfully undifferentiated notion of violence, then, and now power. After
> all, there is a difference between the power play that denies a woman, or a
> person of a certain colour a job because she is a woman, or they are
> coloured, and that of throwing in an off-hand note from Russell. Anyway, is
> what Russell says true, that's the real question? If you are going to call
> everything a power-play then everything is ipso facto a power-play. Doesn't
> help much though does it?
>
>
> >
> >Having said that, I want to address the unsubstantiated implication
> >that there was something wrong with me using the phrase "vulgar
> >realism." First of all, the phrase "vulgar realism", far from
> >implying that all realism must be "vulgar," implies the opposite: that
> >there are distinctions to be made between the sort of realism (the
> >vulgar sort) that some people who identify with the Anti-postmodernism
> >Industry have been known to disseminate, and other (more nuanced and
> >plausible) sorts of realism.
>
> Oh good, but again I think you are again guilty of overextending, are all
> realist critics of postmodernism vulgar realists?
I must tell you honestly, they all read pretty vulgar to me.
> I mean look, Foucault
> (yes, yes, it is a power play) when asked about postmodernism basically said
> that yes Habermas was right in a sense and that we cannot afford to give up
> on rationality and of course he basically went on to reiterate the Kantian
> point that this does not mean that we should never not be critical of
> rationality (sorry about the double neg, hope it makes sense). I agree with
> this, but the point is that we can be critical of rationality but we can't
> do it by being irrational. That is we have no choice but to use our
> rationality to critique our rationality and the uses to which it is put.
Have you noticed that Habermas has completely given up on a radical
critique of Western society? He's basically turned himself into a German
Rawls. And I know there are a lot of people who will say, "Well, if
Habermas has managed that, good for him! 'Bout time!" But for me, this
turn toward liberalism in Continental thought by one of its most starred
representatives reveals the futility of a reliance on the opposition
between "truth" and "falsity" for critical thought.
--John