At 06:18 AM 7/29/98 -0400, dls wrote:
>Daniel Vukovich wrote:
>Suffice it to mention that
>>Hayek, over and over again in his career as a Cold War >Warrior,
most>>emphatically claims that any belief in >*social* justice is absurd and,
>>moreover, dangerous.
>
>Yup. Though I'm not sure why arguing against such a >totalizing concept
makes his political theory egregious
>..... >I'm definitely no Maoist, but again I don't see >how Hayek's arguments
>against contructivist rationalism translate into a >"class-position"
>that is inherently anti-democratic. Perhaps this is another one of those
>things that one either sees or doesn't.
Perhaps so, or perhaps it would be easier if one had a nuanced
understanding of the concept, method and ontology of "totalization." And
of "structure." And of "immanence and nominalism."
Or do "grand" things like (private)property relations and capital
accumulation not exist? And is it true that *any* structural interventions
are baleful, if not "terror" mechanisms? I'm not advocating
"totalization," but I also dont take seriously the ("vulgar postmodern"?)
use of it as a scapegoat for the inherent ills of the Enlightenment and
socialist planning. And how is "social justice" a totalizing concept
anyway? Because its "bigger" than "individual" justice? Because its about
"positive," not "negative" liberties? Or is the government just on your
back too much? Or am I wrong, and there are no such thing as classes (or
even masses), but only "individuals."
Here is my math, and my last word on Hayek:
A. no such thing as social justice
B. No one is responsible for anyone else, or anything other than one's
nominal actions.
C. To think otherwise is to be an unevolved ape, a la those "primitive" tribes
D. *Order* is our supreme value in terms of gov't/system, but we can only
get this thru an anarchic market-system
E. Liberal regimes are the best we can do (shades of Rorty). Ask anyone.
F. Self-interested behavior is our supreme ontological value; and such
acts can *never* have harmful effects at a social level. What is rational
for an individual cannot be irrational for a collectivity. (Natch, b/c the
whole/"society"/structure doesnt exist, except as a miraculous, evolutinary
yet spontaneous system which *is premised upon*, and *takes as its very
foundation and insurance policy*, individual market exchange, exchange and
rational, self-interested calculations of price information.)
A + B + C + D + E + F = Capitalist Roader + Running Dog of US Imperialism
>>
>>I do not, myself, believe that market systems promote something called
>>"freedom"-- as if "freedom" were some Real thing, that is, a concept which
>>is ultimately identical to its object (to call Hayek pre-Saussarian is not
>>I think an exaggeration).
>
>I too have problems with Hayek's conception of freedom. However, to call him
>pre-Saussarian is, I think, unfair.
>
> (Please do advise me otherwise, but my (cursory)
>>sense of Hayek's phenomenological/psychological writings is that they are
>>not simply underdetermined philosophically, but rationalist through and
>>through.)
>
>Again, I agree that Hayek often exhibits the very rationalism he decries,
>but to call his work rationalist through and through is
>arguable.
>
>Hayek's point, of course, is that this bourgeois ideal was a
>>real product of bourgeois societies, but is now under threat from the
>>expansion of both socialist systems, and the Keynesian welfare state.
>>>From a very basic marxist or "materialist" perspective -- and obviously
>>Foucault shares at least this much with the Old Moor -- such ideals or
>>concepts as "freedom" or individual (and collective) justice or liberty,
>>can only be products of specific moments of history, and specific social
>>relations (or specific stratifications of power/knowledge, in more F.
>>parlance). In sum, to say that the workers of the world have nothing to
>>lose but the chains that bind them, does not mean they will then enter
>>*the* realm of Freedom; it means that they "have no ideals to realize."
>>This is also why that famous passage in Capital III on the dialectic
>>between the realms of Freedom and Necessity concludes with the shortening
>>of the working day being the first, necessary step on any road to the
>>latter realm. In short, I do not think this perspective -- call it
>>"materialism," "specificity," "sociological," etc. -- is shared by Hayek.
>
>I'm not really sure what your point is here, but if you're suggesting that
>Hayek wouldn't agree that the act *legislating*, via the state, the
>shortening of the work day is somehow a step towards better social
>conditions, then I'd say your right.
>
>I
>>suspect this is one reason why I polemically called him "absurd."
>>
>>About price information: My point above is that regardless of whether Hayek
>>bases the "catallaxy" and Good Society (his words here) on the distributive
>>functions of the "market mechanism", on some theory of human
>>nature/perception, on "true" liberty, or on cows breaking wind in the
>>Subcontinent, neither these bases nor the market system in general produce
>>"freedom" as such, or in-itself. They give some groups, classes and
>>genders some specific types of power, or *specific* "freedoms" if you wish.
>
>If your referring to the detestable imperialist/fascist/socialist/capitalist
>social formations that have spread over the world over the last two
>centuries, then I'd agree. However, to blame market systems/mechanisms seems
>to me to ignore the social contexts from which they emerged and in which
>they now function.
>
>> As I believe the historical record still shows, these same mechanisms or
>>systems also "empower" other people in other, ethically and politically
>>egregious ways. Among other things, I mean poverty and a relation to
>>temporality in which time is always already deffered, or in which time
>>becomes an impersonal form of domination. (c.f. Moishe Postone's *Time,
>>Labor and Social Domination* on this).
>
>See above.
>
>>That said, you are right to object to my reducing Hayek's market-theory to
>>"only" price-information. There are other things in play, true. For what
>>its worth, I think his take on "the division of knowledge" (as distinct
>>from the division of labor), is a real contribution to economic, even
>>social theory. For him, "society" is indeed unimaginably complex. For me
>>too, and for all kinds of thinkers. But his conclusion is that we
>>therefore need necessarily rely on markey systems, in fact on market
>>societies, not just market-economies. I disagree.
>
>Not that I'm acontextually praising market-systems (that would be as bad
>acontextually damning them), but what alternative do you propose?
>
>Moreover, I cannot help
>>but see Hayek's liberalism and economics as analytically based on price
>>information, in the last analysis.
>
>I'm not sure how.
>
>And surely no one can deny that he is a
>>fanatic about legitimizing liberal regimes, and nowhere interested in
>>problematizing them. Hence his current rebirth, post-Keynesianism, and
>>hence his egregiousness.
>
>Yeah, but that doesn't make his observations about complexity
>and knowledge any less troublesome for those who would
>implement systems that putatively promote "social justice."
>
>>But Im no Hayek exegete, so if you've got a better reading, let me know.
>>Or let me know what you think of the realtions b/w Hayek and Foucault. No
>>doubt a lot to mine here, including the "liberal" dimensions of Foucault,
>>as well as the "governmentality" writings (which have to be about the
>>Keynsian state/society). Right off, I'd say they might agree on society
>>being unimaginably complex (or an "impossible object" as Laclau and Mouffe
>>put it), but not only do they arrive here differently -- Hayek through
>>epistemology and a liberal/conservative ethos, the Nietzchean Foucault thru
>>a critique of epistemology and what Althusser called the ISA's -- but draw
>>different conclusions about "freedom," "liberty," and "power."
>
>
>Perhaps not as different as you suggest. But that's a project in itself.
>Somehow I doubt any exchange btw us will resolve our differences;
>so I suggest that we agree to disagree.
>
>dls
>
>
Daniel Vukovich
English; The Unit for Criticism
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
>Daniel Vukovich wrote:
>Suffice it to mention that
>>Hayek, over and over again in his career as a Cold War >Warrior,
most>>emphatically claims that any belief in >*social* justice is absurd and,
>>moreover, dangerous.
>
>Yup. Though I'm not sure why arguing against such a >totalizing concept
makes his political theory egregious
>..... >I'm definitely no Maoist, but again I don't see >how Hayek's arguments
>against contructivist rationalism translate into a >"class-position"
>that is inherently anti-democratic. Perhaps this is another one of those
>things that one either sees or doesn't.
Perhaps so, or perhaps it would be easier if one had a nuanced
understanding of the concept, method and ontology of "totalization." And
of "structure." And of "immanence and nominalism."
Or do "grand" things like (private)property relations and capital
accumulation not exist? And is it true that *any* structural interventions
are baleful, if not "terror" mechanisms? I'm not advocating
"totalization," but I also dont take seriously the ("vulgar postmodern"?)
use of it as a scapegoat for the inherent ills of the Enlightenment and
socialist planning. And how is "social justice" a totalizing concept
anyway? Because its "bigger" than "individual" justice? Because its about
"positive," not "negative" liberties? Or is the government just on your
back too much? Or am I wrong, and there are no such thing as classes (or
even masses), but only "individuals."
Here is my math, and my last word on Hayek:
A. no such thing as social justice
B. No one is responsible for anyone else, or anything other than one's
nominal actions.
C. To think otherwise is to be an unevolved ape, a la those "primitive" tribes
D. *Order* is our supreme value in terms of gov't/system, but we can only
get this thru an anarchic market-system
E. Liberal regimes are the best we can do (shades of Rorty). Ask anyone.
F. Self-interested behavior is our supreme ontological value; and such
acts can *never* have harmful effects at a social level. What is rational
for an individual cannot be irrational for a collectivity. (Natch, b/c the
whole/"society"/structure doesnt exist, except as a miraculous, evolutinary
yet spontaneous system which *is premised upon*, and *takes as its very
foundation and insurance policy*, individual market exchange, exchange and
rational, self-interested calculations of price information.)
A + B + C + D + E + F = Capitalist Roader + Running Dog of US Imperialism
>>
>>I do not, myself, believe that market systems promote something called
>>"freedom"-- as if "freedom" were some Real thing, that is, a concept which
>>is ultimately identical to its object (to call Hayek pre-Saussarian is not
>>I think an exaggeration).
>
>I too have problems with Hayek's conception of freedom. However, to call him
>pre-Saussarian is, I think, unfair.
>
> (Please do advise me otherwise, but my (cursory)
>>sense of Hayek's phenomenological/psychological writings is that they are
>>not simply underdetermined philosophically, but rationalist through and
>>through.)
>
>Again, I agree that Hayek often exhibits the very rationalism he decries,
>but to call his work rationalist through and through is
>arguable.
>
>Hayek's point, of course, is that this bourgeois ideal was a
>>real product of bourgeois societies, but is now under threat from the
>>expansion of both socialist systems, and the Keynesian welfare state.
>>>From a very basic marxist or "materialist" perspective -- and obviously
>>Foucault shares at least this much with the Old Moor -- such ideals or
>>concepts as "freedom" or individual (and collective) justice or liberty,
>>can only be products of specific moments of history, and specific social
>>relations (or specific stratifications of power/knowledge, in more F.
>>parlance). In sum, to say that the workers of the world have nothing to
>>lose but the chains that bind them, does not mean they will then enter
>>*the* realm of Freedom; it means that they "have no ideals to realize."
>>This is also why that famous passage in Capital III on the dialectic
>>between the realms of Freedom and Necessity concludes with the shortening
>>of the working day being the first, necessary step on any road to the
>>latter realm. In short, I do not think this perspective -- call it
>>"materialism," "specificity," "sociological," etc. -- is shared by Hayek.
>
>I'm not really sure what your point is here, but if you're suggesting that
>Hayek wouldn't agree that the act *legislating*, via the state, the
>shortening of the work day is somehow a step towards better social
>conditions, then I'd say your right.
>
>I
>>suspect this is one reason why I polemically called him "absurd."
>>
>>About price information: My point above is that regardless of whether Hayek
>>bases the "catallaxy" and Good Society (his words here) on the distributive
>>functions of the "market mechanism", on some theory of human
>>nature/perception, on "true" liberty, or on cows breaking wind in the
>>Subcontinent, neither these bases nor the market system in general produce
>>"freedom" as such, or in-itself. They give some groups, classes and
>>genders some specific types of power, or *specific* "freedoms" if you wish.
>
>If your referring to the detestable imperialist/fascist/socialist/capitalist
>social formations that have spread over the world over the last two
>centuries, then I'd agree. However, to blame market systems/mechanisms seems
>to me to ignore the social contexts from which they emerged and in which
>they now function.
>
>> As I believe the historical record still shows, these same mechanisms or
>>systems also "empower" other people in other, ethically and politically
>>egregious ways. Among other things, I mean poverty and a relation to
>>temporality in which time is always already deffered, or in which time
>>becomes an impersonal form of domination. (c.f. Moishe Postone's *Time,
>>Labor and Social Domination* on this).
>
>See above.
>
>>That said, you are right to object to my reducing Hayek's market-theory to
>>"only" price-information. There are other things in play, true. For what
>>its worth, I think his take on "the division of knowledge" (as distinct
>>from the division of labor), is a real contribution to economic, even
>>social theory. For him, "society" is indeed unimaginably complex. For me
>>too, and for all kinds of thinkers. But his conclusion is that we
>>therefore need necessarily rely on markey systems, in fact on market
>>societies, not just market-economies. I disagree.
>
>Not that I'm acontextually praising market-systems (that would be as bad
>acontextually damning them), but what alternative do you propose?
>
>Moreover, I cannot help
>>but see Hayek's liberalism and economics as analytically based on price
>>information, in the last analysis.
>
>I'm not sure how.
>
>And surely no one can deny that he is a
>>fanatic about legitimizing liberal regimes, and nowhere interested in
>>problematizing them. Hence his current rebirth, post-Keynesianism, and
>>hence his egregiousness.
>
>Yeah, but that doesn't make his observations about complexity
>and knowledge any less troublesome for those who would
>implement systems that putatively promote "social justice."
>
>>But Im no Hayek exegete, so if you've got a better reading, let me know.
>>Or let me know what you think of the realtions b/w Hayek and Foucault. No
>>doubt a lot to mine here, including the "liberal" dimensions of Foucault,
>>as well as the "governmentality" writings (which have to be about the
>>Keynsian state/society). Right off, I'd say they might agree on society
>>being unimaginably complex (or an "impossible object" as Laclau and Mouffe
>>put it), but not only do they arrive here differently -- Hayek through
>>epistemology and a liberal/conservative ethos, the Nietzchean Foucault thru
>>a critique of epistemology and what Althusser called the ISA's -- but draw
>>different conclusions about "freedom," "liberty," and "power."
>
>
>Perhaps not as different as you suggest. But that's a project in itself.
>Somehow I doubt any exchange btw us will resolve our differences;
>so I suggest that we agree to disagree.
>
>dls
>
>
Daniel Vukovich
English; The Unit for Criticism
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign