The Nation, April 26, 1999
The Case Against Inaction
Sadly, some on the left are angrier about NATO's bombing
than they are about the Serbian forces' atrocities, even though
Milosevic's men have killed more in one Kosovan village than
have all the airstrikes. Those who want an immediate NATO
cease-fire owe the world an explanation of how they propose
to stop and reverse the massive ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, in
light of Milosevic's history as a serial ethnic cleanser and
promise-breaker. Arguments that the NATO action diminishes
the stature of the United Nations are, to say the least, highly
questionable. What could diminish the UN's stature more than
Milosevic's successful defiance of more than fifty Security
Council resolutions? Only last September, Resolution 1199,
invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, ordered Belgrade to
"cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian
population and order the withdrawal of security units used for
civilian repression" in Kosovo. Only last October, Milosevic
promised to reduce troop numbers in Kosovo, and his pledge
was endorsed and given the force of international law by
Security Council Resolution 1203. By the time the
Rambouillet negotiations had started, he had more troops in
Kosovo than ever before, and they had already begun their
well-prepared campaign of ethnic cleansing.
Real internationalists can hardly use the dubious rights of
"national sovereignty" to oppose action to stop massacres.
Opposition to US military intervention is an understandable
rule of thumb, but it shouldn't become obsessive dogma. After
all, most Europeans were happy with US intervention in
World War II. The British court decisions on Gen. Augusto
Pinochet show that, at last, politicians who murder cannot
expect amnesty afterwards. Why should Slobodan Milosevic
expect impunity as he carries out crimes against humanity?
Ideally, there should have been a UN Security Council vote
endorsing military action, but China and Russia had made it
plain that no matter what barbarities Milosevic committed
they would veto any such resolution. Happily, most of the
Council agreed that ethnic cleansing was not something that
could be shielded behind a dubious claim of national
sovereignty and soundly defeated, 12 votes to 3, a Russian
draft resolution condemning the bombing. Only Namibia
joined Beijing and Moscow. NATO, most of whose
governments are members of the Socialist International,
agreed on a military response.
In short, the court of international public opinion has
implicitly, resoundingly, endorsed military action. Milosevic
is clearly counting on past experience that the international
community will compromise, accept the results of ethnic
cleansing and leave him in power. We hope that this time he
has miscalculated. Three of the major European
players--Britain, France and Germany--under like-minded
left-of-center governments have united in their determination
to stop him, and they have popular majorities for doing so.
Soon NATO will be faced with two alternatives: stop the
bombing and "negotiate," or commit ground troops. The
bombing should stop only when Belgrade agrees to pull out or
is pushed out of Kosovo, if necessary by ground troops. For
most of this decade Milosevic has used negotiations as a cover
to consolidate the gains of ethnic cleansing.
The precondition for a cease-fire must be the withdrawal of
Serbian troops and police from Kosovo and their replacement
by an international force, mostly NATO but including
Russians if they want to become involved--and can afford to.
(No one who saw the UN in inaction in Bosnia could wish UN
forces on the long-suffering Kosovars.) Of course, the present
campaign carries risks. To exorcise its frustration and put off
the inevitable involvement on the ground, the White House
will be increasingly tempted to escalate attacks on civilian and
economic targets. The sooner ground troops are committed to
clear Kosovo of Serbian forces and allow the refugees to
return, the less temptation there will be, and the more likely
that Milosevic will withdraw. Successful military action
would also strengthen the prospects for democracy in Serbia.
Much of the Serbian opposition argues that airstrikes weaken
their position. In fact, it would be impossible to weaken their
position on Kosovo: Even fewer of them explicitly oppose the
repression there than resisted the war in Bosnia. In reality,
Serbia cannot have democracy and Kosovo.
There will be casualties, but the Serbian army and police,
although fearsome against unarmed civilians, will be far from
home, in hostile territory without air cover. The alternative is
a terminal weakening of all the precarious advances in
international humanitarian law that have been achieved over
the past decade--not to mention the deaths and exile of
hundreds of thousands of Kosovars.
Bogdan Denitch and Ian Williams
Bogdan Denitch, director of the Institute for Transitions to
Democracy, which operates in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, is
the author of Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of
Yugoslavia (Minnesota). Ian Williams is The Nation's
United Nations correspondent.
The Case Against Inaction
Sadly, some on the left are angrier about NATO's bombing
than they are about the Serbian forces' atrocities, even though
Milosevic's men have killed more in one Kosovan village than
have all the airstrikes. Those who want an immediate NATO
cease-fire owe the world an explanation of how they propose
to stop and reverse the massive ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, in
light of Milosevic's history as a serial ethnic cleanser and
promise-breaker. Arguments that the NATO action diminishes
the stature of the United Nations are, to say the least, highly
questionable. What could diminish the UN's stature more than
Milosevic's successful defiance of more than fifty Security
Council resolutions? Only last September, Resolution 1199,
invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, ordered Belgrade to
"cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian
population and order the withdrawal of security units used for
civilian repression" in Kosovo. Only last October, Milosevic
promised to reduce troop numbers in Kosovo, and his pledge
was endorsed and given the force of international law by
Security Council Resolution 1203. By the time the
Rambouillet negotiations had started, he had more troops in
Kosovo than ever before, and they had already begun their
well-prepared campaign of ethnic cleansing.
Real internationalists can hardly use the dubious rights of
"national sovereignty" to oppose action to stop massacres.
Opposition to US military intervention is an understandable
rule of thumb, but it shouldn't become obsessive dogma. After
all, most Europeans were happy with US intervention in
World War II. The British court decisions on Gen. Augusto
Pinochet show that, at last, politicians who murder cannot
expect amnesty afterwards. Why should Slobodan Milosevic
expect impunity as he carries out crimes against humanity?
Ideally, there should have been a UN Security Council vote
endorsing military action, but China and Russia had made it
plain that no matter what barbarities Milosevic committed
they would veto any such resolution. Happily, most of the
Council agreed that ethnic cleansing was not something that
could be shielded behind a dubious claim of national
sovereignty and soundly defeated, 12 votes to 3, a Russian
draft resolution condemning the bombing. Only Namibia
joined Beijing and Moscow. NATO, most of whose
governments are members of the Socialist International,
agreed on a military response.
In short, the court of international public opinion has
implicitly, resoundingly, endorsed military action. Milosevic
is clearly counting on past experience that the international
community will compromise, accept the results of ethnic
cleansing and leave him in power. We hope that this time he
has miscalculated. Three of the major European
players--Britain, France and Germany--under like-minded
left-of-center governments have united in their determination
to stop him, and they have popular majorities for doing so.
Soon NATO will be faced with two alternatives: stop the
bombing and "negotiate," or commit ground troops. The
bombing should stop only when Belgrade agrees to pull out or
is pushed out of Kosovo, if necessary by ground troops. For
most of this decade Milosevic has used negotiations as a cover
to consolidate the gains of ethnic cleansing.
The precondition for a cease-fire must be the withdrawal of
Serbian troops and police from Kosovo and their replacement
by an international force, mostly NATO but including
Russians if they want to become involved--and can afford to.
(No one who saw the UN in inaction in Bosnia could wish UN
forces on the long-suffering Kosovars.) Of course, the present
campaign carries risks. To exorcise its frustration and put off
the inevitable involvement on the ground, the White House
will be increasingly tempted to escalate attacks on civilian and
economic targets. The sooner ground troops are committed to
clear Kosovo of Serbian forces and allow the refugees to
return, the less temptation there will be, and the more likely
that Milosevic will withdraw. Successful military action
would also strengthen the prospects for democracy in Serbia.
Much of the Serbian opposition argues that airstrikes weaken
their position. In fact, it would be impossible to weaken their
position on Kosovo: Even fewer of them explicitly oppose the
repression there than resisted the war in Bosnia. In reality,
Serbia cannot have democracy and Kosovo.
There will be casualties, but the Serbian army and police,
although fearsome against unarmed civilians, will be far from
home, in hostile territory without air cover. The alternative is
a terminal weakening of all the precarious advances in
international humanitarian law that have been achieved over
the past decade--not to mention the deaths and exile of
hundreds of thousands of Kosovars.
Bogdan Denitch and Ian Williams
Bogdan Denitch, director of the Institute for Transitions to
Democracy, which operates in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, is
the author of Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of
Yugoslavia (Minnesota). Ian Williams is The Nation's
United Nations correspondent.