An interesting point is made here.
An issue that crossed my mind, relevant to the matter of "relevance," is that
perhaps what we are dealing with is an epochal/epistemic element of
Foucault's general approach to l'histoire.
Warfare, regardless of whether it is high-tech or primitive, is hardly a
"modern" event. It is in fact pre-classical and pre-Homeric. True, warfare
has always been viewed (and is still viewable) as an extension of
discursive/theoretical matters in international relations. But as a
necessary extension or even a "natural" (whatever that may mean)
extension?--it is at this juncture that I see a difficulty of enjoining
Foucault's (or any theorist's) discourse in the debate over the morality of
this (or any) war.
>From Marx onward, theoretical discussions of the conditions of
political-economic instability, either pre-conflict or post-conflict, concern
the ethics/morality of the political-economic conditions themselves: viz.,
how they came to be, how they were addressed, inscribed, and spoken, and the
role of capital, power, and knowledge in the discourses that ensued.
So it is, I think, difficult to weave postmodern, poststructural, and, hence
postcolonial discursive patterns into immediate matters of who is
right/wrong, good/bad, and so forth, once the parties involved commence
indiscriminately killing other human beings. (Not even animals engage in
patterns of ritual slaughter.)
Once "the hu/man" (understood as either a classical or a modern figure)
begins behaving in barbaric and pre-historic patterns, the register of
discourse to which we have become socially accustomed in our discussion of
ethical concerns (as we are intellectually accustomed to framing them) runs a
very likely risk of becoming comically irrelevant.
There is, I feel, a way of approaching the Serbia/Kosovo/USA/NATO war that
would be more intellectually satisfying to members of the Foucault list, but
rather than discussing the morality of already-deployed or
soon-to-be-deployed military options, it would necessitate a discussion of
the broader historical and epistemic matters that prefigured the advent of
these hostilites.
It seems that many western democracies have, alas, become accustomed in the
last decade of approaching "The Serbian Problem" in much the same manner that
Edward Said described discursive patterns of western "foreign" policy in
Orientalism. To wit: we have, first, "orientalized" Yugoslavia, and then
proceeded to debate "our" role in making that part of the globe safe for
NATO-style western democracy. Not very Foucaultian--and not very conducive
to a sustained and worthwhile discussion of how the circumstance that is now
holding the globe's attention was given birth.
The hostility, side-taking, and at times "macho-speak" that I have read on
this subject via this list-serve strike me as intellectually helpless, silly,
and, well, boring. If one must vent, I beg, please do it on another list.
Frank Macke
Mercer University
Macon, GA (USA)
An issue that crossed my mind, relevant to the matter of "relevance," is that
perhaps what we are dealing with is an epochal/epistemic element of
Foucault's general approach to l'histoire.
Warfare, regardless of whether it is high-tech or primitive, is hardly a
"modern" event. It is in fact pre-classical and pre-Homeric. True, warfare
has always been viewed (and is still viewable) as an extension of
discursive/theoretical matters in international relations. But as a
necessary extension or even a "natural" (whatever that may mean)
extension?--it is at this juncture that I see a difficulty of enjoining
Foucault's (or any theorist's) discourse in the debate over the morality of
this (or any) war.
>From Marx onward, theoretical discussions of the conditions of
political-economic instability, either pre-conflict or post-conflict, concern
the ethics/morality of the political-economic conditions themselves: viz.,
how they came to be, how they were addressed, inscribed, and spoken, and the
role of capital, power, and knowledge in the discourses that ensued.
So it is, I think, difficult to weave postmodern, poststructural, and, hence
postcolonial discursive patterns into immediate matters of who is
right/wrong, good/bad, and so forth, once the parties involved commence
indiscriminately killing other human beings. (Not even animals engage in
patterns of ritual slaughter.)
Once "the hu/man" (understood as either a classical or a modern figure)
begins behaving in barbaric and pre-historic patterns, the register of
discourse to which we have become socially accustomed in our discussion of
ethical concerns (as we are intellectually accustomed to framing them) runs a
very likely risk of becoming comically irrelevant.
There is, I feel, a way of approaching the Serbia/Kosovo/USA/NATO war that
would be more intellectually satisfying to members of the Foucault list, but
rather than discussing the morality of already-deployed or
soon-to-be-deployed military options, it would necessitate a discussion of
the broader historical and epistemic matters that prefigured the advent of
these hostilites.
It seems that many western democracies have, alas, become accustomed in the
last decade of approaching "The Serbian Problem" in much the same manner that
Edward Said described discursive patterns of western "foreign" policy in
Orientalism. To wit: we have, first, "orientalized" Yugoslavia, and then
proceeded to debate "our" role in making that part of the globe safe for
NATO-style western democracy. Not very Foucaultian--and not very conducive
to a sustained and worthwhile discussion of how the circumstance that is now
holding the globe's attention was given birth.
The hostility, side-taking, and at times "macho-speak" that I have read on
this subject via this list-serve strike me as intellectually helpless, silly,
and, well, boring. If one must vent, I beg, please do it on another list.
Frank Macke
Mercer University
Macon, GA (USA)