>From Dag Helge Moldenhagen
> Dear John,
> I would like to receive a copy of your article Foucault and Lebensphilosophie.
The reason I am interested is that I am working on a project titlet "the body at
the moment" where I explore a concept of the body in scandinavian theology. It is
quite interesting, The concept of an ahistoric body may give some clues to
determination of vocaulary.
My e-mail Dag.H.Moldenhagen@xxxxxxxxx
> mail. Thanks in advance
>
> Bruni
>
> Quoting "Leigh M. Johnson" <quickleigh@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> > John ,
> >
> > I am interested in your article, "Foucault and Lebensphilosophie", if you
> > could email me a copy.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Leigh
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Dickinson College -- Bologna <fonddc_a@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Date: Saturday, June 26, 1999 5:04 PM
> > Subject: Re: The ahistoric body & Foucault
> >
> >
> > >I talk about this explicitly in _Philospohy and Social History_ in the
> > >article, "Foucault and Lebensphilosophie." Deleuze also makes this wrong
> > >reading of Foucault as does Connolly. If anyone's interested I'll be happy
> > >to send a text version of the article via e-mail.
> > >
> > >--john
> > >
> > >
> > >----- Original Message -----
> > >From: Daniel Purdy <dp31@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > >To: <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > >Sent: Saturday, June 26, 1999 8:09 PM
> > >Subject: Re: The ahistoric body & Foucault
> > >
> > >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> As far as Judith Butler's argument on Foucault's notion of the body: I
> > >> assume you are refering to the passage in Gender Trouble where she does
> > a
> > >> reading of F's comments on hermaphrodites. It seemed to me that
> > Butler's
> > >> argument was quite simply unfair. She really based it on a single
> > >> essay by F. and did not extend her argument to F's major works.
> > >> In the"Psychic Life of Power" Butler makes a very different
> > >> argument against Foucault. I think that the earlier argument about F's
> > >> ahistorical conceptof the body is discreetly abandoned by Butler in
> > favor
> > >of an argument
> > >> that really is at the heart of her own theoretical interests: to what
> > >> extentdo psychoanalytic models of sexual desire provide a means of
> > >> understanding resistence to normative heterosexuality.
> > >>
> > >> In "The Psychic Life of Power"Butler reads D&P against HoS, v.1. She
> > >wants to
> > >> show that there is a contradiction between F's account of the subject
> > as
> > >> being constituted within disciplinary power and his later discussion of
> > >> alternative sexualities developing from the very disciplinary regimes
> > >> which seek to control them. How is resistence possible from within a
> > >> disciplinary regime?
> > >> To answer this question, she goes back to Lacanian psychoanalysis
> > >> to reconsider ALthusser's notion of interpollation, which she argues
> > gives
> > >> a better explanation of how resistence is formed in relationship to a
> > >> legal force, namely as a reaction to being called before the law.
> > >> Butler is certainly on to a problem in Foucault, one that
> > >> other psychoanalysts such as Joan Copjec have also noted: how can one
> > >> explain the existence of an interiorizedd subjectivity with its own
> > moral
> > >> code. Foucault's account of disciplinary power in D&P is so
> > >> overwhelmingly determinist that there would seem to be no way of
> > >> explaining subjective feelings as anything but the direct effect of a
> > >> power regime. In other words, disciplinary power does not allow for or
> > >> acknowledge the possibility of a subject with autonomous feelings and a
> > >> moral conscience. Butler phrases this argument in terms of Foucault's
> > >> failure to explain "resistence" to power; Joan Copjec makes a similar
> > >> point also via a reading of Lacan, but she argues that Foucault's model
> > >> of disciplinary power would vitiate the autonomous moral conscience. To
> > >> the extent that resistence and a moral conscience are real, Butler and
> > >> Copjec are saying that Foucault has not fully accounted for subjectivity
> > >> and they both look to their readings of Lacanian psychoanalysis as an
> > >> alternative that makes up for Foucault's failings. And once they do
> > that
> > >> they throw into question the F's denial of the repression model, and
> > more.
> > >>
> > >> The answer which F does not formulate fully, but then how could he
> > >> answer his later critics, is in devloping a more geneaological account
> > of
> > >> disciplinary power as it acquires an history. Homosexuality as an
> > >> affirmative identity is an unintended effect of nineteenth-century
> > >> sexology. I think that f one thinks about discplinary power in more
> > >> historical terms then Butler's objections could be answered. That would
> > >> require more than further archival evidence, it would mean giving a
> > >> diachronic account of disciplinary power, i.e. a history of its changing
> > >> effects and its responses to those unintended developments.
> > >>
> > >> Daniel Purdy
> > >> Columbia University
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> Dear John,
> I would like to receive a copy of your article Foucault and Lebensphilosophie.
The reason I am interested is that I am working on a project titlet "the body at
the moment" where I explore a concept of the body in scandinavian theology. It is
quite interesting, The concept of an ahistoric body may give some clues to
determination of vocaulary.
My e-mail Dag.H.Moldenhagen@xxxxxxxxx
> mail. Thanks in advance
>
> Bruni
>
> Quoting "Leigh M. Johnson" <quickleigh@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> > John ,
> >
> > I am interested in your article, "Foucault and Lebensphilosophie", if you
> > could email me a copy.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Leigh
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Dickinson College -- Bologna <fonddc_a@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Date: Saturday, June 26, 1999 5:04 PM
> > Subject: Re: The ahistoric body & Foucault
> >
> >
> > >I talk about this explicitly in _Philospohy and Social History_ in the
> > >article, "Foucault and Lebensphilosophie." Deleuze also makes this wrong
> > >reading of Foucault as does Connolly. If anyone's interested I'll be happy
> > >to send a text version of the article via e-mail.
> > >
> > >--john
> > >
> > >
> > >----- Original Message -----
> > >From: Daniel Purdy <dp31@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > >To: <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > >Sent: Saturday, June 26, 1999 8:09 PM
> > >Subject: Re: The ahistoric body & Foucault
> > >
> > >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> As far as Judith Butler's argument on Foucault's notion of the body: I
> > >> assume you are refering to the passage in Gender Trouble where she does
> > a
> > >> reading of F's comments on hermaphrodites. It seemed to me that
> > Butler's
> > >> argument was quite simply unfair. She really based it on a single
> > >> essay by F. and did not extend her argument to F's major works.
> > >> In the"Psychic Life of Power" Butler makes a very different
> > >> argument against Foucault. I think that the earlier argument about F's
> > >> ahistorical conceptof the body is discreetly abandoned by Butler in
> > favor
> > >of an argument
> > >> that really is at the heart of her own theoretical interests: to what
> > >> extentdo psychoanalytic models of sexual desire provide a means of
> > >> understanding resistence to normative heterosexuality.
> > >>
> > >> In "The Psychic Life of Power"Butler reads D&P against HoS, v.1. She
> > >wants to
> > >> show that there is a contradiction between F's account of the subject
> > as
> > >> being constituted within disciplinary power and his later discussion of
> > >> alternative sexualities developing from the very disciplinary regimes
> > >> which seek to control them. How is resistence possible from within a
> > >> disciplinary regime?
> > >> To answer this question, she goes back to Lacanian psychoanalysis
> > >> to reconsider ALthusser's notion of interpollation, which she argues
> > gives
> > >> a better explanation of how resistence is formed in relationship to a
> > >> legal force, namely as a reaction to being called before the law.
> > >> Butler is certainly on to a problem in Foucault, one that
> > >> other psychoanalysts such as Joan Copjec have also noted: how can one
> > >> explain the existence of an interiorizedd subjectivity with its own
> > moral
> > >> code. Foucault's account of disciplinary power in D&P is so
> > >> overwhelmingly determinist that there would seem to be no way of
> > >> explaining subjective feelings as anything but the direct effect of a
> > >> power regime. In other words, disciplinary power does not allow for or
> > >> acknowledge the possibility of a subject with autonomous feelings and a
> > >> moral conscience. Butler phrases this argument in terms of Foucault's
> > >> failure to explain "resistence" to power; Joan Copjec makes a similar
> > >> point also via a reading of Lacan, but she argues that Foucault's model
> > >> of disciplinary power would vitiate the autonomous moral conscience. To
> > >> the extent that resistence and a moral conscience are real, Butler and
> > >> Copjec are saying that Foucault has not fully accounted for subjectivity
> > >> and they both look to their readings of Lacanian psychoanalysis as an
> > >> alternative that makes up for Foucault's failings. And once they do
> > that
> > >> they throw into question the F's denial of the repression model, and
> > more.
> > >>
> > >> The answer which F does not formulate fully, but then how could he
> > >> answer his later critics, is in devloping a more geneaological account
> > of
> > >> disciplinary power as it acquires an history. Homosexuality as an
> > >> affirmative identity is an unintended effect of nineteenth-century
> > >> sexology. I think that f one thinks about discplinary power in more
> > >> historical terms then Butler's objections could be answered. That would
> > >> require more than further archival evidence, it would mean giving a
> > >> diachronic account of disciplinary power, i.e. a history of its changing
> > >> effects and its responses to those unintended developments.
> > >>
> > >> Daniel Purdy
> > >> Columbia University
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >