>(6) I am unimpressed by appeals to the fact that the laws of reason do
> not rationally justify themselves. That strikes me as a line of
> argument structurally (and intellectually) akin to the argument
> whereby the proposition "there is no truth" is shown to be
> self-defeating, thus refuting global relativism or social or
> linguistic constructivism or the "Strong Programme" or whatever
> folks choose to call it around here. It is cheaper than a cheap
> stunt. <<2>> On the other hand, I most certainly am impressed by any
> nice clean, tidy, formally valid arguments the conclusions of which
> go something like "the laws of reason are not universally binding,"
> or "the laws of reason cannot be known to be universally binding," or
> even better "the laws of reason can be proven not to be universally
> binding."
Ask not what postmodernism is, but what it does.
To me the "postmodern programme" is worthless outside the struggles against
all opression. The importance of its attack on the self-sufficiency of
reason (which most undoubtedly is not self sufficient) is to reveal the
(unavoidable) use of reason as an exclusion mechanism. All totalizing
systems are/become tools of oppression.
I know this may not be the answer you're looking for, but post modern
thought will survive as long as there is a voiceless subaltern which is
silenced by the all too powerful voice of reason. It does not matter to me
if it survives in academia, as long as it survives as a tool of opposition
to the SQ.
mohammed abouzaid
> I mean, even Descartes in Med. I and Hume in his Treatise
> gave us good reasons to worry about that. In connection with this, I
> am very interested in the reply from John Ransom. If it can be made
> to go, it strikes as one of the most promising lines of argument,
> though we will have to evaluate it for formal soundness.
> Broadly speaking, what I'm wondering is whether or not an argument
> similar to or better than the sort I allude to above might be found
> somewhere between the pages of some book, article, or the plurals
> thereof by Lyotard, Baudrillard, Bataille, Derrida, Foucault, Adorno,
> or anybody else popularly associated with "postmodernism" and
> "poststructuralism." I'm quite familiar with the process of digging
> genuine and good arguments out of the writings of philosophers who
> are hostile to the notion of being understood by the rest of us. I
> spent ten years doing just that with Heidegger, and some of his
> quasi-Kantian phenomenological arguments really are excellent.
>
>(6) Part of my budding interest in postmodernism in general is the fact
> that Ill be sitting in on a Heidegger seminar in the fall and I was
> advised to go back and re-read some of these authors in connection
> with him. Additionally, a friend of mine in the Philosophy
> Department espouses strong sympathy for postmodernism, and since I
> know for a fact that he is not a supercilious dolt, I figure it's
> likely the authors he admires aren't dolts either. Seems plausible,
> right? Of course, many people who are not dolts are nonetheless
> wrong, they just aren't stupidly wrong.
>
>(7) For those who are more interested in being combative and verbally
> beating up on a dyed-in-the-cloth analytic metaphysician, be my
> guest. My ego is located elsewhere, so I'm likely to be a very easy
> and passive target.
>
>In conclusion, I should like to say that I am very pleased both by the
>volume and the nature of the responses I have received. Several people
>were very gracious and helpful and furthermore it seems my stumbling
>efforts had the salutary effect of bringing new life to some lists that
>were very very dead for quite some time. I just hope I can keep track of
>what information and which arguments on this matter are relevant to which
>lists over the coming months.
>
>
>Cheers,
>
>David Schenk
>
>--------------------------------------------------------------------
>
><<1>> Regarding this, I suppose I should point out that Kuhn is NOT even
> vaguely representative of where philosophy of science stands
> today. His views died a much-deserved death over twenty years
> ago. Scientific anti-realists would do better to look to Bas Van
> Fraasen for the grist they seek. I do not say this to chastise
> anyone. After all, just as I know very little of postmodernism
> right now, it is only to be expected that many other people know
> very little of contemporary philosophy of science. As a hint, I
> should mention that the field simply does not contain much talk
> about "paradigms" nowadays, not the least because that has got to be
> one of the most ill-formed and poorly defined concepts in the
> business.
>
> If anyone wants to get into the debates over Kuhn and philosophy of
> science, I'd be happy to do so either via private email or at least
> under a new heading for the posts. A substantial chunk of my
> dissertation is in the philosophy of science (someday Ill finish
> that accursed thing... someday...) and I dare say that is a field I
> know quite well. If he is anything at all, Kuhn is an object lesson
> in how not to be a logical positivist (that is what he was, after
> all).
>
><<2>> I will include an explanation of why such responses do not impress
> me in my next post. It is unfortunate that many people try to use
> just such a strategy, because as arguments go it is a failure.
>
>
>