TODDVANOY wrote:
> This discussion reminded me of Wittgenstein's, Heidegger's, Husserl's,
Rorty's
> and Quine's work. I mean, haven't there been many twentieth-century attempts
at
> universalist, positivist epistemological formulations? Isn't this an
obsolete,
> archaic debate?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(laughing) No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hasn't this attempt to salvage an essentialist, universalist, positivist
> epistemological scheme has already been attempted, over and over again? For
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those are four completely distinct philosophical terms that have almost
nothing to do with other. Just as a hint, no positivists were ever
essentialists. For that matter, there are no positivists in analytic
philosophy anymore and there haven't been for almost fifty years.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> example, Husserl's phenomenological work began with a Cartesian, Kantian
> attempt at an objective method of epistemological bracketing, but resulted
in
> failure, in an ex post facto classification of consciousness. Wittgenstein,
in
> another example, probably the most brilliant mind in twentieth-century
> philosophy, attempted to construct an objectivist, Logical Positivist system
of
> epistemological knot-loosening, but eventually capitulated into relativism,
> with his later exposition of "Language Games" in his Philosophical
> Investigations. In other examples, didn't Heidegger effectively separate
> "logos" from metaphysics?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(again laughing) No. First of all, Wittgenstein was not a relativist.
Secondly, Heidegger's fundamental ontology did NOT ONE THING to vitiate the
universal applicability of the laws of logic and mathematics. Even in _Being
and Time_ and _Basic Problems of Phenomenology_ the apodictic remains
apodictic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> If "logos" is an expression of ontological discourse, Being-towards -the -
> World, therefore not Platonistically transcendental or metaphysical, but
part
> and parcel of a wandering, existential, phenomenological discourse, then
> wouldn't this critique establish a foundation for deconstructionism and
> hermeneutic discourse?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The antecedent of your conditional is false.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Finally, the skeptic of postmodernism referred to himself as an acolyte of
> "Analytical Metaphysics. " Hasn't the Analytic, Positivist project been
> devastated by critics such as Rorty, Davidson and Quine? Haven't their
> defections and subsequent critiques undermined the legitimacy and even the
> viability of the project? Isn't Positivism the last gasp of Platonism, with
the
> need for universalism and a God's eye view? Obviously, Positivism is more
> heavily
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(really laughing now) No, no, and no.
If you want to set about proposing criticisms of analytic philosophy, you
would do well to learn some first. Logical positivism has very little to do
with contemporary analytic philosophy. As I mentioned earlier, that died a
well-deserved death around the fourties and fifties. Secondly, logical
positivism was *ANTI*-metaphysical and very stridently anti-Platonist. Third,
while Rorty has had almost no lasting effect on analytic philosophy, Quine and
Davidson did. However, neither of them lends any argumentative support to
"wandering, existential" whatevers, nor do either of them in any way serve to
undercut objectivity. Fourth, most of the analytic philosophers I know reject
the Quinean and Davidsonian arguments regarding logic and philosophy of
language (and with good reason).
Anyway, I'm still cataloging all the posts right now, but I enjoyed the
message above too much not to say a quick little something about it.
I'm almost finished with the Baudrillard and Lyotard, plus I'll be getting
_Writing and Difference_ and _Margins of Philosophy_ sometime today or
tomorrow. I'll have more specific responses to the more interesting messages
by Wednesday or Thursday, plus perhaps those who are interested can go through
some of the Derrida and Lyotard with me. Who knows, maybe there's something
valuable there.
Enjoying this,
David Schenk
> This discussion reminded me of Wittgenstein's, Heidegger's, Husserl's,
Rorty's
> and Quine's work. I mean, haven't there been many twentieth-century attempts
at
> universalist, positivist epistemological formulations? Isn't this an
obsolete,
> archaic debate?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(laughing) No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hasn't this attempt to salvage an essentialist, universalist, positivist
> epistemological scheme has already been attempted, over and over again? For
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those are four completely distinct philosophical terms that have almost
nothing to do with other. Just as a hint, no positivists were ever
essentialists. For that matter, there are no positivists in analytic
philosophy anymore and there haven't been for almost fifty years.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> example, Husserl's phenomenological work began with a Cartesian, Kantian
> attempt at an objective method of epistemological bracketing, but resulted
in
> failure, in an ex post facto classification of consciousness. Wittgenstein,
in
> another example, probably the most brilliant mind in twentieth-century
> philosophy, attempted to construct an objectivist, Logical Positivist system
of
> epistemological knot-loosening, but eventually capitulated into relativism,
> with his later exposition of "Language Games" in his Philosophical
> Investigations. In other examples, didn't Heidegger effectively separate
> "logos" from metaphysics?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(again laughing) No. First of all, Wittgenstein was not a relativist.
Secondly, Heidegger's fundamental ontology did NOT ONE THING to vitiate the
universal applicability of the laws of logic and mathematics. Even in _Being
and Time_ and _Basic Problems of Phenomenology_ the apodictic remains
apodictic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> If "logos" is an expression of ontological discourse, Being-towards -the -
> World, therefore not Platonistically transcendental or metaphysical, but
part
> and parcel of a wandering, existential, phenomenological discourse, then
> wouldn't this critique establish a foundation for deconstructionism and
> hermeneutic discourse?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The antecedent of your conditional is false.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Finally, the skeptic of postmodernism referred to himself as an acolyte of
> "Analytical Metaphysics. " Hasn't the Analytic, Positivist project been
> devastated by critics such as Rorty, Davidson and Quine? Haven't their
> defections and subsequent critiques undermined the legitimacy and even the
> viability of the project? Isn't Positivism the last gasp of Platonism, with
the
> need for universalism and a God's eye view? Obviously, Positivism is more
> heavily
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(really laughing now) No, no, and no.
If you want to set about proposing criticisms of analytic philosophy, you
would do well to learn some first. Logical positivism has very little to do
with contemporary analytic philosophy. As I mentioned earlier, that died a
well-deserved death around the fourties and fifties. Secondly, logical
positivism was *ANTI*-metaphysical and very stridently anti-Platonist. Third,
while Rorty has had almost no lasting effect on analytic philosophy, Quine and
Davidson did. However, neither of them lends any argumentative support to
"wandering, existential" whatevers, nor do either of them in any way serve to
undercut objectivity. Fourth, most of the analytic philosophers I know reject
the Quinean and Davidsonian arguments regarding logic and philosophy of
language (and with good reason).
Anyway, I'm still cataloging all the posts right now, but I enjoyed the
message above too much not to say a quick little something about it.
I'm almost finished with the Baudrillard and Lyotard, plus I'll be getting
_Writing and Difference_ and _Margins of Philosophy_ sometime today or
tomorrow. I'll have more specific responses to the more interesting messages
by Wednesday or Thursday, plus perhaps those who are interested can go through
some of the Derrida and Lyotard with me. Who knows, maybe there's something
valuable there.
Enjoying this,
David Schenk