A few notes on some threads:
1) Saying that Foucault's thought is not "normative" has merit, but the
statement requires qualification. The idea of a "norm" grew out of
positivist thought with some borrowing from Hume. The word "normative"
contrasts with "descriptive." The famous is/ought distinction is hardly
above criticism. The "analytic" distinction between normative and
descriptive statements assumes that we have or can create hermetically
sealed categories that maintain their purity throughout a series of
uses. Wittgenstein, among others, has raised serious questions about the
possibility of such immaculate conceptions.
Much of our language freely mixes normative and descriptive categories,
and this mixture is quite effective (and desirable) for a variety of
purposes. If I call Juan Cruz "stupid" I enter a promissory note to
explicate what is a description (of the inane posts he has put on this
and the Nietzsche list) and to evaluate his comments for failing to
measure up to the standards of intelligence I desire in the most
minimally acceptable postings on a list I might enjoy. I see no reason
to find two words to produce one description/evaluation.
<Digression: I do not believe that "Juan Cruz" exists. I think "he" is a
wonderful fiction of a devilish author who wants us to ask: "Can anyone
REALLY be that stupid?">
Even if we do not intend to mix normative and descriptive categories,
they get mixed in their reception history. I offer no opinion on the
"true" status (descriptive or ontological) of "resistance' in Foucault.
Surely no one should be surprised, however, if it is taken as an
ethically or politically charged term. Nor should we be surprised if the
term or Foucault's deployment of it is USED for moral or political
purposes. In itself (whatever that might mean) the term may well be
devoid of normativity. In its effects we may have a different story.
2) Bryan seems to think that normative and ethical terms/thought are
coextensive. I doubt this. "You ought to try grilled mushrooms" is a
thoroughly normative statement. Is it ethical? Nor is it abundantly
clear that "John is the right man for you to have sex with, Bill" is an
ethical (or moral, if we want the distinction) statement.
Bryan's central claim seems to be that normative claims "must" be
accompanied by a transcendental warrant. That "must" can't mean: in
order to be made, since he repeatedly notes that his interlocutors
constantly deploy normative statements without transcendental warrant.
The must appears to man: "if they are to be justified." The claim relies
on a sleight of hand. I can argue for norms or from norms. We may
believe, as many do, that no norms are self justifying. That would put
us at odds with Aristotle, utilitarians and many others. Even if we are
right about the status of norms, it would not entitle us to conclude
that someone who argues from the norms to which she swears allegiance is
either irrational or immoral. Reaching that conclusion requires you to
justify the difficult claim that we should only adhere to norms for
which we can produce transcendental justification. I am not convinced of
this proposition -- indeed it strikes me as insane.
3) I do not think that Kant offers much help in "finding" a
transcendental source for our ethical judgments. The "source" of
morality, for Kant, is the will. To "find" a transcendent source (say,
God's will) would be to compromise our autonomy. Kant's contribution, if
any, to ethical thinking is not to "ground" morality, but rather to
distinguish the moral from the non-moral. To be moral, an act of will
must be universalizable and consistent. What those constraints entail
for moral judgment and action is notoriously obscure. What they leave
open is the infamous question: Why be moral? Does Kant do better with
this than Foucault?
4) Assume, contrary to what I have argued above, that Kant does offer
"grounding for a metaphysic of morals. Does he help with sexual morals?
Someone on this list produced (or provided the germ for) the following
bad Kantian argument: No one can be moral and homosexual since being
homosexual would entail universal suicide if it were enacted as a
universal law.
For Kant, morality does not relate to identities, but rather to acts. We
need to act in such a manner that our actions could become a universal
law. Assuming that a sex act is "moral." could someone will that
everyone suck cock or perform cunilingus without willing the destruction
of the human race? Of course. What about the act of forbidding one's
male son to suck cock. Can we consistently make THAT a universal law?
Most men would revolt against such a rule. The revolt indicates just how
gendered Kant's "all rational creatures" -- the proper subject of moral
deliberation -- are in many moral reasonings. By the way, if I DID will
that everyone be homosexual, it would NOT mean the end of the human
race. Has no one heard of turkey basters?
5) What are we to call Foucault? Foucault works, but many on the list
want to discover his sexual identity. He desired and had "sex" (an
imprecise term indeed since many would not think of "fisting" as sex)
with men. What Foucault encourages us to do is to resist natuarlizing
and universalizing categories. Genealogy (not history) gives us the
tools for that resistance. Is the resistance "normative"? Of course.
Many of us adhere to norms that conflict with the normalizing categories
of Jerry Falwell and his friend Juan Cruz. Why? Well I do not owe you or
myself a transcendental scheme to answer that. I can offer reasons for
thinking ill of an inscribed (or chosen) identity. I will call on the
norms and reasons that will work with you since my resistance is
structured. If we cannot arrive at an overlapping consensus (Rawls) that
would allow me to argue with or against you -- well I may shoot you.
What I cannot do -- what I doubt you can do -- is provide a
transcendental reasons all "rational beings" will accept. If I have to
sacrifice reason to effective politics, I will take the politics and
leave you the pure reason.
6) Foucault says he likes Boswell's distinction between "gay" and
"homosexual." Being gay means that one has affirmed an identity. Being
"homosexual" in Boswell's sense means that one's predominate sexual
attraction is to a member of the same sex. One can be homosexual without
being gay. Many gay theorists contend that being homosexual means that
one is ascribed or accepts an identity fashioned by psychiatry since the
19th century. Gay theorists receive criticism from "queer theorists,"
inspired by Foucault. Queer theorists worry that fashioning a "positive"
identity requires cruel; exclusion (yes a norm) of those who do not fit
the model of gay identity. There are those virtually normal gay people
who fit and those queers who need to be normalized and shunted out of
sight. The debates over the terms homosexual, gay and queer are not
tangential matters for those interested in Foucault. Calling them
"private" matters or treating them as unimportant (to whom?) is a way of
loading the discourse with a particular power configuration. There are
those of us who will resist that move.
1) Saying that Foucault's thought is not "normative" has merit, but the
statement requires qualification. The idea of a "norm" grew out of
positivist thought with some borrowing from Hume. The word "normative"
contrasts with "descriptive." The famous is/ought distinction is hardly
above criticism. The "analytic" distinction between normative and
descriptive statements assumes that we have or can create hermetically
sealed categories that maintain their purity throughout a series of
uses. Wittgenstein, among others, has raised serious questions about the
possibility of such immaculate conceptions.
Much of our language freely mixes normative and descriptive categories,
and this mixture is quite effective (and desirable) for a variety of
purposes. If I call Juan Cruz "stupid" I enter a promissory note to
explicate what is a description (of the inane posts he has put on this
and the Nietzsche list) and to evaluate his comments for failing to
measure up to the standards of intelligence I desire in the most
minimally acceptable postings on a list I might enjoy. I see no reason
to find two words to produce one description/evaluation.
<Digression: I do not believe that "Juan Cruz" exists. I think "he" is a
wonderful fiction of a devilish author who wants us to ask: "Can anyone
REALLY be that stupid?">
Even if we do not intend to mix normative and descriptive categories,
they get mixed in their reception history. I offer no opinion on the
"true" status (descriptive or ontological) of "resistance' in Foucault.
Surely no one should be surprised, however, if it is taken as an
ethically or politically charged term. Nor should we be surprised if the
term or Foucault's deployment of it is USED for moral or political
purposes. In itself (whatever that might mean) the term may well be
devoid of normativity. In its effects we may have a different story.
2) Bryan seems to think that normative and ethical terms/thought are
coextensive. I doubt this. "You ought to try grilled mushrooms" is a
thoroughly normative statement. Is it ethical? Nor is it abundantly
clear that "John is the right man for you to have sex with, Bill" is an
ethical (or moral, if we want the distinction) statement.
Bryan's central claim seems to be that normative claims "must" be
accompanied by a transcendental warrant. That "must" can't mean: in
order to be made, since he repeatedly notes that his interlocutors
constantly deploy normative statements without transcendental warrant.
The must appears to man: "if they are to be justified." The claim relies
on a sleight of hand. I can argue for norms or from norms. We may
believe, as many do, that no norms are self justifying. That would put
us at odds with Aristotle, utilitarians and many others. Even if we are
right about the status of norms, it would not entitle us to conclude
that someone who argues from the norms to which she swears allegiance is
either irrational or immoral. Reaching that conclusion requires you to
justify the difficult claim that we should only adhere to norms for
which we can produce transcendental justification. I am not convinced of
this proposition -- indeed it strikes me as insane.
3) I do not think that Kant offers much help in "finding" a
transcendental source for our ethical judgments. The "source" of
morality, for Kant, is the will. To "find" a transcendent source (say,
God's will) would be to compromise our autonomy. Kant's contribution, if
any, to ethical thinking is not to "ground" morality, but rather to
distinguish the moral from the non-moral. To be moral, an act of will
must be universalizable and consistent. What those constraints entail
for moral judgment and action is notoriously obscure. What they leave
open is the infamous question: Why be moral? Does Kant do better with
this than Foucault?
4) Assume, contrary to what I have argued above, that Kant does offer
"grounding for a metaphysic of morals. Does he help with sexual morals?
Someone on this list produced (or provided the germ for) the following
bad Kantian argument: No one can be moral and homosexual since being
homosexual would entail universal suicide if it were enacted as a
universal law.
For Kant, morality does not relate to identities, but rather to acts. We
need to act in such a manner that our actions could become a universal
law. Assuming that a sex act is "moral." could someone will that
everyone suck cock or perform cunilingus without willing the destruction
of the human race? Of course. What about the act of forbidding one's
male son to suck cock. Can we consistently make THAT a universal law?
Most men would revolt against such a rule. The revolt indicates just how
gendered Kant's "all rational creatures" -- the proper subject of moral
deliberation -- are in many moral reasonings. By the way, if I DID will
that everyone be homosexual, it would NOT mean the end of the human
race. Has no one heard of turkey basters?
5) What are we to call Foucault? Foucault works, but many on the list
want to discover his sexual identity. He desired and had "sex" (an
imprecise term indeed since many would not think of "fisting" as sex)
with men. What Foucault encourages us to do is to resist natuarlizing
and universalizing categories. Genealogy (not history) gives us the
tools for that resistance. Is the resistance "normative"? Of course.
Many of us adhere to norms that conflict with the normalizing categories
of Jerry Falwell and his friend Juan Cruz. Why? Well I do not owe you or
myself a transcendental scheme to answer that. I can offer reasons for
thinking ill of an inscribed (or chosen) identity. I will call on the
norms and reasons that will work with you since my resistance is
structured. If we cannot arrive at an overlapping consensus (Rawls) that
would allow me to argue with or against you -- well I may shoot you.
What I cannot do -- what I doubt you can do -- is provide a
transcendental reasons all "rational beings" will accept. If I have to
sacrifice reason to effective politics, I will take the politics and
leave you the pure reason.
6) Foucault says he likes Boswell's distinction between "gay" and
"homosexual." Being gay means that one has affirmed an identity. Being
"homosexual" in Boswell's sense means that one's predominate sexual
attraction is to a member of the same sex. One can be homosexual without
being gay. Many gay theorists contend that being homosexual means that
one is ascribed or accepts an identity fashioned by psychiatry since the
19th century. Gay theorists receive criticism from "queer theorists,"
inspired by Foucault. Queer theorists worry that fashioning a "positive"
identity requires cruel; exclusion (yes a norm) of those who do not fit
the model of gay identity. There are those virtually normal gay people
who fit and those queers who need to be normalized and shunted out of
sight. The debates over the terms homosexual, gay and queer are not
tangential matters for those interested in Foucault. Calling them
"private" matters or treating them as unimportant (to whom?) is a way of
loading the discourse with a particular power configuration. There are
those of us who will resist that move.