Re: Foucault and Kant

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In a message dated 2/1/01 8:15:46 PM Eastern Standard Time,
thegreatfandincke@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:

> We all knew that power systems and knowledge
> systems affected people's morality. Foucault's radicality is in locating
> ALL morality within power/knowledge. In ways like this, he is
> significantly
> transcendental, and therefore, in a broad and not negligible sense, a
> Kantian after all.
>
>

Foucault is not Kantian because Kant reconstructed how the transcentental
subject, individuals if you will, reconstructed their knowledge of nature.
He did not analyze how humans form social groups and societies. The object
of knowledge for Kant was nature, that is, things which are primarily
perceived by the senses knowledge of which is constructed during the
developmental lifespan of each individual. Knowledge of society, which
Foucault reconstructs, is already existing before the individual is born and
constitutes that individual as he/she grows, something that nature does not
do. Society is a social force construing what each individual is through
both the historical background of beliefs and through the current network of
individual cognitive acts. Society is not nature. To the extent that
Kantian metaphysics is unable to harbor the difference between natural and
social epistomology (what constitutes valid knowledge) is the extent to which
his moral metaphysics runs aground, as in his notion of the universality of
the categorical imperative. But, for Kant, we should understand that he was
attempting to free science from the binding limits of religion and so dealt
primarily with nature as an object, not as an objectivating force.

As for Juan's situation, we can easily recognize Juan as a character who has
been constructed by the prevailing societal ethos of his location and
social-historical context. Juan is unable to be reflexive about his being
constructed and so he believes that he has it figured out. When he realizes
that he 'had it' figured out, he may be able to understand Foucault's
positing of power not in terms of morality, but in terms of local practices.

For Kant, the law and morality represented the same thing. Today we
distinguish ethics from morality as that which pertains to personal private
matters but we still get embroiled in disputes over right and wrong in which
the law is often the only limiting factor between two or more disparate
ethical positions. In those cases where the law is determing individuals'
ethical consciences, resistance is surely bred, one such form being
homosexuality in its many variations. But, the homosexuality does not
necessarily occur as an ethical position, but instead as a way of exerting or
expressing power/resistance. I tend to think of power/resistance as a
metaphor of the antibody-antigen or enzyme-substrate complex.

Vunch

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<HTML>In a message dated 2/1/01 8:15:46 PM Eastern Standard Time,
 thegreatfandincke@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
 
 
 <BLOCKQUOTE TYPE=CITE style="BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px">We all knew that power systems and knowledge
 systems affected people's morality.  Foucault's radicality is in locating
 ALL morality within power/knowledge.  In ways like this, he is
 significantly
 transcendental, and therefore, in a broad and not negligible sense, a
 Kantian after all.
 
 </BLOCKQUOTE>
 
 Foucault is not Kantian because Kant reconstructed how the transcentental
 subject, individuals if you will, reconstructed their knowledge of nature.  
 He did not analyze how humans form social groups and societies.  The object
 of knowledge for Kant was nature, that is, things which are primarily
 perceived by the senses knowledge of which is constructed during the
 developmental lifespan of each individual.  Knowledge of society, which
 Foucault reconstructs, is already existing before the individual is born and
 constitutes that individual as he/she grows, something that nature does not
 do.  Society is a social force construing what each individual is through
 both the historical background of beliefs and through the current network of
 individual cognitive acts.  Society is not nature.  To the extent that
 Kantian metaphysics is unable to harbor the difference between natural and
 social epistomology (what constitutes valid knowledge) is the extent to which
 his moral metaphysics runs aground, as in his notion of the universality of
 the categorical imperative.  But, for Kant, we should understand that he was
 attempting to free science from the binding limits of religion and so dealt
 primarily with nature as an object, not as an objectivating force.  
 
 As for Juan's situation, we can easily recognize Juan as a character who has
 been constructed by the prevailing societal ethos of his location and
 social-historical context.  Juan is unable to be reflexive about his being
 constructed and so he believes that he has it figured out.  When he realizes
 that he 'had it' figured out, he may be able to understand Foucault's
 positing of power not in terms of morality, but in terms of local practices.
 
 For Kant, the law and morality represented the same thing. Today we
 distinguish ethics from morality as that which pertains to personal private
 matters but we still get embroiled in disputes over right and wrong in which
 the law is often the only limiting factor between two or more disparate
 ethical positions.  In those cases where the law is determing individuals'
 ethical consciences, resistance is surely bred, one such form being
 homosexuality in its many variations.  But, the homosexuality does not
 necessarily occur as an ethical position, but instead as a way of exerting or
 expressing power/resistance.  I tend to think of power/resistance as a
 metaphor of the antibody-antigen or enzyme-substrate complex.
 
 Vunch</HTML>

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