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Yves:
I agree that the "Critique of Judgment" provides a more promising route
for bridging the distance between Kant and Foucault (especially
Foucault's aestheticizing, Nietzschean ethics) than Kant's more overtly
ethical and political writings. This work would certainly have more
interesting applications to questions of sexual ethics that have been
central to the thread.
Two books (other than the one's you mention) are worth attention: Hannah
Arendt, "Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy" and Ronald Beiner,
"Political Judgment." Arendt argues that Kant's notion of "validity" can
be transferred to moral and political questions, especially when we are
judging new events or things that do not fit our ordinary categories.
This approach promises to address the questions Bryan raises, but
WITHOUT indulging a transcendental appeal. "Validity" is internal to the
process of judging (using "representational thinking") and makes no
appeal beyond "common sense." The absence of a transcendental appeal is
precisely what drew Arendt's interest.
In her search for an immanent source of valid judgement, I think Arendt
arrives closer to Habermas than Foucault (or Lyotard). The problem is
this: If valid judgments are the product of representational thinking
based on common sense, how are we to adjust for those "others" who do
not fit our representations? That problem puts us in close proximity to
Foucault and Lyotard. To find ourselves alert to a thinker's concerns is
indeed to find a bridge.
Cheers
Larry
PS: I am about to lose my ISP. Anyone know how I can change email
addresses on the list?.
Yves Winter wrote:
> There seems to be quite a bit of Kant-bashing going on here, most of
> it based on a misrepresentation of Kant reduced to the categorical
> imperative. For anybody seriously interested in the key problem of
> passages between incomparable discourse systems I could recommend a
> reading of Kant's _Critique of Judgement_. Here Kant deals exactly
> with the issues we've been discussing, namely how to operate a passage
> between the different faculties and thus how to legitimate a moral
> code. He ends up recognising that there can be no absolute basis for a
> moral code and the best he can do is to provide analogies. For those
> interested, you might also want to have a look at Lyotard's reading of
> the Third Critique (in the Kant notes of _Le Differend_ and in more
> detail in _L'enthousiasme_) which I believe is very much compatible
> with a Foucauldian stance. Yves
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Vunch@xxxxxxx
> To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: Friday, February 02, 2001 4:54 AM
> Subject: Re: Foucault and Kant
> In a message dated 2/1/01 8:15:46 PM Eastern Standard Time,
>
> thegreatfandincke@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>
>
>
> > We all knew that power systems and knowledge
> > systems affected people's morality. Foucault's radicality
> > is in locating
> > ALL morality within power/knowledge. In ways like this,
> > he is
> > significantly
> > transcendental, and therefore, in a broad and not
> > negligible sense, a
> > Kantian after all.
> >
>
> Foucault is not Kantian because Kant reconstructed how the
> transcentental
> subject, individuals if you will, reconstructed their
> knowledge of nature.
> He did not analyze how humans form social groups and
> societies. The object
> of knowledge for Kant was nature, that is, things which are
> primarily
> perceived by the senses knowledge of which is constructed
> during the
> developmental lifespan of each individual. Knowledge of
> society, which
> Foucault reconstructs, is already existing before the
> individual is born and
> constitutes that individual as he/she grows, something that
> nature does not
> do. Society is a social force construing what each
> individual is through
> both the historical background of beliefs and through the
> current network of
> individual cognitive acts. Society is not nature. To the
> extent that
> Kantian metaphysics is unable to harbor the difference
> between natural and
> social epistomology (what constitutes valid knowledge) is
> the extent to which
> his moral metaphysics runs aground, as in his notion of the
> universality of
> the categorical imperative. But, for Kant, we should
> understand that he was
> attempting to free science from the binding limits of
> religion and so dealt
> primarily with nature as an object, not as an objectivating
> force.
>
> As for Juan's situation, we can easily recognize Juan as a
> character who has
> been constructed by the prevailing societal ethos of his
> location and
> social-historical context. Juan is unable to be reflexive
> about his being
> constructed and so he believes that he has it figured out.
> When he realizes
> that he 'had it' figured out, he may be able to understand
> Foucault's
> positing of power not in terms of morality, but in terms of
> local practices.
>
> For Kant, the law and morality represented the same thing.
> Today we
> distinguish ethics from morality as that which pertains to
> personal private
> matters but we still get embroiled in disputes over right
> and wrong in which
> the law is often the only limiting factor between two or
> more disparate
> ethical positions. In those cases where the law is
> determing individuals'
> ethical consciences, resistance is surely bred, one such
> form being
> homosexuality in its many variations. But, the
> homosexuality does not
> necessarily occur as an ethical position, but instead as a
> way of exerting or
> expressing power/resistance. I tend to think of
> power/resistance as a
> metaphor of the antibody-antigen or enzyme-substrate
> complex.
>
> Vunch
>
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Yves:
<br>I agree that the "Critique of Judgment" provides a more promising route
for bridging the distance between Kant and Foucault (especially Foucault's
aestheticizing, Nietzschean ethics) than Kant's more overtly ethical and
political writings. This work would certainly have more interesting applications
to questions of sexual ethics that have been central to the thread.
<p>Two books (other than the one's you mention) are worth attention: Hannah
Arendt, "Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy" and Ronald Beiner, "Political
Judgment." Arendt argues that Kant's notion of "validity" can be transferred
to moral and political questions, especially when we are judging
new events or things that do not fit our ordinary categories. This approach
promises to address the questions Bryan raises, but WITHOUT indulging a
transcendental appeal. "Validity" is internal to the process of judging
(using "representational thinking") and makes no appeal beyond "common
sense." The absence of a transcendental appeal is precisely what drew Arendt's
interest.
<p>In her search for an immanent source of valid judgement, I think Arendt
arrives closer to Habermas than Foucault (or Lyotard). The problem is this:
If valid judgments are the product of representational thinking based on
common sense, how are we to adjust for those "others" who do not fit our
representations? That problem puts us in close proximity to Foucault and
Lyotard. To find ourselves alert to a thinker's concerns is indeed to find
a bridge.
<p>Cheers
<p>Larry
<p>PS: I am about to lose my ISP. Anyone know how I can change email addresses
on the list?.
<br>
<p>Yves Winter wrote:
<blockquote TYPE=CITE><style></style>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>There
seems to be quite a bit of Kant-bashing going on here, most of it based
on a misrepresentation of Kant reduced to the categorical imperative.</font></font> <font face="Arial"><font size=-1>For
anybody seriously interested in the key problem of passages between incomparable
discourse systems I could recommend a reading of Kant's _Critique of Judgement_.
Here Kant deals exactly with the issues we've been discussing, namely how
to operate a passage between the different faculties and thus how to legitimate
a moral code. He ends up recognising that there can be no absolute basis
for a moral code and the best he can do is to provide analogies. For those
interested, you might also want to have a look at Lyotard's reading of
the Third Critique (in the Kant notes of _Le Differend_ and in more
detail in _L'enthousiasme_) which I believe is very much compatible with
a Foucauldian stance.</font></font> <font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Yves</font></font>
<blockquote
style="PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<div style="FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message -----</div>
<div
style="BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: black"><b>From:</b>
<a href="mailto:Vunch@xxxxxxx" title="Vunch@xxxxxxx">Vunch@xxxxxxx</a></div>
<div style="FONT: 10pt arial"><b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" title="foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx">foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</a></div>
<div style="FONT: 10pt arial"><b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 02, 2001 4:54
AM</div>
<div style="FONT: 10pt arial"><b>Subject:</b> Re: Foucault and Kant</div>
<font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>In a message dated 2/1/01
8:15:46 PM Eastern Standard Time,</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1><a href="mailto:thegreatfandincke@xxxxxxxxxxx">thegreatfandincke@xxxxxxxxxxx</a>
writes:</font></font>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote
style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"
TYPE="CITE"><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>We
all knew that power systems and knowledge</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>systems affected people's
morality. Foucault's radicality is in locating</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>ALL morality within power/knowledge.
In ways like this, he is</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>significantly</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>transcendental, and therefore,
in a broad and not negligible sense, a</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>Kantian after all.</font></font>
<br> </blockquote>
<p><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>Foucault is not Kantian because
Kant reconstructed how the transcentental</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>subject, individuals if
you will, reconstructed their knowledge of nature.</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>He did not analyze how humans
form social groups and societies. The object</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>of knowledge for Kant was
nature, that is, things which are primarily</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>perceived by the senses
knowledge of which is constructed during the</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>developmental lifespan of
each individual. Knowledge of society, which</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>Foucault reconstructs, is
already existing before the individual is born and</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>constitutes that individual
as he/she grows, something that nature does not</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>do. Society is a social
force construing what each individual is through</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>both the historical background
of beliefs and through the current network of</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>individual cognitive acts.
Society is not nature. To the extent that</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>Kantian metaphysics is unable
to harbor the difference between natural and</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>social epistomology (what
constitutes valid knowledge) is the extent to which</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>his moral metaphysics runs
aground, as in his notion of the universality of</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>the categorical imperative.
But, for Kant, we should understand that he was</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>attempting to free science
from the binding limits of religion and so dealt</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>primarily with nature as
an object, not as an objectivating force.</font></font>
<p><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>As for Juan's situation,
we can easily recognize Juan as a character who has</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>been constructed by the
prevailing societal ethos of his location and</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>social-historical context.
Juan is unable to be reflexive about his being</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>constructed and so he believes
that he has it figured out. When he realizes</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>that he 'had it' figured
out, he may be able to understand Foucault's</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>positing of power not in
terms of morality, but in terms of local practices.</font></font>
<p><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>For Kant, the law and morality
represented the same thing. Today we</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>distinguish ethics from
morality as that which pertains to personal private</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>matters but we still get
embroiled in disputes over right and wrong in which</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>the law is often the only
limiting factor between two or more disparate</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>ethical positions.
In those cases where the law is determing individuals'</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>ethical consciences, resistance
is surely bred, one such form being</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>homosexuality in its many
variations. But, the homosexuality does not</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>necessarily occur as an
ethical position, but instead as a way of exerting or</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>expressing power/resistance.
I tend to think of power/resistance as a</font></font>
<br><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>metaphor of the antibody-antigen
or enzyme-substrate complex.</font></font>
<p><font face="arial,helvetica"><font size=-1>Vunch</font></font></blockquote>
</blockquote>
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