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Rob, that's quite a batch of questions, and I can't answer them all. So, don't presume
that all of your questions are not being taken into consideration. I will answer the
following.
Rob Maclean wrote:
> The fact that [feminism] ends with "ism" cannot be the only reason, as you
> so easily attach yourself to realism and relativism (the interesting "ismbook" site
> to which you linked does not, by the way, include an entry on feminism). What
> makes these two "isms" more respectable? Is it their attachment to the world of
> abstract ideas rather than the world of specific material and social relations?
> What makes feminism necessarily a "gender 'blanket theory' of truth"? An
> interesting phrase: do not relativism and (especially) realism claim particular and
> perhaps problematic relations with the "truth"?
Yes, I noticed. A feminist site: www.cthonia.com/lyceum/philos_isms/index.html (the
moral epistemology of which is still peculiar, since I must apparently ideologically
endow it with feminism in being a man and the words were all invented by my sex, though
it is so obviously intelligible to females). I wouldn't attach myself to "isms",
rather, to practical theories. Whether or not feminism is practical is the question,
and for whom? I think "attachment" should be defined.
Feminism, just in virtue of the word, is metaethical relativism, if it's presupposition
denies that [moral] sexuality are mutually intelligible among the sexes. Believe me, I
am not going to say everything. Why the preference for realism and what makes it more
respectable than feminism? Realism permits universal affirmative generalization,
whereas feminism asserts particular negative generalization. That's only why the word
is irksome. What is really irksome is that that is true. The problem with relativism,
for realism, is that it denies universalism (or, simply, generalizations). Are males
and females divided in biological perception, independently of whether or not there are
individual males and females, thus incurring an empirical reality undeniably relative
to sex? How would that help to explain sexual differences and how would those
differences be at all intelligible? How would that permit adequate social relations?
Why is "power" even a context for any of this? What is the need for knowledge and
morality to be held so differently? Of course, for the sexes have different biological
functions, which apparently pervade social relations such that these biological
functions must correspond to social relations.
I must say, however, nice batch of questions.
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Rob, that's quite a batch of questions, and I can't answer them all. So,
don't presume that all of your questions are not being taken into consideration.
I will answer the following.
<p>Rob Maclean wrote:
<blockquote TYPE=CITE>The fact that [feminism] ends with "ism" cannot be
the only reason, as you
<br>so easily attach yourself to realism and relativism (the interesting
"ismbook" site
<br>to which you linked does not, by the way, include an entry on feminism).
What
<br>makes these two "isms" more respectable? Is it their attachment
to the world of
<br>abstract ideas rather than the world of specific material and social
relations?
<br>What makes feminism necessarily a "gender 'blanket theory' of truth"?
An
<br>interesting phrase: do not relativism and (especially) realism claim
particular and
<br>perhaps problematic relations with the "truth"?</blockquote>
Yes, I noticed. A feminist site: <a href="http://www.cthonia.com/lyceum/philos_isms/index.html";>www.cthonia.com/lyceum/philos_isms/index.html</a>
(the moral epistemology of which is still peculiar, since I must apparently
ideologically endow it with feminism in being a man and the words were
all invented by my sex, though it is so obviously intelligible to females).
I wouldn't attach myself to "isms", rather, to practical theories. Whether
or not feminism is practical is the question, and for whom? I think "attachment"
should be defined.
<p>Feminism, just in virtue of the word, is metaethical relativism, if
it's presupposition denies that [moral] sexuality are mutually intelligible
among the sexes. Believe me, I am not going to say everything. Why the
preference for realism and what makes it more respectable than feminism?
Realism permits universal affirmative generalization, whereas feminism
asserts particular negative generalization. That's only why the word is
irksome. What is really irksome is that that is true. The problem with
relativism, for realism, is that it denies universalism (or, simply, generalizations).
Are males and females divided in biological perception, independently of
whether or not there are individual males and females, thus incurring an
empirical reality undeniably relative to sex? How would that help to explain
sexual differences and how would those differences be at all intelligible?
How would that permit adequate social relations? Why is "power" even a
context for any of this? What is the need for knowledge and morality to
be held so differently? Of course, for the sexes have different biological
functions, which apparently pervade social relations such that these biological
functions must correspond to social relations.
<p>I must say, however, nice batch of questions.
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