"unsubsribe" me from the list. Thank you.

--- Ali Rizvi <ali_m_rizvi@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

<HR>
<html><div style='background-color:'>Stuart
Thanks for recent comments. I will add mine
beneath yours. <?xml:namespace prefix = o ns =
"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"
/><o:p></o:p>
 First, sure the level of analysis is at the
level of connaissance, but in<o:p></o:p>
order to illuminate the conditions of its
possibility, that is the level
of<o:p></o:p>
savoir. Which might explain our dialogue. (I
think it's kind of like<o:p></o:p>
Heidegger taking the analysis of a being
[Dasein] as a way into the
problem<o:p></o:p>
of being itself - an ontological inquiry whose
mode of access is ontic<o:p></o:p>
knowledge. The problem is people then read
Being and Time as an<o:p></o:p>
anthropology, which completely misses the
point. And I think people do<o:p></o:p>
similar to Foucault, that is miss the
fundamental level)<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
I think your above comments hit the nail.
Heideggers example is most appropriate and your
subsequent observation totally agreed upon. But where
I still find bit of disagreement is this: You say the
level of analysis is at the level of connaissance. I
totally agree. Now you add that this is in order to
illuminate the conditions of possibility. Agreed but
here is an ambiguity which might be the cause of
disagreement, and that ambiguity concerns two
different levels on which we can talk about conditions
of possibility of connaissance. The level of the
formation of subject and object i.e the level of
savior is surely the condition of the possibility of
connaisance but this is not the level of Foucaults
analysis in OT, at least not mainly. On the other hand
at the level of conniasance we can discover the total
set of relations that unite, at a given period, the
discursive practices that give rise to epistemological
figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems . .
. .. (AK p. 191). Foucault calls this episteme of that
given period and says that it cannot be equated with
connaisance. Now this episteme is also the condition
of the possibility of connaisance. This is precisely
the level of archaeology. This is the level on which
Foucault is doing relational ontology. While the first
level that is the level of the formation of savior is
the level of genealogy. Foucault differentiates
between the process of the formation of knowledge
(connaissance) and the movement of knowledge (savior).
I think first is the level of archaeology while second
is the level of genealogy. Now this difference between
the level of formation of knoweldge (archaeological)
level of movement of knowledge (genealogical) level is
in fact an abstraction and thats why it is so much
difficult to understand this distinction. It is
abstraction because the struggle to grasp formation of
knowledge is also a new movement of knowledge [that is
why History for Foucault!
is the combination of process and structures).  Foucault
himself struggles throughout to distinguish them and
he often confused two levels of the conditions of the
possibility of connaisance. I think later on by the
introduction of the notion of thought gives Foucault
extra tool to straighten out this ambiguity and
confusion and in later works like (What is
Enlightenment) he treats archeology and genealogy as
two arms of a single method.  <o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
Do you think that the conceptual apparatus of
AK disappears in the later<o:p></o:p>
work?<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
I think the above answers this also. I
think yes Foucault never ceases to do archeology at
any stage so if you treat Discipline and punish as
later work, it is both archeological and genealogical
work.  In
later work on History of Sexuality genealogical is
more prominent because his prime objective here is to
trace the movement of the formation of modern
subject. 
<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
What do you mean by the conditions of
possibility of savoir? (I know what
is<o:p></o:p>
meant by the conditions of possibility of
connaissance; and i know what
you<o:p></o:p>
mean about conditions of
possibility)<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
that was a mistake. I realized that after I had
posted it. Although I think one can make sense of the
condition possibility of savior.
<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
That's interesting as a formulation, but what
would you mean is different<o:p></o:p>
between archaeology and genealogy? I think the
differences can be overblown.<o:p></o:p>
The incorporation of power is obviously an
issue. But beyond that? To my<o:p></o:p>
mind the formulation you have that you cannot
understand is the exact object<o:p></o:p>
of AK, albeit without the particular phrasing
of 'positive unconscious'.<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
Beside what I have already said above, I would
like to add that genealogy for Foucault is to record
the singularity of events outside of any monotonous
finality (NGH p. 139). Archeology also traces
singularity outside of any monotonous finality but on
the spatial plane, the metaphor here is table, while
metaphor in the first case is long silent motions.
Having said that I agree with you that difference can
be overblown. To treat spatial and temporal in such a
manner is abstraction. Thats why archeology and
genealogy should be treated as two sides, two arms of
a single method. And treating them separately is just
for conceptual requirements.<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
I don't find this a particular problem. I'm
more struck by the continuity of<o:p></o:p>
Foucault's work, at least until the very late
pieces (which is one of the<o:p></o:p>
issues I'm currently working on). To my mind
Folie et deraison is not that<o:p></o:p>
dissimilar to Surveiller et Punir for example.
The explicit methodological<o:p></o:p>
tools might be more overt, or may be altered by
the topic reviewed, but i<o:p></o:p>
think the differences of his approaches can be
overexaggerated.<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
I am totally with you here, and I was not
talking about this at all. I think there is no later
Foucault in this sense. I was rather talking about
Foucaults loose use of terms. Like recently I had
experience that first he distinguishes between
subjection and domination and then sometimes he uses
domination in the sense of subjection, sometimes
according to the original distinction and then again
in the broad sense to include
both.<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
I think the publication of his lecture courses
is going to do similar things<o:p></o:p>
to what happened when Heidegger's courses were
published. It is going to<o:p></o:p>
radically alter our view of Foucault. Those
'silent' periods between<o:p></o:p>
Foucault's major publications i.e. 1968 (or
1970) to 1975; 1976 to 1984 are<o:p></o:p>
already being filled with interesting new
material.<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
It all depends on what our view is and I would
like to hear more about you as I am not much aware of
lecture courses and my sense is that Foucault had
ironical awareness of the limitation of transformation
notwithstanding his obsession with transformation and
change.<o:p></o:p>
 <o:p></o:p>
Regadrs<o:p></o:p>
ali<o:p></o:p>
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