I would be grateful if somebody helps me assess the (in)compatibility of
Lacanian psychoanalysis and poststructuralism in terms of the constitution
of the "I," the self, or identity. This may be an odd question for this list
because Foucault didn't use psychoanalysis very much to understand the
constitution of the self because of that discipline's position in the
power/knowledge regime that Foucault was rebelling against (according to
Stuart Hall in his "Who Needs Identity?").
Anyway, in spite of Judith Butler's attempt to link discourse analysis
(Foucault) and psychoanalysis (Lacan) in unpacking the constitution of
"identity," there seems to be something "uncanny" about Lacanian
psychoanalysis that does not neatly fit with poststructuralism. For
poststructuralists like
Butler, "identity" or the Self is an effect of discursive practices. (Or for
Foucault, it's an effect of discourses.) Likewise, it could be said that
Lacanian psychoanalysis sees the constitution of the "I" as an effect of
language or the Symbolic Other.
Nonetheless, in the mirror stage when the "I" first emerges in relation to
the "other" (not the Big Other yet), the constitution of (the unity of) the
"I" is imaginary--not yet symbolic. (Similarly, the real of one's desire
resists symbolization.) Doesn't this imply that a human organism's capacity
to imaginarily misrecognize and fantasmically constitute the "I" cannot be
fully explained only as an effect of language, discourse (Foucault), or
ideology (Althusser)? In other words, isn't Lacanian psychoanalysis
incompatible with poststructuralism because the former posits some kind of
psychological capacities that are not effects of discourses (even though the
materiality of those psychological dispositions is an effect of discursive
practices).
Hmm, I'm now more confused than I was when I started writing this email...
oh, well :p
Hiro
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Lacanian psychoanalysis and poststructuralism in terms of the constitution
of the "I," the self, or identity. This may be an odd question for this list
because Foucault didn't use psychoanalysis very much to understand the
constitution of the self because of that discipline's position in the
power/knowledge regime that Foucault was rebelling against (according to
Stuart Hall in his "Who Needs Identity?").
Anyway, in spite of Judith Butler's attempt to link discourse analysis
(Foucault) and psychoanalysis (Lacan) in unpacking the constitution of
"identity," there seems to be something "uncanny" about Lacanian
psychoanalysis that does not neatly fit with poststructuralism. For
poststructuralists like
Butler, "identity" or the Self is an effect of discursive practices. (Or for
Foucault, it's an effect of discourses.) Likewise, it could be said that
Lacanian psychoanalysis sees the constitution of the "I" as an effect of
language or the Symbolic Other.
Nonetheless, in the mirror stage when the "I" first emerges in relation to
the "other" (not the Big Other yet), the constitution of (the unity of) the
"I" is imaginary--not yet symbolic. (Similarly, the real of one's desire
resists symbolization.) Doesn't this imply that a human organism's capacity
to imaginarily misrecognize and fantasmically constitute the "I" cannot be
fully explained only as an effect of language, discourse (Foucault), or
ideology (Althusser)? In other words, isn't Lacanian psychoanalysis
incompatible with poststructuralism because the former posits some kind of
psychological capacities that are not effects of discourses (even though the
materiality of those psychological dispositions is an effect of discursive
practices).
Hmm, I'm now more confused than I was when I started writing this email...
oh, well :p
Hiro
_________________________________________________________________
MSN 8 with e-mail virus protection service: 2 months FREE*
http://join.msn.com/?page=features/virus