Hi,
I do think Foucault (or the archologist, the paradox is the same, so if
you refuse to use one, you must also refuse to use the other...) is taking
a statement on ontology. That language is nothing but a ''tactic '' is an
ontological point of view, and a pretty strong claim. Foucault is always
adressing Kant, Frege, the hermeneutical school, the phenomenologists and,
mainly, Hegel...
Here is one ontological claim :
''Many possible kinds of meaning can be attributed to surface statements and
ontological models are only a small part of a subset of those meanings.''
Ontological models are a subset of surface statements, but those statements
must exist for such a subset to exist, so your claim is self-contradictory
because the entire set should then be included in the subset, remembering we
call ontology any discourse on existence, or being. Same problem since
Protagoras : ontological relativism is self contradictory... if you want to
defend that discourse on being is *a general topic*, (I assume here you use
general as *one in many*) you must show you can do so without contradiction.
Foucault is carefull to not fall into such an easy relativism which will
always fall under a strong logical system like Hegel's -- and he is trying
to show that Hegel's dialectic is a bad model for history of ideas. That is
why existence is defined as a function, and the ''surface'' you talk about
as a field of practical relationships. Foucault's solution seems to show
being is, in itself, immanent and multiple, but still, it's another
universal claim, but now we have two universal claims and we cannot decide
wich one is true : so the is multiplicity... and so on. Foucault
ontological strategy is to win by losing, of by making the game of universal
thruth bug into an infernal loop. I believe Foucault point of view is in
this way close to Peirce's pragmaticism, an author he claims having read
before writing the Archeology, somewhere in Dits et Écrits.
As for the apport of computer sciences, well, I totally agree. It is
completely redrawing the way we understand human interaction and
discourse... but remember that in may 68, the reference in ''savoir'' was
not a freedom of information like the www, but the strongly structured
academical society.
And everyone's an amateur ;-)
Regards,
Jean-François Mongrain
2007/9/18, Thomas Lord <lord@xxxxxxx>:
>
> (I'm an amateur, not an academic. My concerns are not typical for the
> list and my expression, though I try, would not pass customary "quality
> checks" for academic work, I'm sure. My comment here
> may well have an easy "you miss the point" kind of reply
> but it is an honest question, at least.)
>
>
> Poulson, in the bottom-quoted stuff below, gives an example
> of what weirds me out and Mograin just takes it right up:
> He introduces the noun phrase "the archeologist". That's an
> ontological concept of deep consequence and I don't think it
> is found anywhere in Foucault (but, again: amateur here).
>
>
> On translation questions like this, a little bit of chat about
> linguistic context would seem an aid but... after a bit...
>
> Isn't it possible that Foucault wasn't all that concerned with
> being *that* precise? There's no "there" there to extract a
> perfect meaning from? No ontological framework that is
> presumed in and permeates his prose that we can rediscover
> by debating close readings?
>
> In discourse you have a bunch of "surface forms" which
> could be actual texts, or actual manuscripts, or actual
> speech acts, paintings, etc. Examples would include
> "these words on paper" or "those words spoken in
> parliment".
>
> In the theory of programming languages, we talk about
> models that map surface forms to ontological models
> and operational models. This is the study of "semantics" --
> what does a given surface form "denote" in terms of what
> happens when it is injected into the environment. The
> denotation of ordinary discourse *as a general topic* not
> as a kind of puzzle, as it pertains to social order,
> seems to me Foucault's main theme.
>
> The temptation exhibited in this thread seems to be to
> ask "what ontological model best reflects the meaning
> of Foucault's statements" and I'm not sure that's a good
> question. Many possible kinds of meaning can be attributed
> to surface statements and ontological models are only a small
> part of a subset of those meanings.
>
> Rather: I read Foucault as a kind of discursive tactical expert.
> He showed how he could read a discourse, absorb the social
> tactics in force there, and then reflect those tactics in a map
> of them. He was a professional "trouble maker," but not
> a professional "metaphysicist." The strongest metaphysical
> claim that he makes is nothing more than his choice of
> conduct -- to focus on tactics in discourse.
>
> Poulson, in the bottom-quoted stuff below, gives an example
> of what weirds me out and Mograin just takes it right up:
> He introduces the noun phrase "the archeologist". That's an
> ontological concept of deep consequence and I don't think it
> is found anywhere in Foucault (but, again: amateur here).
>
> I don't mean to negate the possiblity of a "close reading"
> of Foucault and I think it was the pursuit of such a possibility
> that sparked this thread but.... "the archeologist"??!? wtf
> is that?
>
> -t
>
> p.s.: Foucault would have benefited from some math.
> A lot of his writing comes off, very much, as a qualitative
> / naturalist take on how programming language theorists
> understand language, but as applied to natural discourse.
> He *has* to be understood as a little bit imprecise, to be
> understood, because the thing he noticed and was pointing
> to was a little bit outside of his grasp.
>
>
>
> Jean-François Mongrain wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > I think you misinterpret this passage. Foucault is not saying the
> > archeologist is using intuition or analysis, but that the énoncé is the
> > ontological prerequisite to any analysis or intuition. He is refering
> the
> > works of grammar, logic, and speech-act theory which he criticized some
> > pages before the text you quote. The distinction here is to
> differentiate
> > énoncé from grammatical sentences (faire sens - Saussure, Bénéviste)
> logical
> > propositions (règles de sucessions et être signe de - Frege, Russell,
> etc.)
> > and speech-act (acte effectué par la prononciation - Austin, Searle)...
> he
> > is stating what archeology is not !
> >
> > Regards
> >
> > Jean-François Mongrain
> >
> > 2007/9/18, Frank Ejby Poulsen <frank.ejby.poulsen@xxxxxxxxx>:
> >
> >>> I don't think Foucault is inconsistent on this point: The context that
> >>> the enouncement includes, is a social reality that you have to adopt
> if
> >>> you want to understand others and to be understood. Since the
> >>> enouncement context is abundant in historical texts too, you can - at
> >>> least to some extent - read yourself into the historical meaning of
> >>> historical texts without having to interpret them. The archeologist
> >>> does not decide if the signs make sense, but tries to understand how
> >>> they actually MADE sense in the past.
> >>>
> >>> Flemming
> >>>
> >> I am quoting again the same passage from Foucault, as in my previous
> >> contribution, where he states explicitely what I wrote:
> >> « L'énoncé ... c'est une fonction d'existence qui appartient en propre
> aux
> >> signes et à partir de laquelle on peut décider, ensuite, par l'analyse
> ou
> >> l'intuition, s'ils « font sens » ou non, selon quelle règle ils se
> >> succèdent
> >> ou se juxtaposent, de quoi ils sont signe, et quelle sorte d'acte se
> >> trouve
> >> effectué par leur formulation (orale ou écrite). » (Foucault, Michel
> >> (1969).
> >> *L'archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard: page 115)
> >>
> >> I don't know what the exact English translation is, but he is stating
> >> something like that: "... one can decide, afterwards, through analysis
> or
> >> intuition, if they [the signs] "make sense" or not..."
> >>
> >> It sounds pretty much to me that Foucault is saying that it is the
> >> archeologist who decides if the signs make sense, through his/her
> >> intuition
> >> or analysis.
> >>
> >> Now, I haven't spend all my life studying Foucault, but only one year
> or
> >> so
> >> reading his works, and especially the Archaeology of knowledge, with
> the
> >> intention of making an actual archaeology of something myself. So I may
> be
> >> wrong. If you can show me some examples from Foucault to substantiate
> your
> >> statement, I would be happy to read them.
> >>
> >> Best regards,
> >>
> >> Frank.
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Foucault-L mailing list
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
I do think Foucault (or the archologist, the paradox is the same, so if
you refuse to use one, you must also refuse to use the other...) is taking
a statement on ontology. That language is nothing but a ''tactic '' is an
ontological point of view, and a pretty strong claim. Foucault is always
adressing Kant, Frege, the hermeneutical school, the phenomenologists and,
mainly, Hegel...
Here is one ontological claim :
''Many possible kinds of meaning can be attributed to surface statements and
ontological models are only a small part of a subset of those meanings.''
Ontological models are a subset of surface statements, but those statements
must exist for such a subset to exist, so your claim is self-contradictory
because the entire set should then be included in the subset, remembering we
call ontology any discourse on existence, or being. Same problem since
Protagoras : ontological relativism is self contradictory... if you want to
defend that discourse on being is *a general topic*, (I assume here you use
general as *one in many*) you must show you can do so without contradiction.
Foucault is carefull to not fall into such an easy relativism which will
always fall under a strong logical system like Hegel's -- and he is trying
to show that Hegel's dialectic is a bad model for history of ideas. That is
why existence is defined as a function, and the ''surface'' you talk about
as a field of practical relationships. Foucault's solution seems to show
being is, in itself, immanent and multiple, but still, it's another
universal claim, but now we have two universal claims and we cannot decide
wich one is true : so the is multiplicity... and so on. Foucault
ontological strategy is to win by losing, of by making the game of universal
thruth bug into an infernal loop. I believe Foucault point of view is in
this way close to Peirce's pragmaticism, an author he claims having read
before writing the Archeology, somewhere in Dits et Écrits.
As for the apport of computer sciences, well, I totally agree. It is
completely redrawing the way we understand human interaction and
discourse... but remember that in may 68, the reference in ''savoir'' was
not a freedom of information like the www, but the strongly structured
academical society.
And everyone's an amateur ;-)
Regards,
Jean-François Mongrain
2007/9/18, Thomas Lord <lord@xxxxxxx>:
>
> (I'm an amateur, not an academic. My concerns are not typical for the
> list and my expression, though I try, would not pass customary "quality
> checks" for academic work, I'm sure. My comment here
> may well have an easy "you miss the point" kind of reply
> but it is an honest question, at least.)
>
>
> Poulson, in the bottom-quoted stuff below, gives an example
> of what weirds me out and Mograin just takes it right up:
> He introduces the noun phrase "the archeologist". That's an
> ontological concept of deep consequence and I don't think it
> is found anywhere in Foucault (but, again: amateur here).
>
>
> On translation questions like this, a little bit of chat about
> linguistic context would seem an aid but... after a bit...
>
> Isn't it possible that Foucault wasn't all that concerned with
> being *that* precise? There's no "there" there to extract a
> perfect meaning from? No ontological framework that is
> presumed in and permeates his prose that we can rediscover
> by debating close readings?
>
> In discourse you have a bunch of "surface forms" which
> could be actual texts, or actual manuscripts, or actual
> speech acts, paintings, etc. Examples would include
> "these words on paper" or "those words spoken in
> parliment".
>
> In the theory of programming languages, we talk about
> models that map surface forms to ontological models
> and operational models. This is the study of "semantics" --
> what does a given surface form "denote" in terms of what
> happens when it is injected into the environment. The
> denotation of ordinary discourse *as a general topic* not
> as a kind of puzzle, as it pertains to social order,
> seems to me Foucault's main theme.
>
> The temptation exhibited in this thread seems to be to
> ask "what ontological model best reflects the meaning
> of Foucault's statements" and I'm not sure that's a good
> question. Many possible kinds of meaning can be attributed
> to surface statements and ontological models are only a small
> part of a subset of those meanings.
>
> Rather: I read Foucault as a kind of discursive tactical expert.
> He showed how he could read a discourse, absorb the social
> tactics in force there, and then reflect those tactics in a map
> of them. He was a professional "trouble maker," but not
> a professional "metaphysicist." The strongest metaphysical
> claim that he makes is nothing more than his choice of
> conduct -- to focus on tactics in discourse.
>
> Poulson, in the bottom-quoted stuff below, gives an example
> of what weirds me out and Mograin just takes it right up:
> He introduces the noun phrase "the archeologist". That's an
> ontological concept of deep consequence and I don't think it
> is found anywhere in Foucault (but, again: amateur here).
>
> I don't mean to negate the possiblity of a "close reading"
> of Foucault and I think it was the pursuit of such a possibility
> that sparked this thread but.... "the archeologist"??!? wtf
> is that?
>
> -t
>
> p.s.: Foucault would have benefited from some math.
> A lot of his writing comes off, very much, as a qualitative
> / naturalist take on how programming language theorists
> understand language, but as applied to natural discourse.
> He *has* to be understood as a little bit imprecise, to be
> understood, because the thing he noticed and was pointing
> to was a little bit outside of his grasp.
>
>
>
> Jean-François Mongrain wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > I think you misinterpret this passage. Foucault is not saying the
> > archeologist is using intuition or analysis, but that the énoncé is the
> > ontological prerequisite to any analysis or intuition. He is refering
> the
> > works of grammar, logic, and speech-act theory which he criticized some
> > pages before the text you quote. The distinction here is to
> differentiate
> > énoncé from grammatical sentences (faire sens - Saussure, Bénéviste)
> logical
> > propositions (règles de sucessions et être signe de - Frege, Russell,
> etc.)
> > and speech-act (acte effectué par la prononciation - Austin, Searle)...
> he
> > is stating what archeology is not !
> >
> > Regards
> >
> > Jean-François Mongrain
> >
> > 2007/9/18, Frank Ejby Poulsen <frank.ejby.poulsen@xxxxxxxxx>:
> >
> >>> I don't think Foucault is inconsistent on this point: The context that
> >>> the enouncement includes, is a social reality that you have to adopt
> if
> >>> you want to understand others and to be understood. Since the
> >>> enouncement context is abundant in historical texts too, you can - at
> >>> least to some extent - read yourself into the historical meaning of
> >>> historical texts without having to interpret them. The archeologist
> >>> does not decide if the signs make sense, but tries to understand how
> >>> they actually MADE sense in the past.
> >>>
> >>> Flemming
> >>>
> >> I am quoting again the same passage from Foucault, as in my previous
> >> contribution, where he states explicitely what I wrote:
> >> « L'énoncé ... c'est une fonction d'existence qui appartient en propre
> aux
> >> signes et à partir de laquelle on peut décider, ensuite, par l'analyse
> ou
> >> l'intuition, s'ils « font sens » ou non, selon quelle règle ils se
> >> succèdent
> >> ou se juxtaposent, de quoi ils sont signe, et quelle sorte d'acte se
> >> trouve
> >> effectué par leur formulation (orale ou écrite). » (Foucault, Michel
> >> (1969).
> >> *L'archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard: page 115)
> >>
> >> I don't know what the exact English translation is, but he is stating
> >> something like that: "... one can decide, afterwards, through analysis
> or
> >> intuition, if they [the signs] "make sense" or not..."
> >>
> >> It sounds pretty much to me that Foucault is saying that it is the
> >> archeologist who decides if the signs make sense, through his/her
> >> intuition
> >> or analysis.
> >>
> >> Now, I haven't spend all my life studying Foucault, but only one year
> or
> >> so
> >> reading his works, and especially the Archaeology of knowledge, with
> the
> >> intention of making an actual archaeology of something myself. So I may
> be
> >> wrong. If you can show me some examples from Foucault to substantiate
> your
> >> statement, I would be happy to read them.
> >>
> >> Best regards,
> >>
> >> Frank.
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Foucault-L mailing list
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list