Qualifier: I can't help you with the French original
(not qualified). I think that I can help with how
you are reading it based on the English translation
you have.
On Tue, 2010-02-23 at 00:27 -0800, Kevin Turner wrote:
> Which I have translated as follows:
>
> But here we have perhaps touched upon one of the
> paradoxes of mental illness that demands new forms
> of analysis: if the subjectivity of the insane is,
> at the same time, a call to and an abandonment of
> the world, is it not of the world itself that we
> should ask the secret of this enigmatic subjectivity?
> After having explored the external dimensions, are we
> not necessarily led to consider its exterior and
> objective conditions?
(Independently of your analysis, that makes sense
to me and seems in keeping with Foucault's larger
view of things. I can believe (not prove) it is a
reasonable translation. There are easier ways to
say the same thing in plainer English that stray farther
from his French original, though.)
> Now my question concerns the first external/exterior
> (extérieures) in the last sentence.
> I have read a number of texts that have suggested that
> this is actually a misprint and should read internal/interior
> (intérieures) (e.g. Bernauer, J. W., Michel Foucault’s Force
> of Flight, London, 1990: 187). I have also read a number of
> texts which have simply rendered this as internal without
> explanation.
I don't think it is likely to be a misprint. I can see the
confusion in judging it to be so. Here in plainer
English:
"After we have characterized the externally visible
manifestations of mental illness, ought we not next
consider the external and objective conditions
in which these manifestations occur?"
In other words, having come up with ways to measure
the behavior or presentation of one who is mentally
ill, ought we not ask next what conditions surrounding
the mentally ill allow or preclude, produce or suppress
those manifestations?
For example, a kid in today's classrooms may be judged
mentally ill for frequently speaking out in class.
So we have a dimension for measuring an external feature
of mental illness: the ability to speak only in turn in
class. We *might* turn next to an inferred subjectivity
in the child - perhaps he is acting out a trauma.
Or we might look for pharmaceutical tricks to suppress
the unwanted behavior (and thus "cure" the illness).
Alternatively, per Foucault, perhaps we should look at the external
conditions of this behavior such as the system of surveillance
and punishment which elevates "silence in class" to
a condition of mental health.
> So, my question is, is this a misprint or not?
Doubt it.
> What Foucault discusses in this chapter is the twin
> tasks of a phenomenology of mental illness: noetic – noematic
> (Mmp: 55-56). The first of these tasks aims to describe the
> experience that the ill person has of their illness;
An inferred subjective model like: the child is speaking
out because he is processing some past trauma; or,
the child is speaking out because a chemical disturbance
makes it impossible for him to concentrate.
Foucault is specifically speaking against such inference
(see below).
> the second attempts to analyse the existential structured
> of the experienced pathological world: Umwelt, Mitwelt, Eigenwelt
> (61-64, 64-65, 65-67 respectively).
The surrounding and objective world which conditionalizes
(allows or precludes, produces or suppresses) the behavior.
I think that Foucault would tend to evade any demand
that he give a detailed existential theory in the abstract
before trying to talk about what objectively exists in
the world. He would concentrate more on pretty uncontroversial
things like "The teacher is monitoring the student," "the
teacher demands silence at certain times," "grades are impacted
by behavior," "access to the classroom is impacted by behavior,"
"it is commonly accepted that forgoing access to the classroom
voluntarily is irrational and harmful to self," "irrationality
with threat of harm to self or others is treated by various
authorities as symptoms of mental illness sufficient to invoke
the exercise of power to impose treatment," etc.
You don't need any complicated existential theory to say
those things.
You can also then draw historical comparisons and similar
comparisons. "It wasn't always this way," "here are other
views of teacher authority that worked," "we can ask how and
why these arrangements change".
This is where I think you probably go wrong, in this
bit of your analysis:
> Could not the first external in the last sentence cited
> above be referring to this noematic analysis? Since what it
> addresses are the contradictions between the experienced
> pathological world and the real world. And so this last
> sentence could read:
>
> “After having explored the external dimensions
> [the pathological world], are we not necessarily
> led to consider its exterior and objective
> conditions [the real world]?”
That is where I think you probably go wrong.
If by "[the pathological world]" you mean some account
of the subjective interior experience of the mentally
ill, then I sincerely doubt that that is what he means.
The clue that that is *not* what he means is in the
satirical phrase "this enigmatic subjectivity".
He takes no position on the existence or non-existence
of that subjectivity. Rather, he dismisses the notion
that we have by any means gotten at it any further than
hypothesizing its existence. People talk about it as if
they knew something but don't convincingly get anywhere.
Hence, "enigmatic". He has a history of conflicting
accounts of that hypothesis of subjectivity to back him
up.
Paraphrasing in plain English again:
"We're given this poorly supported hypothesis of
a specially mentally-ill subjectivity. Well, look,
we've examined the behavior of the mentally-ill and
characterized its dimensions. We could assume the
hypothesis about a special kind of subjectivity but
wouldn't be better off by turning next to the external
conditions that allow or preclude, compel or forbid
that behavior?"
If anything, he is saying "Aren't we wasting time
with noematic hypotheses? All we have is the surface
manifestations (external dimensions) and the chance
to do something we've neglected: look at the power
and discourse surroundings of those manifestations.
Let's stick to the facts rather than assuming too much
about 'what's in someone's head'"
> I may be totally wrong about this,
> which is why I wanted to see what others
> had to say before I proceed any further.
I hope my take on it is helpful.
Regards,
-t
>
> Regards,
> Kevin.
>
> ____________________________________________________________
> Receive Notifications of Incoming Messages
> Easily monitor multiple email accounts & access them with a click.
> Visit http://www.inbox.com/notifier and check it out!
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
(not qualified). I think that I can help with how
you are reading it based on the English translation
you have.
On Tue, 2010-02-23 at 00:27 -0800, Kevin Turner wrote:
> Which I have translated as follows:
>
> But here we have perhaps touched upon one of the
> paradoxes of mental illness that demands new forms
> of analysis: if the subjectivity of the insane is,
> at the same time, a call to and an abandonment of
> the world, is it not of the world itself that we
> should ask the secret of this enigmatic subjectivity?
> After having explored the external dimensions, are we
> not necessarily led to consider its exterior and
> objective conditions?
(Independently of your analysis, that makes sense
to me and seems in keeping with Foucault's larger
view of things. I can believe (not prove) it is a
reasonable translation. There are easier ways to
say the same thing in plainer English that stray farther
from his French original, though.)
> Now my question concerns the first external/exterior
> (extérieures) in the last sentence.
> I have read a number of texts that have suggested that
> this is actually a misprint and should read internal/interior
> (intérieures) (e.g. Bernauer, J. W., Michel Foucault’s Force
> of Flight, London, 1990: 187). I have also read a number of
> texts which have simply rendered this as internal without
> explanation.
I don't think it is likely to be a misprint. I can see the
confusion in judging it to be so. Here in plainer
English:
"After we have characterized the externally visible
manifestations of mental illness, ought we not next
consider the external and objective conditions
in which these manifestations occur?"
In other words, having come up with ways to measure
the behavior or presentation of one who is mentally
ill, ought we not ask next what conditions surrounding
the mentally ill allow or preclude, produce or suppress
those manifestations?
For example, a kid in today's classrooms may be judged
mentally ill for frequently speaking out in class.
So we have a dimension for measuring an external feature
of mental illness: the ability to speak only in turn in
class. We *might* turn next to an inferred subjectivity
in the child - perhaps he is acting out a trauma.
Or we might look for pharmaceutical tricks to suppress
the unwanted behavior (and thus "cure" the illness).
Alternatively, per Foucault, perhaps we should look at the external
conditions of this behavior such as the system of surveillance
and punishment which elevates "silence in class" to
a condition of mental health.
> So, my question is, is this a misprint or not?
Doubt it.
> What Foucault discusses in this chapter is the twin
> tasks of a phenomenology of mental illness: noetic – noematic
> (Mmp: 55-56). The first of these tasks aims to describe the
> experience that the ill person has of their illness;
An inferred subjective model like: the child is speaking
out because he is processing some past trauma; or,
the child is speaking out because a chemical disturbance
makes it impossible for him to concentrate.
Foucault is specifically speaking against such inference
(see below).
> the second attempts to analyse the existential structured
> of the experienced pathological world: Umwelt, Mitwelt, Eigenwelt
> (61-64, 64-65, 65-67 respectively).
The surrounding and objective world which conditionalizes
(allows or precludes, produces or suppresses) the behavior.
I think that Foucault would tend to evade any demand
that he give a detailed existential theory in the abstract
before trying to talk about what objectively exists in
the world. He would concentrate more on pretty uncontroversial
things like "The teacher is monitoring the student," "the
teacher demands silence at certain times," "grades are impacted
by behavior," "access to the classroom is impacted by behavior,"
"it is commonly accepted that forgoing access to the classroom
voluntarily is irrational and harmful to self," "irrationality
with threat of harm to self or others is treated by various
authorities as symptoms of mental illness sufficient to invoke
the exercise of power to impose treatment," etc.
You don't need any complicated existential theory to say
those things.
You can also then draw historical comparisons and similar
comparisons. "It wasn't always this way," "here are other
views of teacher authority that worked," "we can ask how and
why these arrangements change".
This is where I think you probably go wrong, in this
bit of your analysis:
> Could not the first external in the last sentence cited
> above be referring to this noematic analysis? Since what it
> addresses are the contradictions between the experienced
> pathological world and the real world. And so this last
> sentence could read:
>
> “After having explored the external dimensions
> [the pathological world], are we not necessarily
> led to consider its exterior and objective
> conditions [the real world]?”
That is where I think you probably go wrong.
If by "[the pathological world]" you mean some account
of the subjective interior experience of the mentally
ill, then I sincerely doubt that that is what he means.
The clue that that is *not* what he means is in the
satirical phrase "this enigmatic subjectivity".
He takes no position on the existence or non-existence
of that subjectivity. Rather, he dismisses the notion
that we have by any means gotten at it any further than
hypothesizing its existence. People talk about it as if
they knew something but don't convincingly get anywhere.
Hence, "enigmatic". He has a history of conflicting
accounts of that hypothesis of subjectivity to back him
up.
Paraphrasing in plain English again:
"We're given this poorly supported hypothesis of
a specially mentally-ill subjectivity. Well, look,
we've examined the behavior of the mentally-ill and
characterized its dimensions. We could assume the
hypothesis about a special kind of subjectivity but
wouldn't be better off by turning next to the external
conditions that allow or preclude, compel or forbid
that behavior?"
If anything, he is saying "Aren't we wasting time
with noematic hypotheses? All we have is the surface
manifestations (external dimensions) and the chance
to do something we've neglected: look at the power
and discourse surroundings of those manifestations.
Let's stick to the facts rather than assuming too much
about 'what's in someone's head'"
> I may be totally wrong about this,
> which is why I wanted to see what others
> had to say before I proceed any further.
I hope my take on it is helpful.
Regards,
-t
>
> Regards,
> Kevin.
>
> ____________________________________________________________
> Receive Notifications of Incoming Messages
> Easily monitor multiple email accounts & access them with a click.
> Visit http://www.inbox.com/notifier and check it out!
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list