Is the translationg your duing for public publication? Or is this just your
personal translation of the French text?
On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 10:28 PM, michael bibby <shmickeyd@xxxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> A small but crucial correction to the selection I reproduced from Mental
> Illness and Psychology: the sentence, in the third paragraph, which reads
>
> "...in wishing to carry out a psychology of madness, one is demanding that
> psychology should undermine its own conditions, that it should turn back to
> that which made it possible, and that it should circumvent what is for it,
> by definition, the unsuspected."
>
> should read
>
> "...in wishing to carry out a psychology of madness, one is demanding that
> psychology should undermine its own conditions, that it should turn back to
> that which made it possible, and that it should circumvent what is for it,
> by definition, the *unsupersedable*."
>
>
>
>
> --- On Wed, 17/3/10, michael bibby <shmickeyd@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > From: michael bibby <shmickeyd@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] foucault and "human nature" and 'Homo
> Psychologicus'
> > To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Received: Wednesday, 17 March, 2010, 1:00 PM
> >
>
> "It must not be forgotten that
> > 'objective,' or 'positive,' or 'scientific' psychology found
> > its historical origin and its basis in pathological
> > experience. In other words, man became a 'psychologizable
> > species' only when his relation to madness made a psychology
> > possible, that is to say, when his relation to madness was
> > defined by the external dimension of exclusion and
> > punishment and by the internal dimension of moral
> > assignation and guilt. In situating madness in relation to
> > these two fundamental axes, early-nineteenth-century man
> > made it possible to grasp madness and thus to initiate a
> > general psychology. ...
> >
> > This experience of Unreason in which, up to the eighteenth
> > century, Western man encountered the night of his truth and
> > its absolute challenge was to become, and still remains for
> > us, the mode of access to the natural truth of man. It is
> > understandable, then, that this mode of access should be so
> > ambiguous and that, at the same time, it invites objective
> > reductions (on the side of exclusion) and constatnly
> > solicits the recall to self (on the side of moral
> > assignation). The whole epistemological structure of
> > contemporary psychology is rooted in this event, which is
> > contemporary with the French Revolution and which concerns
> > man‚s relation to himself. 'Psychology' is merely a thin
> > skin on the surface of the ethical world in which modern man
> > seeks his truth - and looses it.
> >
> > As a result, a psychology of madness cannot be but
> > derisory, and yet it touches on the essential. It is
> > derisory because, in wishing to carry out a psychology of
> > madness, one is demanding that psychology should undermine
> > its own conditions, that it should turn back to that which
> > made it possible, and that it should circumvent what is for
> > it, by definition, the unsuspected. Psychology can never
> > tell the truth about madness because it is madness that
> > holds the truth of psychology. And yet a psychology of
> > madness cannot fail to move toward the essential, since it
> > is obscurely directed toward the e point at which its
> > possibilities are created; that is to say, it moves upstream
> > against its own current toward those regions in which man
> > has a relation with himself and inaugurates that form of
> > alienation that turns him into Homo psychologicus."
> >
> > Mental Illness and Psychology.
> >
> >
> >
> > --- On Thu, 11/3/10, Teemu K <teemuta@xxxxxxxxx>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > From: Teemu K <teemuta@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] foucault and "human nature"
> > > To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Received: Thursday, 11 March, 2010, 12:11 AM
> > > Dear all,
> > >
> > > I would have some questions about this comment of
> > Foucault
> > > (thanks to Kevin
> > > about the interesting excerpt):
> > >
> > > "...the functioning which makes life possible is a
> > > functioning which
> > > constantly wears matter out, in such a way that it is
> > > precisely that which
> > > makes possible life which at the same time produces
> > death"
> > >
> > > 1) What do you think, might Foucault be referring here
> > --
> > > instead of / in
> > > addition to the idea of entropy -- to the attempt of
> > the
> > > late eighteenth
> > > century to build a unified physiology + pathology
> > (unified
> > > 'physiopathologie')? This way, it was thought, you
> > could
> > > get knowledge about
> > > pathological phenomena on the basis of studying
> > normal
> > > phenomena: in short,
> > > pathology grounded in normality. (see Foucault's
> > > introduction to the English
> > > translation of Canguilhem's Normal and Pathological
> > and a
> > > slightly different
> > > version found in DE t. IV. And of course Canguihem's
> > > book.)
> > >
> > > 2) And if this is the case, does he really agree with
> > it?
> > > This would be
> > > rather interesting, given how much effort Canguilhem
> > > devoted to his attack
> > > against the view that we could obtain all relevant
> > > knowledge about
> > > pathological phenomena on the basis of the physiology
> > of a
> > > healthy man.
> > >
> > > best regards,
> > > Teemu Kemppainen
> > > Univ. Helsinki.
> > >
> > > On Fri, Mar 5, 2010 at 9:30 AM, Kevin Turner <kevin.turner@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > There's a passage from an interview that Foucault
> > gave
> > > (in 1967, I think),
> > > > which may help to shed some light on his
> > understanding
> > > of "human nature."
> > > >
> > > > The passage comes from 'Who are you, Professor
> > > Foucault?' in Carrette, J.
> > > > R. (ed.) Religion and Culture, Manchester, 1999:
> > > 87-104, and it reads:
> > > >
> > > > We have to resign ourselves to taking, faced
> > with
> > > mankind, a position
> > > > similar to the one taken towards the end of the
> > > eighteenth century with
> > > > regard to other living species, when it was
> > realised
> > > that they did not
> > > > function for someone – neither for themselves,
> > nor
> > > for man, nor for God –
> > > > but that they quite simply functioned. Organisms
> > > function. Why do they
> > > > function? In order to reproduce? Not at all. To
> > keep
> > > alive? No more for this
> > > > reason. They function. They function in a very
> > > ambiguous way, in order to
> > > > live but also in order to die, since it is well
> > known
> > > that the functioning
> > > > which makes life possible is a functioning which
> > > constantly wears matter
> > > > out, in such a way that it is precisely that
> > which
> > > makes possible life which
> > > > at the same time produces death. Species do not
> > > function for themselves, nor
> > > > for man, nor for the greater glory of God; they
> > > confine themselves to
> > > > functioning. The same thing may be said of the
> > human
> > > species. Mankind is a
> > > > species endowed with a nervous system such that
> > to a
> > > certain point it can
> > > > control its functioning. And it is plain that
> > this
> > > possibility of control
> > > > continuously raises the idea that mankind must
> > have a
> > > purpose. We discover
> > > > that purpose insofar as we have the possibility
> > of
> > > controlling our own
> > > > functioning. But this is to turn things around.
> > We
> > > tell ourselves: as we
> > > > have a purpose, we must control our functioning;
> > > whereas in reality it is
> > > > only on the basis of this possibility of control
> > that
> > > ideologies,
> > > > philosophies, systems of metaphysics, religions
> > can
> > > appear, which provide a
> > > > certain image able to focus this possibility of
> > > controlling functioning...It
> > > > is the possibility of control which gives rise to
> > the
> > > idea of purpose. But
> > > > mankind has in reality no purpose, it functions,
> > it
> > > controls its own
> > > > functioning, and it continually creates
> > justifications
> > > for this control. We
> > > > have to resign ourselves to admitting that these
> > are
> > > only justifications.
> > > > Humanism is one of them, the last one’ (RAC:
> > 102).
> > > >
> > > > I see no evidence that Foucault ever radically
> > revised
> > > this position.
> > > >
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Kevin.
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Foucault-L mailing list
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Foucault-L mailing list
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Foucault-L mailing list
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
--
Chetan Vemuri
West Des Moines, IA
aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
(319)-512-9318
"You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
world"
personal translation of the French text?
On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 10:28 PM, michael bibby <shmickeyd@xxxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> A small but crucial correction to the selection I reproduced from Mental
> Illness and Psychology: the sentence, in the third paragraph, which reads
>
> "...in wishing to carry out a psychology of madness, one is demanding that
> psychology should undermine its own conditions, that it should turn back to
> that which made it possible, and that it should circumvent what is for it,
> by definition, the unsuspected."
>
> should read
>
> "...in wishing to carry out a psychology of madness, one is demanding that
> psychology should undermine its own conditions, that it should turn back to
> that which made it possible, and that it should circumvent what is for it,
> by definition, the *unsupersedable*."
>
>
>
>
> --- On Wed, 17/3/10, michael bibby <shmickeyd@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > From: michael bibby <shmickeyd@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] foucault and "human nature" and 'Homo
> Psychologicus'
> > To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Received: Wednesday, 17 March, 2010, 1:00 PM
> >
>
> "It must not be forgotten that
> > 'objective,' or 'positive,' or 'scientific' psychology found
> > its historical origin and its basis in pathological
> > experience. In other words, man became a 'psychologizable
> > species' only when his relation to madness made a psychology
> > possible, that is to say, when his relation to madness was
> > defined by the external dimension of exclusion and
> > punishment and by the internal dimension of moral
> > assignation and guilt. In situating madness in relation to
> > these two fundamental axes, early-nineteenth-century man
> > made it possible to grasp madness and thus to initiate a
> > general psychology. ...
> >
> > This experience of Unreason in which, up to the eighteenth
> > century, Western man encountered the night of his truth and
> > its absolute challenge was to become, and still remains for
> > us, the mode of access to the natural truth of man. It is
> > understandable, then, that this mode of access should be so
> > ambiguous and that, at the same time, it invites objective
> > reductions (on the side of exclusion) and constatnly
> > solicits the recall to self (on the side of moral
> > assignation). The whole epistemological structure of
> > contemporary psychology is rooted in this event, which is
> > contemporary with the French Revolution and which concerns
> > man‚s relation to himself. 'Psychology' is merely a thin
> > skin on the surface of the ethical world in which modern man
> > seeks his truth - and looses it.
> >
> > As a result, a psychology of madness cannot be but
> > derisory, and yet it touches on the essential. It is
> > derisory because, in wishing to carry out a psychology of
> > madness, one is demanding that psychology should undermine
> > its own conditions, that it should turn back to that which
> > made it possible, and that it should circumvent what is for
> > it, by definition, the unsuspected. Psychology can never
> > tell the truth about madness because it is madness that
> > holds the truth of psychology. And yet a psychology of
> > madness cannot fail to move toward the essential, since it
> > is obscurely directed toward the e point at which its
> > possibilities are created; that is to say, it moves upstream
> > against its own current toward those regions in which man
> > has a relation with himself and inaugurates that form of
> > alienation that turns him into Homo psychologicus."
> >
> > Mental Illness and Psychology.
> >
> >
> >
> > --- On Thu, 11/3/10, Teemu K <teemuta@xxxxxxxxx>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > From: Teemu K <teemuta@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] foucault and "human nature"
> > > To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Received: Thursday, 11 March, 2010, 12:11 AM
> > > Dear all,
> > >
> > > I would have some questions about this comment of
> > Foucault
> > > (thanks to Kevin
> > > about the interesting excerpt):
> > >
> > > "...the functioning which makes life possible is a
> > > functioning which
> > > constantly wears matter out, in such a way that it is
> > > precisely that which
> > > makes possible life which at the same time produces
> > death"
> > >
> > > 1) What do you think, might Foucault be referring here
> > --
> > > instead of / in
> > > addition to the idea of entropy -- to the attempt of
> > the
> > > late eighteenth
> > > century to build a unified physiology + pathology
> > (unified
> > > 'physiopathologie')? This way, it was thought, you
> > could
> > > get knowledge about
> > > pathological phenomena on the basis of studying
> > normal
> > > phenomena: in short,
> > > pathology grounded in normality. (see Foucault's
> > > introduction to the English
> > > translation of Canguilhem's Normal and Pathological
> > and a
> > > slightly different
> > > version found in DE t. IV. And of course Canguihem's
> > > book.)
> > >
> > > 2) And if this is the case, does he really agree with
> > it?
> > > This would be
> > > rather interesting, given how much effort Canguilhem
> > > devoted to his attack
> > > against the view that we could obtain all relevant
> > > knowledge about
> > > pathological phenomena on the basis of the physiology
> > of a
> > > healthy man.
> > >
> > > best regards,
> > > Teemu Kemppainen
> > > Univ. Helsinki.
> > >
> > > On Fri, Mar 5, 2010 at 9:30 AM, Kevin Turner <kevin.turner@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > There's a passage from an interview that Foucault
> > gave
> > > (in 1967, I think),
> > > > which may help to shed some light on his
> > understanding
> > > of "human nature."
> > > >
> > > > The passage comes from 'Who are you, Professor
> > > Foucault?' in Carrette, J.
> > > > R. (ed.) Religion and Culture, Manchester, 1999:
> > > 87-104, and it reads:
> > > >
> > > > We have to resign ourselves to taking, faced
> > with
> > > mankind, a position
> > > > similar to the one taken towards the end of the
> > > eighteenth century with
> > > > regard to other living species, when it was
> > realised
> > > that they did not
> > > > function for someone – neither for themselves,
> > nor
> > > for man, nor for God –
> > > > but that they quite simply functioned. Organisms
> > > function. Why do they
> > > > function? In order to reproduce? Not at all. To
> > keep
> > > alive? No more for this
> > > > reason. They function. They function in a very
> > > ambiguous way, in order to
> > > > live but also in order to die, since it is well
> > known
> > > that the functioning
> > > > which makes life possible is a functioning which
> > > constantly wears matter
> > > > out, in such a way that it is precisely that
> > which
> > > makes possible life which
> > > > at the same time produces death. Species do not
> > > function for themselves, nor
> > > > for man, nor for the greater glory of God; they
> > > confine themselves to
> > > > functioning. The same thing may be said of the
> > human
> > > species. Mankind is a
> > > > species endowed with a nervous system such that
> > to a
> > > certain point it can
> > > > control its functioning. And it is plain that
> > this
> > > possibility of control
> > > > continuously raises the idea that mankind must
> > have a
> > > purpose. We discover
> > > > that purpose insofar as we have the possibility
> > of
> > > controlling our own
> > > > functioning. But this is to turn things around.
> > We
> > > tell ourselves: as we
> > > > have a purpose, we must control our functioning;
> > > whereas in reality it is
> > > > only on the basis of this possibility of control
> > that
> > > ideologies,
> > > > philosophies, systems of metaphysics, religions
> > can
> > > appear, which provide a
> > > > certain image able to focus this possibility of
> > > controlling functioning...It
> > > > is the possibility of control which gives rise to
> > the
> > > idea of purpose. But
> > > > mankind has in reality no purpose, it functions,
> > it
> > > controls its own
> > > > functioning, and it continually creates
> > justifications
> > > for this control. We
> > > > have to resign ourselves to admitting that these
> > are
> > > only justifications.
> > > > Humanism is one of them, the last one’ (RAC:
> > 102).
> > > >
> > > > I see no evidence that Foucault ever radically
> > revised
> > > this position.
> > > >
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Kevin.
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Foucault-L mailing list
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Foucault-L mailing list
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Foucault-L mailing list
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
--
Chetan Vemuri
West Des Moines, IA
aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
(319)-512-9318
"You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
world"