Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault, correspondence theory vs coherence theory

In addition to Kay Fisher:

1) I myself like to use Donald Davidson when this kind of truth-discussion pops up
2) Actually, that truth-discussion is most of the time focused on (the interdiction on)relativism; to me Rorty's articles on Truth (see Philosophical Papers vol.3) were very helpful in order to get grip on Foucault's statements on (the power of) truth as a practice and as truth(also see the lectures of 1982/3 and 1984)
3)Moreover, I think that in this kind of discussion it will be very helpfull to understand Foucault as sceptical historian. So reframe the coherence - correspondence discussion into the questions on historical truth, historical relativism, historism and the 'progress' of (historical) knowledge.

machiel karskens

----- "Kay Fisher" <fisherk@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> From: "Kay Fisher" <fisherk@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: Wednesday, April 6, 2011 10:04:34 AM
> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault, correspondence theory vs coherence theory
> Hi Chetan
> I think the works of Todd May (philosopher) could be what you are
> looking for. He has written (sympathetic) books about Foucault and
> reviewed Prado's perspective on Foucault in relation to these kinds of
> philosophical questions. He is a pleasure to read - clear and
> succinct. In particular I recommend the following book as May
> positions
> Foucault in relation to Sellars in this book.
> (1993) /Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, politics and
> knowledge in the thought of Michel Foucault. /
> See also his review of Prado's book in /Notre Dame Philosophical
> Reviews/ published in 2006
> For what it's worth, I think that you can meaningfully use the
> definitions of the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence
> theory of truth in relation to Foucault's work, particularly if you
> understand them rather as thought-practices for truth discernment
> (that
> make sense in this culture).
> In my view, at a minimum Foucault must rely on these kinds of
> descriptive-truth and coherence-truth practices to make his claim to
> identify and delineate the existence of the particular
> thought-practices
> he was interested in. I also don't think these truth-discernment
> practices (as opposed to analytical theorising about them) need be
> intrinsically connected to foundational conceptions of truth. He
> doesn't
> of course assume that his claims, or these kinds of truth practices
> for
> that matter, are universal, objective, timeless but as historically
> and
> otherwise politically situated. But we would all be lost without some
> minimum agreements at a descriptive and practical level about what can
> count as true (enough) for now. As May says of Foucault's approach-
> everything is open to criticism but not all at the one time. This is
> in
> accord, I think, with Foucault's particular form of realism.
> cheers
> kay
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