Alexandre,
Yes, I think we are in accord on this issue. We might say
that in developing an "economy of power relations," Foucault
repudiates the economics of power, or economism. I also
believe that the same readign should be afforded to Marx; at
any rate, the next step to take would be to investigate what
an "economy of power relations" is really all about - and I
think Marx can help us here (in other words, I don't care if
Foucault is a "Marxist" - I'm not interested in inlfuence,
the history of ideas. etc. - but I do think he has a
peculiar way of making points which in several senses are
"Marxian" - or closely related to the manner in which Marx
makes his points).
First of all, we cannot treat power as an entity, else we
fall into a metaphysics of power. This is a problem that
several MArxists, especially Freudo-Marxists, run into. Why
avoid such a metaphysics if it's unavoidable? Well, it's not
unavoidable id one adheres to a few other methodological
principles:
1. a descriptive sociology: "genealogy" is such an attempt
insofar as one's descriptions do not fall back onto a
conception of the true meaning/function/or purposes of the
desciptors one describes. "No longer a search for origins,"
etc. In fact, in On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche
criticizes Paul Ree, and other utilitarian/functionalist
accounts of the "origin of the moral sentiments" because
they fail to adequately describe the phenomena at hand, so
strongly do their metaphyscial presupppositions get in the
way of what they attmept to describe. The moral sentiments,
according to Ree, must have a purpose, must demonstrate some
good or utility, and must be revisable (hence they
"progress"), and hence theyir utility, purpose, etc. must
lie at the heart of their "origins". "Genealogists" in the
Nietzschean sense (which Foucault - who by the way dares
other thinkers to "colonize" his thought in "Two Lectures,"
seek lowly, rather than "lofty" origins - if that's what
they find.
Marx, as my quotes from last week are meant to demonstrate
(I don't feel like repeating them) was also very critical of
idealist, and "ideological" histories, and sought a more
descriptive sociology; in fact, let's face it, Nietzsche was
not a very good historian, though he may have been a fun
one, but Marx has the upper hand between the two in htis
arena.
2. Linked to #1, obviously, is an empiricist methodology.
Foucault claims: "I'm an empiricist. I don't try to advance
things unless they apply" (Body/Power) He does indicate in
other places that he is not an empiricist - but the main
point is that one seeks, as did Hume, explanations which do
not refer to innate faculties, metaphysical entities,
substances, etc.
3. Linked to #1&2 (an these can come in any order), a
materialism (again, A Marxian precept).
Sorry, have to go, rejoin this later.
Joe Cronin
TMC
Yes, I think we are in accord on this issue. We might say
that in developing an "economy of power relations," Foucault
repudiates the economics of power, or economism. I also
believe that the same readign should be afforded to Marx; at
any rate, the next step to take would be to investigate what
an "economy of power relations" is really all about - and I
think Marx can help us here (in other words, I don't care if
Foucault is a "Marxist" - I'm not interested in inlfuence,
the history of ideas. etc. - but I do think he has a
peculiar way of making points which in several senses are
"Marxian" - or closely related to the manner in which Marx
makes his points).
First of all, we cannot treat power as an entity, else we
fall into a metaphysics of power. This is a problem that
several MArxists, especially Freudo-Marxists, run into. Why
avoid such a metaphysics if it's unavoidable? Well, it's not
unavoidable id one adheres to a few other methodological
principles:
1. a descriptive sociology: "genealogy" is such an attempt
insofar as one's descriptions do not fall back onto a
conception of the true meaning/function/or purposes of the
desciptors one describes. "No longer a search for origins,"
etc. In fact, in On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche
criticizes Paul Ree, and other utilitarian/functionalist
accounts of the "origin of the moral sentiments" because
they fail to adequately describe the phenomena at hand, so
strongly do their metaphyscial presupppositions get in the
way of what they attmept to describe. The moral sentiments,
according to Ree, must have a purpose, must demonstrate some
good or utility, and must be revisable (hence they
"progress"), and hence theyir utility, purpose, etc. must
lie at the heart of their "origins". "Genealogists" in the
Nietzschean sense (which Foucault - who by the way dares
other thinkers to "colonize" his thought in "Two Lectures,"
seek lowly, rather than "lofty" origins - if that's what
they find.
Marx, as my quotes from last week are meant to demonstrate
(I don't feel like repeating them) was also very critical of
idealist, and "ideological" histories, and sought a more
descriptive sociology; in fact, let's face it, Nietzsche was
not a very good historian, though he may have been a fun
one, but Marx has the upper hand between the two in htis
arena.
2. Linked to #1, obviously, is an empiricist methodology.
Foucault claims: "I'm an empiricist. I don't try to advance
things unless they apply" (Body/Power) He does indicate in
other places that he is not an empiricist - but the main
point is that one seeks, as did Hume, explanations which do
not refer to innate faculties, metaphysical entities,
substances, etc.
3. Linked to #1&2 (an these can come in any order), a
materialism (again, A Marxian precept).
Sorry, have to go, rejoin this later.
Joe Cronin
TMC