O.K.
Lets try and grapple with this. I don't have a problem with epistemological
relativism. Unless we assume that knowledge is produced ex nihilo, which I
reject, then knowledge must be produced out of antecedant material; other
bits of knowledge. Go all the way down and all you will find is other bits
of knowledge and the quest for certain epistemological foundations is one
one infinte regress. So I'm actually very comfortable with epistemological
relativism. However, questions possess presuppositions and to ask the question:
>
>>Why is it that cultural relatavism is deemed acceptable, but
>>epistemological relativism is not?
Presupposes that the two issues are distinct. But values are not distinct
and untainted by "facts", and vice versa, hence the two issues are
inextricably linked. I am also not, by the way, happy with cultural
relativism, and hence to me the question, in cultural terms, (although
remember, this implies epistemological complications):
>What's wrong with relativism?
Is almost naive. Tell that to the people living on the street in Britain and
throughout the developed world (I've started with these unfortunates for a
reason) today: "It's all relative mate, I've got, you haven't and what's
more that creates a difference between you and me, and hence, I can say
nothing about your plight, but equally you can say nothing about mine, so
don't intrude on my space and tell me why I should care about you" - lets go
with difference for a moment.
A fairy tale.
Once upon a time. A person living in my street. I have never talked to
him/her, and know nothing about him/her. In fact, let's just call this
person the 'other in my street'. One night noises erupt. Sounds like murder
to me. What do I do? Well, it's the 'other in my street'. None of my
business, I do nothing, I don't know enough about the 'other in my street'
to say whether he/she enjoys being murdered. But is this acceptable? Most I
think would say not. But if the answer is that my lack of action towards the
'other in the street' is not acceptable, why is it acceptable to sit on our
a***s when the 'other' is not in my street? I'll tell you why. Because, 'we'
(to use Rorty's much overused phrase) have decided to buy totally into the
game of nation-states as immutable natural entities (natural in the sense
of, they exist and we have no foundational ground from which to critique
them hence they are 'real' (where 'real can be taken to be 'natural'))
The issue of choice, however, does not satnd or fall on a foundational
point, some non-ground from which to choose. This is the positivist fallacy.
"I need certainty!" But without this certainty, is the only choice no way to
make reasoned choice?
>Well, we all know the answer. By running political campaigns, using moral
>blackmail, appealing to "common decency", putting forward "convincing"
>arguments, .....
You are heading into a rather big hole here! Onwards and downwards I suppose.
>
>And of course, these who hold views we consider most evil can do exactly
>the same thing.
>So, do we hope that by appealing to our "elite" knowledge of philosophy,
>logic, etc we can tip the balance, or at least be assured we were right all
>along, even if we don't win.
>Even if philosophy gave some "objective" guarantee, it wouldn't necessarily
>win the media war.
Exactly, we now hit rock-bottom. My discipline (International Relations) has
an answer to this problem. We just get the biggest sticks, guns, bombs or
whatever and make SURE that WE win the media war.It's called a power
politics game and as a species we've been playing it for centuries (it's
natural its what we do!, or so we're told). ( as an aside, it is curious
here that, in fact, the media war, is generally won not by appeals to
philosophical foundations but by appeals to scientific knowledge, reasoned
arguments etc., but which do all carry philosophical positions - consider
the role of such knowledge in the BSE scare in Britian today.)
>
>And, following Dan, what has epistemological certainty got to do with it.
>Being sure about atoms isn't going to help me decide between Christianity
>and Islam.
And there's me thinking we had reached rock bottom. Exactly! What has
epistmological certainty got to do with it? Still, split an atom, generate a
modicum of radioactivity and see if either Christianity or Islam will save
you from its effects.
>
>Colin says of Hume (joking I hope) that his ethics were really appalling.
>I assume the point Hume was making about "scratching his finger and
>destroying the world" was that logic wouldn't support even the most
>"obvious" ethical decisions. But why would we expect it to? Logic only
>ever pushes us back to more basic premises. And won't ethics often
>recommend "illogical" actions.
I wasn't joking about Hume, and if you read him his ethics are indeed
suspect, and precisely because of the same reason Jim seems to accept. That
is, that values just are different and separate from facts. Or simpler,
epistemolgy is distinct from ethics. I didn't think anyone thought this any
longer.
>
>Colin also says:
>"But we surely also have to ask what these associations are about and whether
>such things really do act in such and such a way or not. Because if these
>things do not act in such and such a way but only "our" reflection sees
>them, or creates the appearance of such associations, then again we must all
>be conspiring to reach agreement. This to me seems to be smuggling in a form
>of mysticism which would have made even Hegel smile."
>
>I thought that Foucault's main project in the power/knowledge area was to
>show how "conspiring to reach agreement" was a simple, inevitable, day to
>day activity, which had no element of mysticism.
Well, he may well have, but that's the point. Put this way, it is mystical,
and highly meatphysical too. There is no escaping from metaphysics, only
delusions of having done so.
>I guess my real question is: why are so many people so uncomfortable with
>relativism?
>or perhaps: for those of us who do not believe in some god-given "natural
>law" whcih we can directly know, what alternative to relativism are you
>actually proposing?
Acceptance of epistemological relativism does not imply acceptance of
judgemental relativism. we don't require a "god-given, natural law" in order
to make judgements. But, I will want more than 'poetic irony' before I walk
into the fires of 'linguistic idealism'. Of course, I take it that Jim's
comments are an attempt at reasoned arguments in favour of his position. So,
what's wrong with relativism? Nothing. But it doesn't mean we are unable to
give good reasons for what we do. Even if we do nothing. Now, back to the
'other in my street'.
Thanks. :-)
--------------------------------------------------------
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
Lets try and grapple with this. I don't have a problem with epistemological
relativism. Unless we assume that knowledge is produced ex nihilo, which I
reject, then knowledge must be produced out of antecedant material; other
bits of knowledge. Go all the way down and all you will find is other bits
of knowledge and the quest for certain epistemological foundations is one
one infinte regress. So I'm actually very comfortable with epistemological
relativism. However, questions possess presuppositions and to ask the question:
>
>>Why is it that cultural relatavism is deemed acceptable, but
>>epistemological relativism is not?
Presupposes that the two issues are distinct. But values are not distinct
and untainted by "facts", and vice versa, hence the two issues are
inextricably linked. I am also not, by the way, happy with cultural
relativism, and hence to me the question, in cultural terms, (although
remember, this implies epistemological complications):
>What's wrong with relativism?
Is almost naive. Tell that to the people living on the street in Britain and
throughout the developed world (I've started with these unfortunates for a
reason) today: "It's all relative mate, I've got, you haven't and what's
more that creates a difference between you and me, and hence, I can say
nothing about your plight, but equally you can say nothing about mine, so
don't intrude on my space and tell me why I should care about you" - lets go
with difference for a moment.
A fairy tale.
Once upon a time. A person living in my street. I have never talked to
him/her, and know nothing about him/her. In fact, let's just call this
person the 'other in my street'. One night noises erupt. Sounds like murder
to me. What do I do? Well, it's the 'other in my street'. None of my
business, I do nothing, I don't know enough about the 'other in my street'
to say whether he/she enjoys being murdered. But is this acceptable? Most I
think would say not. But if the answer is that my lack of action towards the
'other in the street' is not acceptable, why is it acceptable to sit on our
a***s when the 'other' is not in my street? I'll tell you why. Because, 'we'
(to use Rorty's much overused phrase) have decided to buy totally into the
game of nation-states as immutable natural entities (natural in the sense
of, they exist and we have no foundational ground from which to critique
them hence they are 'real' (where 'real can be taken to be 'natural'))
The issue of choice, however, does not satnd or fall on a foundational
point, some non-ground from which to choose. This is the positivist fallacy.
"I need certainty!" But without this certainty, is the only choice no way to
make reasoned choice?
>Well, we all know the answer. By running political campaigns, using moral
>blackmail, appealing to "common decency", putting forward "convincing"
>arguments, .....
You are heading into a rather big hole here! Onwards and downwards I suppose.
>
>And of course, these who hold views we consider most evil can do exactly
>the same thing.
>So, do we hope that by appealing to our "elite" knowledge of philosophy,
>logic, etc we can tip the balance, or at least be assured we were right all
>along, even if we don't win.
>Even if philosophy gave some "objective" guarantee, it wouldn't necessarily
>win the media war.
Exactly, we now hit rock-bottom. My discipline (International Relations) has
an answer to this problem. We just get the biggest sticks, guns, bombs or
whatever and make SURE that WE win the media war.It's called a power
politics game and as a species we've been playing it for centuries (it's
natural its what we do!, or so we're told). ( as an aside, it is curious
here that, in fact, the media war, is generally won not by appeals to
philosophical foundations but by appeals to scientific knowledge, reasoned
arguments etc., but which do all carry philosophical positions - consider
the role of such knowledge in the BSE scare in Britian today.)
>
>And, following Dan, what has epistemological certainty got to do with it.
>Being sure about atoms isn't going to help me decide between Christianity
>and Islam.
And there's me thinking we had reached rock bottom. Exactly! What has
epistmological certainty got to do with it? Still, split an atom, generate a
modicum of radioactivity and see if either Christianity or Islam will save
you from its effects.
>
>Colin says of Hume (joking I hope) that his ethics were really appalling.
>I assume the point Hume was making about "scratching his finger and
>destroying the world" was that logic wouldn't support even the most
>"obvious" ethical decisions. But why would we expect it to? Logic only
>ever pushes us back to more basic premises. And won't ethics often
>recommend "illogical" actions.
I wasn't joking about Hume, and if you read him his ethics are indeed
suspect, and precisely because of the same reason Jim seems to accept. That
is, that values just are different and separate from facts. Or simpler,
epistemolgy is distinct from ethics. I didn't think anyone thought this any
longer.
>
>Colin also says:
>"But we surely also have to ask what these associations are about and whether
>such things really do act in such and such a way or not. Because if these
>things do not act in such and such a way but only "our" reflection sees
>them, or creates the appearance of such associations, then again we must all
>be conspiring to reach agreement. This to me seems to be smuggling in a form
>of mysticism which would have made even Hegel smile."
>
>I thought that Foucault's main project in the power/knowledge area was to
>show how "conspiring to reach agreement" was a simple, inevitable, day to
>day activity, which had no element of mysticism.
Well, he may well have, but that's the point. Put this way, it is mystical,
and highly meatphysical too. There is no escaping from metaphysics, only
delusions of having done so.
>I guess my real question is: why are so many people so uncomfortable with
>relativism?
>or perhaps: for those of us who do not believe in some god-given "natural
>law" whcih we can directly know, what alternative to relativism are you
>actually proposing?
Acceptance of epistemological relativism does not imply acceptance of
judgemental relativism. we don't require a "god-given, natural law" in order
to make judgements. But, I will want more than 'poetic irony' before I walk
into the fires of 'linguistic idealism'. Of course, I take it that Jim's
comments are an attempt at reasoned arguments in favour of his position. So,
what's wrong with relativism? Nothing. But it doesn't mean we are unable to
give good reasons for what we do. Even if we do nothing. Now, back to the
'other in my street'.
Thanks. :-)
--------------------------------------------------------
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------