On Wed, 01 May 1996 10:15:02 +0100, ccw94@xxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>Quetzil said:
>
> i certainly do not believe that
>>what is and the meaning of what is are separable entities,
>
>What is, will be what it 'is', whatever 'meaning' we arrogant 'humans'
>decide to give it. Quetzil's version is just one more tired version of the
>humanist arrogance that no matter how many philosophical revolutions we
>delude ourselves we have gone through we seem to keep repeating. The
>epistemological difficulties we encounter in our clumsy attempts to access
>the 'what is' should not allow us ala, Descartes, Hegel, Plato, Parmenides,
>add as one wishes, to put the real as a transcendent entity, God, Geist, the
>Forms, the Lacanian Real, Kantian noumena etc., somewhere beyond our
>comprehension. The actual, the here and now, is not necessarily the 'real',
>things could always be otherwise and there is much going on behind our backs
>that we may never gain access to, which affects our life: the depletion of
>the ozone layer didn't just begin when we constructed our narrative of it.
>Reality, may well be much stranger than any fiction we can construct about it.
>From arrogance to arrogance how about the pervasive arrogance (Heidegger, e.g) you seem to share of
reducing all philosophical writing of almost three millenia to a single sentence. The Lacanian real equals
the Pareminian Being equal the Kantian nuomena, are you serious? The distinction between meaning and
being (actual facts), and the rejection of meaning in favour of being, is the pillar of logical positivism. F's
distinction between discourse and the non-discoursive is a quite different one, because both "facts" and
their "meaning" are produced in the encounter between the discursive and the non-discursive. Facts and
meanings are different *discursive* entities.
>I am constantly amazed at the way people seem to keep reading, if that is
>the right word, the likes of Derrida and Foucault as linguistic idealists.
>It really does come to something when Derrida has to declare:
>"I never cease to be surprised by critics who see my work as a declaration
>that there is nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned in language;
>it is, in fact, saying the exact opposite. The critique of logocentrism is
>above all else the search for the "other" and the "other of language"".
I am amazed too, and I think it is a part of a strategy of avoidance. "We know how to treat linguistic idealists.
That's easy. Post-modernism is linguistic Idealism. Ergo: We know how to deal with Post-modernism'.
>Perhaps, Geography might be a subject that all social theorists should be
>'forced' to study. Knowing where one is and has been, philosophically
>speaking, might enable one to stop going round in circles.
The return of repressed/ing Humanism: You really believe that social theorists will improve their politics if
their knowledge is improved?
-------------
Gabriel Ash
Notre-Dame
-------------
>Quetzil said:
>
> i certainly do not believe that
>>what is and the meaning of what is are separable entities,
>
>What is, will be what it 'is', whatever 'meaning' we arrogant 'humans'
>decide to give it. Quetzil's version is just one more tired version of the
>humanist arrogance that no matter how many philosophical revolutions we
>delude ourselves we have gone through we seem to keep repeating. The
>epistemological difficulties we encounter in our clumsy attempts to access
>the 'what is' should not allow us ala, Descartes, Hegel, Plato, Parmenides,
>add as one wishes, to put the real as a transcendent entity, God, Geist, the
>Forms, the Lacanian Real, Kantian noumena etc., somewhere beyond our
>comprehension. The actual, the here and now, is not necessarily the 'real',
>things could always be otherwise and there is much going on behind our backs
>that we may never gain access to, which affects our life: the depletion of
>the ozone layer didn't just begin when we constructed our narrative of it.
>Reality, may well be much stranger than any fiction we can construct about it.
>From arrogance to arrogance how about the pervasive arrogance (Heidegger, e.g) you seem to share of
reducing all philosophical writing of almost three millenia to a single sentence. The Lacanian real equals
the Pareminian Being equal the Kantian nuomena, are you serious? The distinction between meaning and
being (actual facts), and the rejection of meaning in favour of being, is the pillar of logical positivism. F's
distinction between discourse and the non-discoursive is a quite different one, because both "facts" and
their "meaning" are produced in the encounter between the discursive and the non-discursive. Facts and
meanings are different *discursive* entities.
>I am constantly amazed at the way people seem to keep reading, if that is
>the right word, the likes of Derrida and Foucault as linguistic idealists.
>It really does come to something when Derrida has to declare:
>"I never cease to be surprised by critics who see my work as a declaration
>that there is nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned in language;
>it is, in fact, saying the exact opposite. The critique of logocentrism is
>above all else the search for the "other" and the "other of language"".
I am amazed too, and I think it is a part of a strategy of avoidance. "We know how to treat linguistic idealists.
That's easy. Post-modernism is linguistic Idealism. Ergo: We know how to deal with Post-modernism'.
>Perhaps, Geography might be a subject that all social theorists should be
>'forced' to study. Knowing where one is and has been, philosophically
>speaking, might enable one to stop going round in circles.
The return of repressed/ing Humanism: You really believe that social theorists will improve their politics if
their knowledge is improved?
-------------
Gabriel Ash
Notre-Dame
-------------