Perhaps the goal of "rational communication" is amiss
because it requires an essentially rational subject to get
off the ground. The idea of a form of rational
communication which is non-essentialist is not, of itself,
an impossible ideal. But we have to make allowances for
different kinds of rationality; this, unfortunately, is
habermas' fatal weakness. he's not interested in
rationalities - in that Kantian/Hegelian/(Hitlerian?)
tradition, the REAL is The rational, and so on. Sorry, but
in that discourse, there's only one form of rationality (and
communication, really) available. This form can't have a
history id it is to serve as the ground and measure of
history.
we can, as Focuault does, speak of divegernt rationalities,
and forms of communication within and among them. That not
only seems to be a much clearer description of how things
actually do happen, it is not overladen with a
transcendental subjekt either.
------------------
because it requires an essentially rational subject to get
off the ground. The idea of a form of rational
communication which is non-essentialist is not, of itself,
an impossible ideal. But we have to make allowances for
different kinds of rationality; this, unfortunately, is
habermas' fatal weakness. he's not interested in
rationalities - in that Kantian/Hegelian/(Hitlerian?)
tradition, the REAL is The rational, and so on. Sorry, but
in that discourse, there's only one form of rationality (and
communication, really) available. This form can't have a
history id it is to serve as the ground and measure of
history.
we can, as Focuault does, speak of divegernt rationalities,
and forms of communication within and among them. That not
only seems to be a much clearer description of how things
actually do happen, it is not overladen with a
transcendental subjekt either.
------------------