Re: Re[2]: >Habermas is Habermas, 'nough said.

I agree.

At 04:59 PM 3/12/96, you wrote:
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>Subject: Re[2]: >Habermas is Habermas, 'nough said.
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>Joe Cronin, et. al.,
> I'd like to throw in one more theme:
>> "I think, in fact, that reason is self-created, which is why
>> I have tried to analyse forms of rationality: different
>> foundations, different creations, different modifications in
>> which rationalities engender one another, oppose and pursue
>> one another." (Politics, Philosophy, Culture 28-29)
>> I think that F's conception of ratioanlities and power
>> relations poses a severe challenge to the critical
>> theorists, and that the heart of teh challenge concenrs the
>> two principles mentioned: the (self)cretivity of
>> ratioanlities, and the principle of immanence. For the
>> "critters," reason has an exteriority - it lies apart from
>> power relations, just as the Descartes found it necessary
>> for the subject to stand apart from its object.
> Okay, I understand that Foucault thinks that rationality, that is
>what counts as reasonable and as something possible to say in a meaningful
>way, depends on the discourse in which it occurs. Any discourse defines by
>its discursive rules what can be said and what is reasonable to say- it
>does so by "defining" concepts and "pointing" to certain objects. Thus
>reason is a very subjective (at least to a discourse and perhaps a people
>engaged in a specific discourse) thing. Scientists will not accept as
>reasonable any claims that try to explain away evolution and scientific
>data by reference to God's hands. Similarly, some religious sects won't
>accept as reasonable claims made by scientists that the Earth is several
>billion years old and that dinosaurs died out long before humankind came
>along. (This is a particularly relevant issue in Kentucky because some
>religious group is proposing building a museum which takes the latter point
>of view in its displays.)
> But this does not mean that there is no external rationality per
>se. I am not convinced that F denies that there is. Those of you who are
>familiar with Gutting's _Foucault's Archeology of Scientific Reasoning_
>knows he defends a position that F beleived progress could be made in
>discovering the truth. If this is a reasnable and valid understanding of F
>(particularly against others such as Lyotard) then it would follow that F
>accepted that there was some external rationality.
> Unfortunately for Gutting's position, F does not defend such a view
>and states at other times things like there is no external rationality.
> Even so, I am not willing to give F the prize here without some
>defense of the position of the Frankfurt School/Critical Theorists. I
>suppose that as an essentialist, I beleive in some external measure of
>rationality and reason. But since we are human beings who are fallible and
>limited, our access (am I sounding too Platonic) to such reason is
>jeopardized and does not give us full use of that reason. But indeed we do
>use it. This is how multiple rationalities occur- through various cultures
>and societies which have a different access route to rationality itself
>(now that does sound Platonic, sorry).
> I am still not convinced by F or Lyotard that all life and
>rationality is incommensuarable, and that we are each engaged in different
>games where rules do not cross borders. How then, does one defend against
>University of Kentucky


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