Response to JLN et al:
The problem with the Gilligan-style feminist "rationality"
is twofold: first of all, she is not describing a
rationality, but its "female" counterpart, compassion,
sentiment, etc. Here she is caught in the same old jargon
as the neo-Kantians.
What I would like someone to comment on is FOucault's notion
that: 1. a rationality is immanent to a discourse (HS,
ENGLISH edition(sorry), p. 94-95:
1. "Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or
shared"
2. "Relations of power are not in a position of
exteriority.."
3. "there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition
between rulers and ruled at teh root of power relations..."
4. "Power realtions are both intentional and nonsubjective."
Alongside these Spinozistic (can I say that?)
considerations of th immanence of rationalities in power
relations, I'd like to throw in one more theme:
"I think, in fact, that reason is self-created, which is why
I have tried to analyse forms of rationality: different
foundations, different creations, different modifications in
which rationalities engender one another, oppose and pursue
one another." (Politics, Philosophy, Culture 28-29)
I think that F's conception of ratioanlities and power
relations poses a severe challenge to the critical
theorists, and that the heart of teh challenge concenrs the
two principles mentioned: the (self)cretivity of
ratioanlities, and the principle of immanence. For the
"critters," reason has an exteriority - it lies apart from
power relations, just as the Descartes found it necessary
for the subject to stand apart from its object.
Joe Cronin
TMC
croninj@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------
The problem with the Gilligan-style feminist "rationality"
is twofold: first of all, she is not describing a
rationality, but its "female" counterpart, compassion,
sentiment, etc. Here she is caught in the same old jargon
as the neo-Kantians.
What I would like someone to comment on is FOucault's notion
that: 1. a rationality is immanent to a discourse (HS,
ENGLISH edition(sorry), p. 94-95:
1. "Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or
shared"
2. "Relations of power are not in a position of
exteriority.."
3. "there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition
between rulers and ruled at teh root of power relations..."
4. "Power realtions are both intentional and nonsubjective."
Alongside these Spinozistic (can I say that?)
considerations of th immanence of rationalities in power
relations, I'd like to throw in one more theme:
"I think, in fact, that reason is self-created, which is why
I have tried to analyse forms of rationality: different
foundations, different creations, different modifications in
which rationalities engender one another, oppose and pursue
one another." (Politics, Philosophy, Culture 28-29)
I think that F's conception of ratioanlities and power
relations poses a severe challenge to the critical
theorists, and that the heart of teh challenge concenrs the
two principles mentioned: the (self)cretivity of
ratioanlities, and the principle of immanence. For the
"critters," reason has an exteriority - it lies apart from
power relations, just as the Descartes found it necessary
for the subject to stand apart from its object.
Joe Cronin
TMC
croninj@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------