At 03:19 PM 7/23/96 -0500, you wrote:
I'm intersted in knowing what W's "sceptical paradox" is.
>I'm reading Zizek about Lacan, but he is discussing Hegel's deduction of
>monarchy from his philosophy of right (as he describes it). He says
T: First of all, nice trap. Explaining Wittgenstein's sceptical paradox in
this forum could be difficult. Here is a shot: Wittgenstein is getting at
the notion of certainty, or rather, uncertainty. But you have to understand
that his ideas on certainty are presented in the context of playing games,
through language, in which we, as individuals, and collectively, constitute
the rules and structure of the very game(s) we play.
Now doubt and certainty can change with the sort of game we play, depending
on the various interpretations of the rules of structure at work and how we
contribute in space and time, and so on. So, scepticism, as much as it is a
quest for certainty, a certainty that can never be achieved absolutely, is
our perpetual state. Indeed it is the most profitable state we can assume
given our relative circumstances. Moreover, scepticism is actually a key to
community and social relations in general, as it prevents us from ever
BELIEVING that we are sure, with authority, about what we know.
Various examples in the history of war show the drastic consequences that
can arise when two communities violently oppose each other's convictions and
challange each one another's authority to be absolutely right.
>
> "This coincidence of pure Culture (the empty signifier)
>with the left over of Nature in the person of the king entails the paradox
>of the king's relationship toward's law...In this sense, monarch functions
>as a personification of Wittgenstein's 'sceptical paradox...'"
T: Do you know any International Relations Theory on the concept of
Sovereignty?
>Later Zizek talks about the "Wittgensteinian definition of identity,"
>and I'd like to know more about that, also. I suspect that it is
>quite similar to Hegel's just by the way Zizek writes about it.
T: Wittgenstein could never offer a "definition of identity." The very
notion is ludicrous.
> Like Tina Chanter writing on Irigaray, Zizek spends more time
>discussing Hegel's ideas than he does the ostensible subject of the book...
T: Never heard Irigary, thank god.
>Thanks to the rest of you for your tolerance (Hegel says it is already
>decided that you will grant even before I asked. Or was that God who
>said that: I get confused.)
T: I too am confused.
Bye
>
>Darlene Sybert
>*****************************************************************************
> ...feelings too
>Of unremembered pleasure: such, perhaps
>As have no slight or trivial influence
>On that best portion of a good man's life,
>His little, nameless, unremembered acts
>Of kindness and of love... -Wm Wordsworth
> "LINES Composed A Few Miles Above Tinturn Abbey,
> On Revisiting the Banks of the Wye [River]
> During a Tour, July 11, 1798"
>******************************************************************************
>
>
>
>
I'm intersted in knowing what W's "sceptical paradox" is.
>I'm reading Zizek about Lacan, but he is discussing Hegel's deduction of
>monarchy from his philosophy of right (as he describes it). He says
T: First of all, nice trap. Explaining Wittgenstein's sceptical paradox in
this forum could be difficult. Here is a shot: Wittgenstein is getting at
the notion of certainty, or rather, uncertainty. But you have to understand
that his ideas on certainty are presented in the context of playing games,
through language, in which we, as individuals, and collectively, constitute
the rules and structure of the very game(s) we play.
Now doubt and certainty can change with the sort of game we play, depending
on the various interpretations of the rules of structure at work and how we
contribute in space and time, and so on. So, scepticism, as much as it is a
quest for certainty, a certainty that can never be achieved absolutely, is
our perpetual state. Indeed it is the most profitable state we can assume
given our relative circumstances. Moreover, scepticism is actually a key to
community and social relations in general, as it prevents us from ever
BELIEVING that we are sure, with authority, about what we know.
Various examples in the history of war show the drastic consequences that
can arise when two communities violently oppose each other's convictions and
challange each one another's authority to be absolutely right.
>
> "This coincidence of pure Culture (the empty signifier)
>with the left over of Nature in the person of the king entails the paradox
>of the king's relationship toward's law...In this sense, monarch functions
>as a personification of Wittgenstein's 'sceptical paradox...'"
T: Do you know any International Relations Theory on the concept of
Sovereignty?
>Later Zizek talks about the "Wittgensteinian definition of identity,"
>and I'd like to know more about that, also. I suspect that it is
>quite similar to Hegel's just by the way Zizek writes about it.
T: Wittgenstein could never offer a "definition of identity." The very
notion is ludicrous.
> Like Tina Chanter writing on Irigaray, Zizek spends more time
>discussing Hegel's ideas than he does the ostensible subject of the book...
T: Never heard Irigary, thank god.
>Thanks to the rest of you for your tolerance (Hegel says it is already
>decided that you will grant even before I asked. Or was that God who
>said that: I get confused.)
T: I too am confused.
Bye
>
>Darlene Sybert
>*****************************************************************************
> ...feelings too
>Of unremembered pleasure: such, perhaps
>As have no slight or trivial influence
>On that best portion of a good man's life,
>His little, nameless, unremembered acts
>Of kindness and of love... -Wm Wordsworth
> "LINES Composed A Few Miles Above Tinturn Abbey,
> On Revisiting the Banks of the Wye [River]
> During a Tour, July 11, 1798"
>******************************************************************************
>
>
>
>