John wrote:
>But I don't think that argument is very persuasive. Power constitutes us.
>That doesn't mean that power is able to permanently control the
>consequences of that constitution. Let's say someone teaches us how to
>write--perhaps the state in the form of a compulsory education system.
Err, can I ask who built the state? A bunch of subjects perhaps? (I feel an
infinite regress coming on)
The
>state has its own "reasons of state" for making this a part of the
>curriculum: it needs bureaucrats who can write. Power "constitutes"
>generations upon generations of young people who can write. But this
>constitution of individuals is clearly on some level an empowerment of
>them as well.
This is a nice claim, but you would have to legitimate it from the position
>from which you articulate it. Where does this locus of resistance exist?
>
>That individuals are constituted does not mean they are mere cogs in a
>machine. That *can* happen, but it is not an automatic consequence of the
>operation of power vis-a-vis individuals.
But why not? if the subject has no existence prior to the discourse (which
is actually a rapamant structuralist position - links to Althusser here) and
it is in fact, a product of the discourse, then once constituted every move
it makes is for and of the discourse. This is the point about the lack of
agency. If the subject is totally constituted by the discourse and we know
this, we should do nothing if we wish to resist. (of course, the question of
'out of what material is this subject constructed?' is also an thorn in the
side for Foucault, after all, the kinds of subjects we can make out of wood
is different from that we can make out of human beings, that is, the
material puts limits on the discourse).
Spivak argues that for agency to be possible it must be located in the
'freedom of subjectivity'. I think early Foucault would have some difficulty
with this, but the later Foucault came to recognise it's necessity for
Politics to be possible (just as Derrida has come to recognise that for
justice and/or politics to be possible some part of the discourse must be
exempt from deconstruction - do we see the rebirth of God here, or simply a
spectre of marx?).
Anyway, Foucualt makes this explicit when he says that what his work has
actually being about is the way 'HUMAN BEINGS are made subjects'. I am sure
that some died in the wool members of the Foucault industry (hi Murray, is
this the tone you were referring to (BTW, I am not suggesting that Murray is
one of these)) will recoil in horror at this and attempt, paradoxically
enough, to get at some deeper meaning behind this and claim that they can
see inside Foucault's mind (thus unconsciously legitimating the notion of
freedom of subjectivity) and claim that 'by human, Foucault meant...', or
that he was only being ironic (what sort of argument is this by the way?).
How I read it on the other hand, and taking Foucault at his word, is that
Foucault can in no way be read as a naive ant-humanist (whatever that might
mean).
>
>The individual does not have to be repressed in order to make sense out of
>oppositional activity.
'Human beings made subjects', which implies a normative point and alludes to
the fact that they could be otherwise. Foucault has his own repressive
hypothesis.
Thanks,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
>But I don't think that argument is very persuasive. Power constitutes us.
>That doesn't mean that power is able to permanently control the
>consequences of that constitution. Let's say someone teaches us how to
>write--perhaps the state in the form of a compulsory education system.
Err, can I ask who built the state? A bunch of subjects perhaps? (I feel an
infinite regress coming on)
The
>state has its own "reasons of state" for making this a part of the
>curriculum: it needs bureaucrats who can write. Power "constitutes"
>generations upon generations of young people who can write. But this
>constitution of individuals is clearly on some level an empowerment of
>them as well.
This is a nice claim, but you would have to legitimate it from the position
>from which you articulate it. Where does this locus of resistance exist?
>
>That individuals are constituted does not mean they are mere cogs in a
>machine. That *can* happen, but it is not an automatic consequence of the
>operation of power vis-a-vis individuals.
But why not? if the subject has no existence prior to the discourse (which
is actually a rapamant structuralist position - links to Althusser here) and
it is in fact, a product of the discourse, then once constituted every move
it makes is for and of the discourse. This is the point about the lack of
agency. If the subject is totally constituted by the discourse and we know
this, we should do nothing if we wish to resist. (of course, the question of
'out of what material is this subject constructed?' is also an thorn in the
side for Foucault, after all, the kinds of subjects we can make out of wood
is different from that we can make out of human beings, that is, the
material puts limits on the discourse).
Spivak argues that for agency to be possible it must be located in the
'freedom of subjectivity'. I think early Foucault would have some difficulty
with this, but the later Foucault came to recognise it's necessity for
Politics to be possible (just as Derrida has come to recognise that for
justice and/or politics to be possible some part of the discourse must be
exempt from deconstruction - do we see the rebirth of God here, or simply a
spectre of marx?).
Anyway, Foucualt makes this explicit when he says that what his work has
actually being about is the way 'HUMAN BEINGS are made subjects'. I am sure
that some died in the wool members of the Foucault industry (hi Murray, is
this the tone you were referring to (BTW, I am not suggesting that Murray is
one of these)) will recoil in horror at this and attempt, paradoxically
enough, to get at some deeper meaning behind this and claim that they can
see inside Foucault's mind (thus unconsciously legitimating the notion of
freedom of subjectivity) and claim that 'by human, Foucault meant...', or
that he was only being ironic (what sort of argument is this by the way?).
How I read it on the other hand, and taking Foucault at his word, is that
Foucault can in no way be read as a naive ant-humanist (whatever that might
mean).
>
>The individual does not have to be repressed in order to make sense out of
>oppositional activity.
'Human beings made subjects', which implies a normative point and alludes to
the fact that they could be otherwise. Foucault has his own repressive
hypothesis.
Thanks,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------