On Sat, 15 Mar 1997, John Ransom quoted F's "Preface to Transgression"
as follows:
> Selection #9: Since this existence [of the relation between transgression
> and limit-jsr] is both so pure and so complicated, it must be detached
> from its questionable association to ethics if we want to understand it
> and to begin thinking from it and in the space it denotes; it must be
> liberated from the scandalous or subversive, that is, from anything
> aroused by negative associations. Transgression does not seek to oppose
> one thing to another, nor does it achieve its purpose through mockery or
> by upsetting the solidity of foundations; it does not transform the other
> side of the mirror, beyond an invisible and uncrossable line, into a
> glittering expanse. Transgression is neither violence in a divided world
> (in an ethical world) nor a victory over limits (in a dialectical or
> revolutionary world); and exactly for this reason, its role is to measure
> the excessive distance that it opens at the heart of the limit and to
> trace the flashing line that causes the limit to arise. Transgression
> contains nothing negative, but affirms limited being--affirms the
> limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens this zone to existence
> for the first time. (p. 35)
>
I think it's valuable to compare F's approach to transgression with
Hegel's. In the _Introduction to the Philosophy of History_ Hegel writes,
It is the passions, the aims of particular interests, the satisfaction of
selfish desire that are the most forceful things. They get their power
>from the fact that they observe none of the limits which the law and
morality would seek to impose upon them--and from the fact that these
forces of nature are closer and more immediate to human beings than the
artificial and tedious discipline toward order and moderation, toward law
and morality. (Hegel, _Intro to the Philosophy of History_, trans. Leo
Rausch; Hackett, 1988, p. 23.)
Clearly both Hegel and Foucault are concerned about limits and what the
significance of a transgression can be. Hegel seems to be suggesting
that transgressions should be assessed relative to their capacity to
draw Spirit into new, deeper, and horizon-shattering advances in
self-consciousness. Put simply, when Napoleon is wandering around Europe
passing out democratic constitutions to everyone and giving the idea of
the French Revolution such incredible press, you do not stop (him) to ask
about the body count.
So F is interested in the same phenomenon Hegel is, namely the unique role
of transgressive activity. (H says the forces behind such acts "are closer
and more immediate to human beings.") But F is going to develop his
account in a way that is opposed to the attempts of thinkers like Hegel to
recouperate transgressive acts and subordinate them all (along with
everything else) to Spirit's developmental imperative.
In any event, I think further (and hopefully deeper) comparisons of
Hegel's "logic" concerning limits and their transcendence with F's attempt
to rethink the same phenomenon in a different context would produce real
insights into the thinking of both.
--John
as follows:
> Selection #9: Since this existence [of the relation between transgression
> and limit-jsr] is both so pure and so complicated, it must be detached
> from its questionable association to ethics if we want to understand it
> and to begin thinking from it and in the space it denotes; it must be
> liberated from the scandalous or subversive, that is, from anything
> aroused by negative associations. Transgression does not seek to oppose
> one thing to another, nor does it achieve its purpose through mockery or
> by upsetting the solidity of foundations; it does not transform the other
> side of the mirror, beyond an invisible and uncrossable line, into a
> glittering expanse. Transgression is neither violence in a divided world
> (in an ethical world) nor a victory over limits (in a dialectical or
> revolutionary world); and exactly for this reason, its role is to measure
> the excessive distance that it opens at the heart of the limit and to
> trace the flashing line that causes the limit to arise. Transgression
> contains nothing negative, but affirms limited being--affirms the
> limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens this zone to existence
> for the first time. (p. 35)
>
I think it's valuable to compare F's approach to transgression with
Hegel's. In the _Introduction to the Philosophy of History_ Hegel writes,
It is the passions, the aims of particular interests, the satisfaction of
selfish desire that are the most forceful things. They get their power
>from the fact that they observe none of the limits which the law and
morality would seek to impose upon them--and from the fact that these
forces of nature are closer and more immediate to human beings than the
artificial and tedious discipline toward order and moderation, toward law
and morality. (Hegel, _Intro to the Philosophy of History_, trans. Leo
Rausch; Hackett, 1988, p. 23.)
Clearly both Hegel and Foucault are concerned about limits and what the
significance of a transgression can be. Hegel seems to be suggesting
that transgressions should be assessed relative to their capacity to
draw Spirit into new, deeper, and horizon-shattering advances in
self-consciousness. Put simply, when Napoleon is wandering around Europe
passing out democratic constitutions to everyone and giving the idea of
the French Revolution such incredible press, you do not stop (him) to ask
about the body count.
So F is interested in the same phenomenon Hegel is, namely the unique role
of transgressive activity. (H says the forces behind such acts "are closer
and more immediate to human beings.") But F is going to develop his
account in a way that is opposed to the attempts of thinkers like Hegel to
recouperate transgressive acts and subordinate them all (along with
everything else) to Spirit's developmental imperative.
In any event, I think further (and hopefully deeper) comparisons of
Hegel's "logic" concerning limits and their transcendence with F's attempt
to rethink the same phenomenon in a different context would produce real
insights into the thinking of both.
--John