Leo
Thanks for your reply. I hope this contributes to your/our aim of a
'fruitful and productive dialogue'.
>The issue I would like to take up
>involves the distinction between authority and authoritarianism.
>I agree with Stuart that it is useful to think of the relationship as a
>continuum -- indeed, my original point was that it is a conceptual mistake
to
>collapse authoritarianism into authority, as if all forms of authority are
>innately authoritarian.
I wonder if we are slightly at cross purposes here. It might be a conceptual
mistake to collapse authoritarianism into authority, but I think we should
realise that all forms of authoritarianism innately trade on a concept of
authority. i wonder if the distinction is quantitative rather than
qualitative.
>I do, however, want to add some pretty important
>caveats to the idea of a continuum. Interestingly enough, I took a position
>rather close to what Stuart proposes when I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on
the
>problem of state authoritarianism in democratic and political theory about
ten
>years ago. As Stuart notes, it is important to see authoritarianism as a
>potential in all modern states, given the specific form and constitution
(in
>the generic sense) of that state. This is a particularly important insight
>with the contemporary growth of bureaucratic statism, a kind of -- for the
>lack of a better term -- creeping authoritarianism. In this vein, I think
that
>one of the more interesting engagements with Foucault was Nicos Poulantzas'
>_State, Power, Socialism_ in which Poulantzas took up this issue, but with
a
>perspective that took the role of the state in power relations more
seriously
>than Foucault did. While Poulantzas' perspective was unduly gloomy, IMHO,
he
>did an excellent job of analyzing some crucial, widespread developments in
the
>direction of state authoritarianism (i.e., the decline of civil liberties,
>growing predominance of the executive over the legislative branches, the
>growing collapse of independent, mass political parties into state forms)
and
>related them to the expansion of disciplinary power and state normalization
of
>the individual.
Poulantzas' book is important I think. I haven't read this for a while, and
intend to return to it soon. One of my future projects is to look at Henri
Lefebvre's 4 vol De l'Etat, which Poulantzas cites as important and similar
to his work. I would also recommend Mark Neocleous' Administering Civil
Society, Macmillan/St Martins, 1996 which engages with Hegel, Marx and
Foucault, amongst others, on the issue of the state/civil society
distinction and develops the notion of political administration. Mark was my
PhD supervisor, and is currently working on two book projects: one on the
term 'police', another on the state. Both further the project of
Administering Civil Society.
>It is possible to accept this continuum, and still see a vital importance
to
>making distinctions between different points along that continuum. The fact
>that a liberal or representative democracy, a fascist and a Stalinist state
>are all modern states which are located at different points along that
>continuum does not mean, IMO, that there are not absolutely vital and
salient
>differences among them.
Sure, but the point being made was that they share a common essence. One of
Foucault's most important critiques within his work on power is to dispute
the liberal distinction between power and authority.
>What is important, I would contend, is not figuring
>out where to draw a line of demarcation, as if there was a particular point
at
>which we could unequivocally say that a state is now authoritarian. In
part,
>this is because such narrowly taxonomic exercises usually serve little
purpose
>beyond academic discourse;
Though it would also be crucial in political discourse. Though the line of
demarcation might be academic, the distinction is used practically all the
time. As an example, the opposition set up between Serbia and the NATO
countries at the moment.
>in part, it is because the continuum metaphor would begin to break down in
>such an exercise, since there are a number of different axes along which
>authoritarianism develops, and there is no one linear
>progression from representative democracy to an authoritarian state, or
vice
>versa. But it is necessary, I would insist, to have conceptions of
different
>forms of the modern state, even if they are 'ideal types' in a Weberian
sense,
>for without them one is not able to wage political struggle at the level of
>the state structure, with any notion of what one is fighting for and where
one
>wants to head. If a conception of individual rights in a representative
>democracy and the disciplinary, normalizing discourse of the individual in
an
>authoritarian state are all one and the same thing ?- and yes, I do
understand
>their common discursive roots in humanist ideology ?- then why should we
care
>which is hegemonic? Only those whose individual rights are not in question
can
>blithely dismiss the significance of that particular discursive construct.
What criteria would then be used to demarcate, distinguish?
>Now, what I propose is not a classical liberal, binary conception of modern
>states, as others have suggested; we are not talking about a contrast
between
>the rule of law and the rule of men, between liberty and despotism, or any
one
>of a number of formulations of that concept. Quite clearly, authority is
not
>the polar 'other,' the negation, of authoritarianism. Rather, authority is
a
>necessary component of all modern states and societies -- as Foucault would
>put it, there is no 'outside' to, no escape from, power. Moreover,
authority
>is at the core of the authoritarian dynamic in the modern state. But
authority
>is simply not organized or structured in the same way in all modern states.
The >mark of an authoritarian state is unbridled, unfettered authority. The
>mark of a liberal or representative democracy are restraints and limits on
the
>exercise of authority.
I wonder how this works out in practice. This seems to be suggesting that
authority acts without limit/restraint in authoritarian states. I'm not sure
this is the case. Take Nazi Germany for example. Many of its acts of
authority were constrained by law, but we might want to challenge those very
laws. The Nuremberg laws, for example, legitimised and delimited a number of
practices we might call authoritarian. Is not the question rather of some
universal norm by which we measure the practice of authority? I am
uncomfortable with this, though realise its practical efficacy.
Are you suggesting a liberal state = authority with limits; an authoritarian
state = authority without limits? But surely the notion of authority = power
+ legitimacy (i.e. limits?), at least in common (liberal) parlance. If so,
does this mean authoritarianism = power (i.e. authority - legitimacy);
liberal = authority? This requires a fairly narrow view of what legitimacy
might be, and risks the sort of binary Foucault tried to critique.
Now I realise all of this starts to collapse if you argue limits does not
equal legitimacy. This is a fair enough point. But by what crititeria do you
then look at limits? A democratic state, with parliamentary sovereignty
could legally, legitimately, enact laws which seriously endangered civil
liberties, etc. and were therefore authoritarian. An example: British use of
internment in Northern Ireland. Because these are therefore the practice of
authority within limits does this mean they are not authoritarian?
I am uncomfortable with this notion that authoritarianism is authority
without limits. Rather we need to look at what the limits, what the legal
framework, etc. is. The question is how do we evaluate. I don't know the
answer to this.
There is a world of difference between Macbeth's rule in Scotland and
Hitler's rule in Germany. What makes Nazi Germany so worrying is the
bureaucratic, legalistic framework within which so many of its atrocities
took place. It is because this framework bears comparison with the framework
of Britain today that I am interested in this question. Now, I don't want to
understate the differences, but equally we shouldn't understate the
similarities.
BTW I don't think my comparison of Foucault with Heidegger in a previous
mail was correct. Heidegger's distinction between the similar (Gleiche) and
the same (Selbe) is not as I portrayed it. Heidegger's point is that modern
agriculture, the gas chambers, the atom bomb, and famine are the same in
their essence (not in essence the same). Whilst non-technically we might
therefore say they are similar, Heidegger would not. He would say, in their
essence, i.e. in their underlying structure, their Ge-stell, they are the
same.
>To return to the question of education, I would argue that all education
>requires some conception of authority. The very task of education ?- the
>introduction of a young person into her/his culture, broadly understood ?-
is
>predicated on a power (knowledge is power) inequality. But it is possible
to
>conceive of a teacher as a democratic authority, as someone who understands
>that he/she is she is a mentor, the senior and guiding partner in an
ongoing,
>teaching and learning relationship and dialogue with other, younger human
>beings entrusted to her care. This conception involves a difficult and
>nuanced, but nonetheless vital balance between the directive leadership
>qualities and the responsive listening qualities of a teacher. The problem
is
>not simply that such a concept is lost in the vulgar Foucaultian reduction
of
>school to prison, of all authority to authoritarianism; it is that it is
not
>even thinkable within its parameters.
I don't think Foucault is reducing schools to prisons, rather saying that
they share enough similarities to make a striking comparison. Or perhaps
rather, their underlying essence is the same. There is a danger in reading
Discipline and Punish the wrong way round. I don't think Foucault is using
the prison to understand society, but rather using society to understand the
prison. The prison is the structures of the army, medicine, schools, etc.
taken to their extreme.
I've said enough, and I realise some of this is sketchy at best. I think
we're aiming in the same direction, but I wonder if the mechanisms you would
like to use to distinguish fall back on the same problems Foucault
identified.
Best wishes
Stuart
Thanks for your reply. I hope this contributes to your/our aim of a
'fruitful and productive dialogue'.
>The issue I would like to take up
>involves the distinction between authority and authoritarianism.
>I agree with Stuart that it is useful to think of the relationship as a
>continuum -- indeed, my original point was that it is a conceptual mistake
to
>collapse authoritarianism into authority, as if all forms of authority are
>innately authoritarian.
I wonder if we are slightly at cross purposes here. It might be a conceptual
mistake to collapse authoritarianism into authority, but I think we should
realise that all forms of authoritarianism innately trade on a concept of
authority. i wonder if the distinction is quantitative rather than
qualitative.
>I do, however, want to add some pretty important
>caveats to the idea of a continuum. Interestingly enough, I took a position
>rather close to what Stuart proposes when I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on
the
>problem of state authoritarianism in democratic and political theory about
ten
>years ago. As Stuart notes, it is important to see authoritarianism as a
>potential in all modern states, given the specific form and constitution
(in
>the generic sense) of that state. This is a particularly important insight
>with the contemporary growth of bureaucratic statism, a kind of -- for the
>lack of a better term -- creeping authoritarianism. In this vein, I think
that
>one of the more interesting engagements with Foucault was Nicos Poulantzas'
>_State, Power, Socialism_ in which Poulantzas took up this issue, but with
a
>perspective that took the role of the state in power relations more
seriously
>than Foucault did. While Poulantzas' perspective was unduly gloomy, IMHO,
he
>did an excellent job of analyzing some crucial, widespread developments in
the
>direction of state authoritarianism (i.e., the decline of civil liberties,
>growing predominance of the executive over the legislative branches, the
>growing collapse of independent, mass political parties into state forms)
and
>related them to the expansion of disciplinary power and state normalization
of
>the individual.
Poulantzas' book is important I think. I haven't read this for a while, and
intend to return to it soon. One of my future projects is to look at Henri
Lefebvre's 4 vol De l'Etat, which Poulantzas cites as important and similar
to his work. I would also recommend Mark Neocleous' Administering Civil
Society, Macmillan/St Martins, 1996 which engages with Hegel, Marx and
Foucault, amongst others, on the issue of the state/civil society
distinction and develops the notion of political administration. Mark was my
PhD supervisor, and is currently working on two book projects: one on the
term 'police', another on the state. Both further the project of
Administering Civil Society.
>It is possible to accept this continuum, and still see a vital importance
to
>making distinctions between different points along that continuum. The fact
>that a liberal or representative democracy, a fascist and a Stalinist state
>are all modern states which are located at different points along that
>continuum does not mean, IMO, that there are not absolutely vital and
salient
>differences among them.
Sure, but the point being made was that they share a common essence. One of
Foucault's most important critiques within his work on power is to dispute
the liberal distinction between power and authority.
>What is important, I would contend, is not figuring
>out where to draw a line of demarcation, as if there was a particular point
at
>which we could unequivocally say that a state is now authoritarian. In
part,
>this is because such narrowly taxonomic exercises usually serve little
purpose
>beyond academic discourse;
Though it would also be crucial in political discourse. Though the line of
demarcation might be academic, the distinction is used practically all the
time. As an example, the opposition set up between Serbia and the NATO
countries at the moment.
>in part, it is because the continuum metaphor would begin to break down in
>such an exercise, since there are a number of different axes along which
>authoritarianism develops, and there is no one linear
>progression from representative democracy to an authoritarian state, or
vice
>versa. But it is necessary, I would insist, to have conceptions of
different
>forms of the modern state, even if they are 'ideal types' in a Weberian
sense,
>for without them one is not able to wage political struggle at the level of
>the state structure, with any notion of what one is fighting for and where
one
>wants to head. If a conception of individual rights in a representative
>democracy and the disciplinary, normalizing discourse of the individual in
an
>authoritarian state are all one and the same thing ?- and yes, I do
understand
>their common discursive roots in humanist ideology ?- then why should we
care
>which is hegemonic? Only those whose individual rights are not in question
can
>blithely dismiss the significance of that particular discursive construct.
What criteria would then be used to demarcate, distinguish?
>Now, what I propose is not a classical liberal, binary conception of modern
>states, as others have suggested; we are not talking about a contrast
between
>the rule of law and the rule of men, between liberty and despotism, or any
one
>of a number of formulations of that concept. Quite clearly, authority is
not
>the polar 'other,' the negation, of authoritarianism. Rather, authority is
a
>necessary component of all modern states and societies -- as Foucault would
>put it, there is no 'outside' to, no escape from, power. Moreover,
authority
>is at the core of the authoritarian dynamic in the modern state. But
authority
>is simply not organized or structured in the same way in all modern states.
The >mark of an authoritarian state is unbridled, unfettered authority. The
>mark of a liberal or representative democracy are restraints and limits on
the
>exercise of authority.
I wonder how this works out in practice. This seems to be suggesting that
authority acts without limit/restraint in authoritarian states. I'm not sure
this is the case. Take Nazi Germany for example. Many of its acts of
authority were constrained by law, but we might want to challenge those very
laws. The Nuremberg laws, for example, legitimised and delimited a number of
practices we might call authoritarian. Is not the question rather of some
universal norm by which we measure the practice of authority? I am
uncomfortable with this, though realise its practical efficacy.
Are you suggesting a liberal state = authority with limits; an authoritarian
state = authority without limits? But surely the notion of authority = power
+ legitimacy (i.e. limits?), at least in common (liberal) parlance. If so,
does this mean authoritarianism = power (i.e. authority - legitimacy);
liberal = authority? This requires a fairly narrow view of what legitimacy
might be, and risks the sort of binary Foucault tried to critique.
Now I realise all of this starts to collapse if you argue limits does not
equal legitimacy. This is a fair enough point. But by what crititeria do you
then look at limits? A democratic state, with parliamentary sovereignty
could legally, legitimately, enact laws which seriously endangered civil
liberties, etc. and were therefore authoritarian. An example: British use of
internment in Northern Ireland. Because these are therefore the practice of
authority within limits does this mean they are not authoritarian?
I am uncomfortable with this notion that authoritarianism is authority
without limits. Rather we need to look at what the limits, what the legal
framework, etc. is. The question is how do we evaluate. I don't know the
answer to this.
There is a world of difference between Macbeth's rule in Scotland and
Hitler's rule in Germany. What makes Nazi Germany so worrying is the
bureaucratic, legalistic framework within which so many of its atrocities
took place. It is because this framework bears comparison with the framework
of Britain today that I am interested in this question. Now, I don't want to
understate the differences, but equally we shouldn't understate the
similarities.
BTW I don't think my comparison of Foucault with Heidegger in a previous
mail was correct. Heidegger's distinction between the similar (Gleiche) and
the same (Selbe) is not as I portrayed it. Heidegger's point is that modern
agriculture, the gas chambers, the atom bomb, and famine are the same in
their essence (not in essence the same). Whilst non-technically we might
therefore say they are similar, Heidegger would not. He would say, in their
essence, i.e. in their underlying structure, their Ge-stell, they are the
same.
>To return to the question of education, I would argue that all education
>requires some conception of authority. The very task of education ?- the
>introduction of a young person into her/his culture, broadly understood ?-
is
>predicated on a power (knowledge is power) inequality. But it is possible
to
>conceive of a teacher as a democratic authority, as someone who understands
>that he/she is she is a mentor, the senior and guiding partner in an
ongoing,
>teaching and learning relationship and dialogue with other, younger human
>beings entrusted to her care. This conception involves a difficult and
>nuanced, but nonetheless vital balance between the directive leadership
>qualities and the responsive listening qualities of a teacher. The problem
is
>not simply that such a concept is lost in the vulgar Foucaultian reduction
of
>school to prison, of all authority to authoritarianism; it is that it is
not
>even thinkable within its parameters.
I don't think Foucault is reducing schools to prisons, rather saying that
they share enough similarities to make a striking comparison. Or perhaps
rather, their underlying essence is the same. There is a danger in reading
Discipline and Punish the wrong way round. I don't think Foucault is using
the prison to understand society, but rather using society to understand the
prison. The prison is the structures of the army, medicine, schools, etc.
taken to their extreme.
I've said enough, and I realise some of this is sketchy at best. I think
we're aiming in the same direction, but I wonder if the mechanisms you would
like to use to distinguish fall back on the same problems Foucault
identified.
Best wishes
Stuart