At 08:05 18/10/1999 -0700, you wrote:
>Hello,
>I am on another list and the following "confusion" was written
>about.
>" I am very confused about a couple of issues, please help me!
>First, I am confused that a therapist would read Foucault and decide to
>talk about dominant discourses that oppress. Foucault also wrote about
>technologies of self which open up new possibilities for living life and
>being a person. Indeed, he called it an ethic of free choice through
>which people continously produce themselves. So, how come, we don't hear
>about this ethic of free choice? I'm so confused."
>Laura
>
>Hi Laura!
You're correct in identifying a deficiency in the secondary literature with
respect of Foucault's later work on technologies of the self and an
aesthetics of existence. It surprises me that there hasn't been a more
enthusiatic exploration of the potential of an ethics of self-fashioning
which seems at the very least to address the problem of resistance and
transgression in ways that Foucault's earlier material perhaps does not.
I'm not sure, however, that it's wise to think of Foucault's ethics as
entirely voluntarist or volitional; a misapprehension implied by describing
Foucault's ethics as an exercise in free choice. Whilst, of course the
problem of self-fashioning suggests a practice whereby the self develops a
relationship qua self in which the creation of alternative modes of
experiencing subjectivity and the body is explored; however, the suggestion
that such a practice is somehow outside of prevailing regimes of power and
subjectivation is not something Foucault would have entertained. Practices
of the self are not invented by the self (well very, very rarely!) but
rather are suggested or perhaps even imposed upon the self by the cultural
environment in which one finds oneself. So the extent to which such an
exercise represents free deliberation or rational choice seems quite
problematic. In this sense, modern practices of subjectivation will always
imvolve a complex network of relations of power/knowledge and subjection,
as well as the subject's own ethical practices which may or may not subvert
existing power relations. Hence the need for careful genealogical inquiry
which deploying the axes of truth, power and ethics, might allow the
specific intellectual to begin making claims about the effects of certain
practices and the political ramifications of existing identities and
techniques of subjectivation.
With respect of Foucault and therapy, I think Foucault would be very
suspicious of a formal therapeutic practice that sought to incorporate some
of his insights re self-fashioning whilst retaining the formal distiction
between analyst and analysand. Too much power and not enough resistance!
Perhaps an alternative is suggested by the development of a personal ethics
understood as the setting of personal rules of conduct whereby the self
must decide upon an ethical framework appropriate to one's experience
without the mediation of experts and doctors. Anyhow, I've recently heard
of a new publication (Adrenne S. Chambon, Allan Irving, Laura Epstein
Reading Foucault for Social Work New York: Columbia University Press, 1999)
that seems to address these issues in the context of occupational therapies
etc. I've not had a chance to have a look at this yet but it might be of
interest to you. One I have read is Greco, M. (1998) Illness as a Work of
Thought. A Foucauldian Perspective on Psychosomatics. London, Routledge,
November 1998. This is a fascinating work that takes on Butler and Foucault
in order to interrogate the operations of power through the body as evinced
in psychosomatic disorders. Out of left field but well worth a look!
Anyway, I don't know if any of this is of any use, but you've raised some
important issues which I'm sure others on the list will be eager to engage
(hint hint!)...
keep up the pressure!
cameron duff
U of Q Australia
>Hello,
>I am on another list and the following "confusion" was written
>about.
>" I am very confused about a couple of issues, please help me!
>First, I am confused that a therapist would read Foucault and decide to
>talk about dominant discourses that oppress. Foucault also wrote about
>technologies of self which open up new possibilities for living life and
>being a person. Indeed, he called it an ethic of free choice through
>which people continously produce themselves. So, how come, we don't hear
>about this ethic of free choice? I'm so confused."
>Laura
>
>Hi Laura!
You're correct in identifying a deficiency in the secondary literature with
respect of Foucault's later work on technologies of the self and an
aesthetics of existence. It surprises me that there hasn't been a more
enthusiatic exploration of the potential of an ethics of self-fashioning
which seems at the very least to address the problem of resistance and
transgression in ways that Foucault's earlier material perhaps does not.
I'm not sure, however, that it's wise to think of Foucault's ethics as
entirely voluntarist or volitional; a misapprehension implied by describing
Foucault's ethics as an exercise in free choice. Whilst, of course the
problem of self-fashioning suggests a practice whereby the self develops a
relationship qua self in which the creation of alternative modes of
experiencing subjectivity and the body is explored; however, the suggestion
that such a practice is somehow outside of prevailing regimes of power and
subjectivation is not something Foucault would have entertained. Practices
of the self are not invented by the self (well very, very rarely!) but
rather are suggested or perhaps even imposed upon the self by the cultural
environment in which one finds oneself. So the extent to which such an
exercise represents free deliberation or rational choice seems quite
problematic. In this sense, modern practices of subjectivation will always
imvolve a complex network of relations of power/knowledge and subjection,
as well as the subject's own ethical practices which may or may not subvert
existing power relations. Hence the need for careful genealogical inquiry
which deploying the axes of truth, power and ethics, might allow the
specific intellectual to begin making claims about the effects of certain
practices and the political ramifications of existing identities and
techniques of subjectivation.
With respect of Foucault and therapy, I think Foucault would be very
suspicious of a formal therapeutic practice that sought to incorporate some
of his insights re self-fashioning whilst retaining the formal distiction
between analyst and analysand. Too much power and not enough resistance!
Perhaps an alternative is suggested by the development of a personal ethics
understood as the setting of personal rules of conduct whereby the self
must decide upon an ethical framework appropriate to one's experience
without the mediation of experts and doctors. Anyhow, I've recently heard
of a new publication (Adrenne S. Chambon, Allan Irving, Laura Epstein
Reading Foucault for Social Work New York: Columbia University Press, 1999)
that seems to address these issues in the context of occupational therapies
etc. I've not had a chance to have a look at this yet but it might be of
interest to you. One I have read is Greco, M. (1998) Illness as a Work of
Thought. A Foucauldian Perspective on Psychosomatics. London, Routledge,
November 1998. This is a fascinating work that takes on Butler and Foucault
in order to interrogate the operations of power through the body as evinced
in psychosomatic disorders. Out of left field but well worth a look!
Anyway, I don't know if any of this is of any use, but you've raised some
important issues which I'm sure others on the list will be eager to engage
(hint hint!)...
keep up the pressure!
cameron duff
U of Q Australia