Thanks for the repsonses so far, this is a point that I really wish to clear
up hence my replies and furtherance of the debate:
Asher, You say:
?I think that an important distinction to be made here is what exactly it
means for power to be productive rather than repressive. Most importantly,
it means that no one _possesses_ power. Power is exercised.?
I could be wrong and I am calling on distant memories but I thought that F
uses on Hegel?s Master / Slave dialectic when describing this operation of
power and it productive capacities. I.e. the slave always has power because
the power of the master is predicated on an ensemble of power relations
intrinsic to which is the slave and their relationships (and thus identity).
E.g. I am master / you are slave --affirmation of mater identity which calls
upon an affirmation of slave identity--
?That has tremendous implications on the discussion of agency and identity
formation.
Foucault's argument seems to be that the only way to create/maintain agency
is through a formation of an identity politics -- individual voices of
identity. To say that certain individuals wield greater process of identity
construction ignores that process.?
This is a really interesting point and goes to the crux of what I am getting
at: The formation of an identity politics and the creation of agency implies
a degree of volition and a political process. Who is doing the creation, is
agency being constructed by power or self interested groups? I can see how
one could argue that but I would like to know how we logically hop from the
creation of individual voices of agency and by my saying that ?certain
individuals wield greater process of identity construction? ignores this
process of agency construction. My point is, who or what is doing this
construction. Your paragraph above seems to imply a volition of some kind.
?Certainly in the clearest sense, saying that power is productive means that
it produces normalizing subjectivities. To say that it is productive,
however, also means that it has the potential for resistance. To presume
that someone can posses power or that someone can be without power is to
trap oppressed groups in what might be called (to borrow), "a discursive
prison box." This notion of power denies agency to oppressed groups as you
are discussing.?
Again very interesting: Why would my presumption that someone possesses
power trap ?oppressed groups? in a ?discursive power box?. Through an
analyses of differential access to power (and I don?t mean in a strictly
negative/ oppressive sense, but in the sense that power produces
?normalizing subjectivities?) I think we can deepen political analysis of
?society? and its operations. Advertising, the media, TV etc are in my
opinion the greatest nodal points of discursive propagation. An analyses of
these nodal points for me and their effects in producing normalising
subjectivities would deepen the armoury of oppressed groups. I think F was
badly effected by his experiences of the Leninism of the French communist
party and its desire to ?speak? on behalf of oppressed groups. He thus
theorised into his work the idea of the ?specific? intellectual as opposed
to the ?general? intellectual. I.e. those that can intervene in specific
points of struggle and not generalise grand theories of social / economic
transformation. Hence the growth of his ideas on identity politics and the
?care of the self? i.e. the ethically situated individual. In my opinion his
later work was a politically neutering collapse into a radical ethical
individualism. But fair enough, he never professed to speak for us and give
us a political program.
?Your wording seems to answer your
question -- discourses cluster around those institutions. That means
effectively that as a society (whatever that means) we constitute the
structures within. That provides the opportunity to reclaim a position and
reverse those situations.?
How do we reverse those situations? Do we constitute those structures within
through the ballot box? Through struggle? What is it we are struggling
against?
And to Loren:
I think what you say makes a lot of sense. I think one of the strengths of F
is his idea of the localisation of power, and also its productive nature.
Have you or anybody on this list ever read any Laclau & Mouffe and / or
Stuart Hall. Whilst working with a lot of F?s ideas they situate themselves
more firmly in the post-Marxist camp and there work on interpellation and
articulation provides good tools with which to analyse the operation of
discourse etc. I will end with a quote by the good man himself, which in my
opinion gets to what I want.
?I always analyse quite precise and localised phenomenon: for example, the
formation of ?disciplinary civilisation? in all its aspects. The systems of
discipline are applied by one group upon another. There is a difference
between governing and being governed. And I emphasise that?
Foucault. Remarks on Marx. Pg 167 (Semiotexte. 1991)
How does one group apply discipline upon another?
Doug.
______________________________________________________
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up hence my replies and furtherance of the debate:
Asher, You say:
?I think that an important distinction to be made here is what exactly it
means for power to be productive rather than repressive. Most importantly,
it means that no one _possesses_ power. Power is exercised.?
I could be wrong and I am calling on distant memories but I thought that F
uses on Hegel?s Master / Slave dialectic when describing this operation of
power and it productive capacities. I.e. the slave always has power because
the power of the master is predicated on an ensemble of power relations
intrinsic to which is the slave and their relationships (and thus identity).
E.g. I am master / you are slave --affirmation of mater identity which calls
upon an affirmation of slave identity--
?That has tremendous implications on the discussion of agency and identity
formation.
Foucault's argument seems to be that the only way to create/maintain agency
is through a formation of an identity politics -- individual voices of
identity. To say that certain individuals wield greater process of identity
construction ignores that process.?
This is a really interesting point and goes to the crux of what I am getting
at: The formation of an identity politics and the creation of agency implies
a degree of volition and a political process. Who is doing the creation, is
agency being constructed by power or self interested groups? I can see how
one could argue that but I would like to know how we logically hop from the
creation of individual voices of agency and by my saying that ?certain
individuals wield greater process of identity construction? ignores this
process of agency construction. My point is, who or what is doing this
construction. Your paragraph above seems to imply a volition of some kind.
?Certainly in the clearest sense, saying that power is productive means that
it produces normalizing subjectivities. To say that it is productive,
however, also means that it has the potential for resistance. To presume
that someone can posses power or that someone can be without power is to
trap oppressed groups in what might be called (to borrow), "a discursive
prison box." This notion of power denies agency to oppressed groups as you
are discussing.?
Again very interesting: Why would my presumption that someone possesses
power trap ?oppressed groups? in a ?discursive power box?. Through an
analyses of differential access to power (and I don?t mean in a strictly
negative/ oppressive sense, but in the sense that power produces
?normalizing subjectivities?) I think we can deepen political analysis of
?society? and its operations. Advertising, the media, TV etc are in my
opinion the greatest nodal points of discursive propagation. An analyses of
these nodal points for me and their effects in producing normalising
subjectivities would deepen the armoury of oppressed groups. I think F was
badly effected by his experiences of the Leninism of the French communist
party and its desire to ?speak? on behalf of oppressed groups. He thus
theorised into his work the idea of the ?specific? intellectual as opposed
to the ?general? intellectual. I.e. those that can intervene in specific
points of struggle and not generalise grand theories of social / economic
transformation. Hence the growth of his ideas on identity politics and the
?care of the self? i.e. the ethically situated individual. In my opinion his
later work was a politically neutering collapse into a radical ethical
individualism. But fair enough, he never professed to speak for us and give
us a political program.
?Your wording seems to answer your
question -- discourses cluster around those institutions. That means
effectively that as a society (whatever that means) we constitute the
structures within. That provides the opportunity to reclaim a position and
reverse those situations.?
How do we reverse those situations? Do we constitute those structures within
through the ballot box? Through struggle? What is it we are struggling
against?
And to Loren:
I think what you say makes a lot of sense. I think one of the strengths of F
is his idea of the localisation of power, and also its productive nature.
Have you or anybody on this list ever read any Laclau & Mouffe and / or
Stuart Hall. Whilst working with a lot of F?s ideas they situate themselves
more firmly in the post-Marxist camp and there work on interpellation and
articulation provides good tools with which to analyse the operation of
discourse etc. I will end with a quote by the good man himself, which in my
opinion gets to what I want.
?I always analyse quite precise and localised phenomenon: for example, the
formation of ?disciplinary civilisation? in all its aspects. The systems of
discipline are applied by one group upon another. There is a difference
between governing and being governed. And I emphasise that?
Foucault. Remarks on Marx. Pg 167 (Semiotexte. 1991)
How does one group apply discipline upon another?
Doug.
______________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com