I sent this to the Bataille list and thought I may as well send it to the
Foucault list too.
-- John
----- Original Message -----
From: J. Ransom <dickins@xxxxxx>
To: <bataille@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2000 12:44 PM
Subject: re: can postmodernism survive
> David Schenk writes:
>
> [begin Schenk quotation]
> Actually, it is entirely unclear to me that any such thing is possible.
> As I understand it, the limits of rationality are the limits of
> intelligibility and the limits of logical possibility. To violate them is
> to abandon the very business of sense-making, to say nothing of
> truth-tracking. Therefore, to "transgress" rationality is just to utter
> either:
>
> (1) supervacuous (and ultimately meaningless) rubbish, or;
> (2) a demonstrably false set of propositions (i.e. propositions
> that are either logically false or else mutually
> contradictory)
> [end quotation from Schenk]
>
> Mr. Schenk goes on to plead for clarity on why postmodernism wishes to
> transgress rationality, and assures readers he does not want to start a
> fight, only understand how postmodernism can maintain the strange kinds of
> things it does.
>
> But the answer to Mr. Schenk's dilemma is very simple. Nowhere does any of
> the thinkers he mentions say anything about wanting to 'transgress'
> rationality. Thus it seems to me that he has violated the principle of
> charity he mentions near the end of his note -- and I commend him for
> bringing up that principle, as I think it is crucial to respect it when
> evaluating anyone's thought, or any trend of thought. But asking, 'why does
> postmodernism want to be irrational?' is like the very old joke about the
> lawyer asking the defendant on the stand, 'when did you stop beating your
> wife?'
>
> Now, what I imagine Schenk would do now is say, 'what do you mean
> postmodernists don't say they want to transgress rationality?' And he
will --
> in my scenario -- produce a quotation from someone saying something nasty
> about rationality. But the discussion can't even get going with these kinds
> of errors. Because obviously there are different kinds of referents for the
> term 'rationality.'
>
> To be rational is to adjust means to ends. If I want a coke from a vending
> machine, and I insert the appropriate coins and all other things being
equal,
> I get a coke. I've acted rationally. If I go up to the coke machine and
> instead of putting in the coins I argue with the coke machine to give me a
> coke, or bang my head against the machine thinking that is the appropriate
> way to get a coke, then I've acted irrationally.
>
> But there's a huge difference between 'rationality' writ large as above and
> the *uses* rationality is put to; the strategies it is harnessed to; the
> wills-to-power it is placed in the service of. Thus when Foucault writes
> about rationally organized hospitals in _DP_, or about how the
> plague-infested city is organized, he's not saying that these things are
> horrible because they are rationalistic 'dispositifs' -- indeed, he's not
> saying they're horrible at all. Nor is he saying we should let plague
victims
> do whatever they want or that hospitals should be unorganized or organized
in
> some non-rational way.
>
> To sum up, this is the mistake that David Schenk is making: confusing
> particular exercises of power that employ rationality with rationality
'tout
> court.' This accounts, I believe, for the unwise truck with uncharitable
> figures such as Sokal.
>
> -- John Ransom
>
Foucault list too.
-- John
----- Original Message -----
From: J. Ransom <dickins@xxxxxx>
To: <bataille@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2000 12:44 PM
Subject: re: can postmodernism survive
> David Schenk writes:
>
> [begin Schenk quotation]
> Actually, it is entirely unclear to me that any such thing is possible.
> As I understand it, the limits of rationality are the limits of
> intelligibility and the limits of logical possibility. To violate them is
> to abandon the very business of sense-making, to say nothing of
> truth-tracking. Therefore, to "transgress" rationality is just to utter
> either:
>
> (1) supervacuous (and ultimately meaningless) rubbish, or;
> (2) a demonstrably false set of propositions (i.e. propositions
> that are either logically false or else mutually
> contradictory)
> [end quotation from Schenk]
>
> Mr. Schenk goes on to plead for clarity on why postmodernism wishes to
> transgress rationality, and assures readers he does not want to start a
> fight, only understand how postmodernism can maintain the strange kinds of
> things it does.
>
> But the answer to Mr. Schenk's dilemma is very simple. Nowhere does any of
> the thinkers he mentions say anything about wanting to 'transgress'
> rationality. Thus it seems to me that he has violated the principle of
> charity he mentions near the end of his note -- and I commend him for
> bringing up that principle, as I think it is crucial to respect it when
> evaluating anyone's thought, or any trend of thought. But asking, 'why does
> postmodernism want to be irrational?' is like the very old joke about the
> lawyer asking the defendant on the stand, 'when did you stop beating your
> wife?'
>
> Now, what I imagine Schenk would do now is say, 'what do you mean
> postmodernists don't say they want to transgress rationality?' And he
will --
> in my scenario -- produce a quotation from someone saying something nasty
> about rationality. But the discussion can't even get going with these kinds
> of errors. Because obviously there are different kinds of referents for the
> term 'rationality.'
>
> To be rational is to adjust means to ends. If I want a coke from a vending
> machine, and I insert the appropriate coins and all other things being
equal,
> I get a coke. I've acted rationally. If I go up to the coke machine and
> instead of putting in the coins I argue with the coke machine to give me a
> coke, or bang my head against the machine thinking that is the appropriate
> way to get a coke, then I've acted irrationally.
>
> But there's a huge difference between 'rationality' writ large as above and
> the *uses* rationality is put to; the strategies it is harnessed to; the
> wills-to-power it is placed in the service of. Thus when Foucault writes
> about rationally organized hospitals in _DP_, or about how the
> plague-infested city is organized, he's not saying that these things are
> horrible because they are rationalistic 'dispositifs' -- indeed, he's not
> saying they're horrible at all. Nor is he saying we should let plague
victims
> do whatever they want or that hospitals should be unorganized or organized
in
> some non-rational way.
>
> To sum up, this is the mistake that David Schenk is making: confusing
> particular exercises of power that employ rationality with rationality
'tout
> court.' This accounts, I believe, for the unwise truck with uncharitable
> figures such as Sokal.
>
> -- John Ransom
>