having done some research on this; and having been helped in this by
Xavier Delcourt, i think i now have the gist of foucault argument.
Foucault made the argument in the lecture of 22 March, 1978; and I think
it goes something like this:
Following the "Treaty of Westphalia," there emerged a 'new governmental
rationality,' which had as its target not only the preservation of the
state, but also the preservation of the relations of force between states
(Germany, France, Sweden, Austria, etc.): i.e to maintain a European
equilibrium (l' equilibre de l''Europe).
Thus, this new governmental rationality invented two political
technologies or mechanisms of security (mecanisme de securite): on the one
hand, a police apparatus (le dispositif de la police) to secure the
preservation of the state; on the other hand, a diplomatico-military
apparatus (un dispositif diplomatico-militaire) to secure the balance of
power between states.
it was the later that interested me in the question that i posed, and so
it is that that i will somewhat schematically outline below.
according to foucault, this diplomatico-military apparatus 'consists in
ensuring and developing the forces of a state through a system of
alliances, and the organizing of an armed apparatus. The search for a
European equilibrium...is a consequence of this political technology.'
it has both an objective and an instrument:
the objectives:
1. there emerges a new idea of Europe - no longer the universality of
Christendom, but the plurality of separate states.
2. no state can dictate its laws to other states.
3. no state should be so powerful as to not be threatened by the greater
power of the alliance of other states (que la puissance prépondérante d'un
ou plusieurs pays soit égale à la puissance réunie des autres).
4. a desire for universal peace.
the instruments:
1. the first instrument is war (c'est la guerre); but only insofar as war
is waged to maintain balance and peace.
2. the diplomatic instrument (c'est l'instrument diplomatique).
3. a permanent army: a. professionalisation (une professionnalisation de
l'homme de guerre, la constitution d'une carriere des armes); b. a
standing army and conscription in times of war (une structure armée
permanente, susceptible de servir de cadre a des recrutements
exceptionnels en temps de guerre); c. logistics (un equipement de
forteresses et de transports); and d. strategy and tactics (un savoir, une
reflexion tactique, des types de manceuvre, des schemas d' attaque et de
defense, bref toute une reflexion propre et autonome sur la chose
militaire et les guerres possibles).
foucault concludes the lecture, or at least that part that deals with the
above, by once again citing clausewitz's (in)famous dictum that "war is
the continuation of policy by other means" (que la guerre, c'est la
politique continuee).
hope this rather breif and schematics overview makes sense.
k
--
Kevin Turner
Deptment of Sociology
County South
Lancaster University
Lancaster
LA1 4YD
(01524) 594508
Xavier Delcourt, i think i now have the gist of foucault argument.
Foucault made the argument in the lecture of 22 March, 1978; and I think
it goes something like this:
Following the "Treaty of Westphalia," there emerged a 'new governmental
rationality,' which had as its target not only the preservation of the
state, but also the preservation of the relations of force between states
(Germany, France, Sweden, Austria, etc.): i.e to maintain a European
equilibrium (l' equilibre de l''Europe).
Thus, this new governmental rationality invented two political
technologies or mechanisms of security (mecanisme de securite): on the one
hand, a police apparatus (le dispositif de la police) to secure the
preservation of the state; on the other hand, a diplomatico-military
apparatus (un dispositif diplomatico-militaire) to secure the balance of
power between states.
it was the later that interested me in the question that i posed, and so
it is that that i will somewhat schematically outline below.
according to foucault, this diplomatico-military apparatus 'consists in
ensuring and developing the forces of a state through a system of
alliances, and the organizing of an armed apparatus. The search for a
European equilibrium...is a consequence of this political technology.'
it has both an objective and an instrument:
the objectives:
1. there emerges a new idea of Europe - no longer the universality of
Christendom, but the plurality of separate states.
2. no state can dictate its laws to other states.
3. no state should be so powerful as to not be threatened by the greater
power of the alliance of other states (que la puissance prépondérante d'un
ou plusieurs pays soit égale à la puissance réunie des autres).
4. a desire for universal peace.
the instruments:
1. the first instrument is war (c'est la guerre); but only insofar as war
is waged to maintain balance and peace.
2. the diplomatic instrument (c'est l'instrument diplomatique).
3. a permanent army: a. professionalisation (une professionnalisation de
l'homme de guerre, la constitution d'une carriere des armes); b. a
standing army and conscription in times of war (une structure armée
permanente, susceptible de servir de cadre a des recrutements
exceptionnels en temps de guerre); c. logistics (un equipement de
forteresses et de transports); and d. strategy and tactics (un savoir, une
reflexion tactique, des types de manceuvre, des schemas d' attaque et de
defense, bref toute une reflexion propre et autonome sur la chose
militaire et les guerres possibles).
foucault concludes the lecture, or at least that part that deals with the
above, by once again citing clausewitz's (in)famous dictum that "war is
the continuation of policy by other means" (que la guerre, c'est la
politique continuee).
hope this rather breif and schematics overview makes sense.
k
--
Kevin Turner
Deptment of Sociology
County South
Lancaster University
Lancaster
LA1 4YD
(01524) 594508