OK, now that we have that reasonably well sorted out, I have a follow up question.
In a retrospective of his work the ‘Preface to the History of Sexuality, Volume Two,’ in which he details how he came to analyse forms of experience in their historicity, Foucault describes how this idea originated in Maladie mentale et personnalité.
In this retrospective, Foucault notes two aspects of this original project left him unsatisfied: (1) ‘its theoretical weakness in elaborating the notion of experience,’ and (2) ‘its ambiguous link with a psychiatric practice, which it simultaneously ignored and took for granted’ (EW1: 200; DEII: 1398). And he goes on to note how (1) ‘one could deal with the first problem by referring to a general theory of the human being, and (2) treat the second altogether differently by turning...to the "economic and social context."’ In doing so, so he claims, one would have to ‘accept the resulting dilemma of (1) a philosophical anthropology and (2) a social history.’
Foucault then details two negative tasks undertaken in moving to a form of analysis that ‘consider[s] the very historicity of forms of experience:’ (1) a "nominalist" reduction of philosophical anthropology and the notions it supports, and (2) a displacement relative to the domain, the concepts, and the methods of the history of societies’ (trans mod [‘une réduction « nominaliste » de l'anthropologie philosophique ainsi que des notions qui pouvaient s'appuyer sur elle, et un déplacement par rapport au domaine, aux concepts et aux méthodes de l'histoire des sociétés’]).
Finally, my questions:
Firstly, would I be correct in thinking that one of the things that motivate both of these negative tasks is the question of imposition?
(1) imposing a general theory of the human being upon human beings (hence the nominalist reduction of philosophical anthropology), and
(2) imposing a single grid of intelligibility upon all historical processes (hence the displacement relative to social history).
Secondly, I initially thought that "philosophical anthropology" referred exclusively to existentialism/phenomenology (i.e. to Chapter 4 of MMPer). However, following our discussion of the internal/external dimension, and given that Foucault states that what he means by "philosophical anthropology" is "a general theory of the human being," would I now be right in thinking that this expression refers to the analysis undertaken in the whole of Part One of Maladie mentale et personnalité?
Third and lastly, would I be correct to state that the displacement that Foucault undertook relative to the domain (economic and social context), the concepts (contradiction, alienation), and the methods (dialectics) of the history of societies was a displacement in the direction of a (critical) history of (systems of) thought?
Sorry for the long post.
Regards,
Kevin.
Regards,
Kevin.
____________________________________________________________
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In a retrospective of his work the ‘Preface to the History of Sexuality, Volume Two,’ in which he details how he came to analyse forms of experience in their historicity, Foucault describes how this idea originated in Maladie mentale et personnalité.
In this retrospective, Foucault notes two aspects of this original project left him unsatisfied: (1) ‘its theoretical weakness in elaborating the notion of experience,’ and (2) ‘its ambiguous link with a psychiatric practice, which it simultaneously ignored and took for granted’ (EW1: 200; DEII: 1398). And he goes on to note how (1) ‘one could deal with the first problem by referring to a general theory of the human being, and (2) treat the second altogether differently by turning...to the "economic and social context."’ In doing so, so he claims, one would have to ‘accept the resulting dilemma of (1) a philosophical anthropology and (2) a social history.’
Foucault then details two negative tasks undertaken in moving to a form of analysis that ‘consider[s] the very historicity of forms of experience:’ (1) a "nominalist" reduction of philosophical anthropology and the notions it supports, and (2) a displacement relative to the domain, the concepts, and the methods of the history of societies’ (trans mod [‘une réduction « nominaliste » de l'anthropologie philosophique ainsi que des notions qui pouvaient s'appuyer sur elle, et un déplacement par rapport au domaine, aux concepts et aux méthodes de l'histoire des sociétés’]).
Finally, my questions:
Firstly, would I be correct in thinking that one of the things that motivate both of these negative tasks is the question of imposition?
(1) imposing a general theory of the human being upon human beings (hence the nominalist reduction of philosophical anthropology), and
(2) imposing a single grid of intelligibility upon all historical processes (hence the displacement relative to social history).
Secondly, I initially thought that "philosophical anthropology" referred exclusively to existentialism/phenomenology (i.e. to Chapter 4 of MMPer). However, following our discussion of the internal/external dimension, and given that Foucault states that what he means by "philosophical anthropology" is "a general theory of the human being," would I now be right in thinking that this expression refers to the analysis undertaken in the whole of Part One of Maladie mentale et personnalité?
Third and lastly, would I be correct to state that the displacement that Foucault undertook relative to the domain (economic and social context), the concepts (contradiction, alienation), and the methods (dialectics) of the history of societies was a displacement in the direction of a (critical) history of (systems of) thought?
Sorry for the long post.
Regards,
Kevin.
Regards,
Kevin.
____________________________________________________________
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Easily monitor multiple email accounts & access them with a click.
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