Hi, Chetan
Maybe this passage from Cousins and Hussain (1984:33) might be of help:
"Knowledge [in the classical episteme] consists in the correct ordering of
representations. [In the Renaissance episteme]
it had consisted in the penetration of the signs in the world in order to
read the wisdom scattered throughout it. [In the classical episteme] i
consists in representing identities, differences and their degrees. [In the
Renaissance episteme] it had consisted in divination or similitiude. (...)
Signs were placed and hidden in the world, awaiting knowledge. [In the
classical episteme] signs are knowledge, tools of analysis and means of
representing order. The world, not signs, awaits knowledge. The world and
signs, things and words, are divided".
Cousins and Hussains also observe that the ternary structure the
characterized the mode of knowledge of Renaissance -- all the things of the
world, words (which are special things that function as marks put upon all
the things of the world), and the interpretation that shows how words and
things are related. In the classical episteme, there is a binary structure
of production of knowledge: a significant (a sing, a word) and a signified
(the thing that the word represents).
Hope this helps.
Best'
Emmanoel
2010/2/27 Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>
> So I was explaining the important concepts in *Les Mots et les Choses* to a
> friend who was reading it. She wanted to know how to distinguish Foucault's
> argument about the Renaissance period's unique epistemical focus on
> "representation" from the general human cognitive ability to think in terms
> of representation or symbols. I explained that representation was being
> used
> more in the terms of knowledge and how various signs represented
> totalities,
> but perhaps I oversimplified something? Because any discussion of
> representation often involves discussion of symbols and such, which is did
> of course, so perhaps that only adds to the confusion.
> How would any of you guys distinguish his account of the representative
> episteme from a general human cognitive capacity to think in terms of
> representation (which led to early art and perhaps spirituality).
>
> Looking forward to your comments.
>
>
> --
> Chetan Vemuri
> West Des Moines, IA
> aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> (319)-512-9318
> "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> world"
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>
Maybe this passage from Cousins and Hussain (1984:33) might be of help:
"Knowledge [in the classical episteme] consists in the correct ordering of
representations. [In the Renaissance episteme]
it had consisted in the penetration of the signs in the world in order to
read the wisdom scattered throughout it. [In the classical episteme] i
consists in representing identities, differences and their degrees. [In the
Renaissance episteme] it had consisted in divination or similitiude. (...)
Signs were placed and hidden in the world, awaiting knowledge. [In the
classical episteme] signs are knowledge, tools of analysis and means of
representing order. The world, not signs, awaits knowledge. The world and
signs, things and words, are divided".
Cousins and Hussains also observe that the ternary structure the
characterized the mode of knowledge of Renaissance -- all the things of the
world, words (which are special things that function as marks put upon all
the things of the world), and the interpretation that shows how words and
things are related. In the classical episteme, there is a binary structure
of production of knowledge: a significant (a sing, a word) and a signified
(the thing that the word represents).
Hope this helps.
Best'
Emmanoel
2010/2/27 Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>
> So I was explaining the important concepts in *Les Mots et les Choses* to a
> friend who was reading it. She wanted to know how to distinguish Foucault's
> argument about the Renaissance period's unique epistemical focus on
> "representation" from the general human cognitive ability to think in terms
> of representation or symbols. I explained that representation was being
> used
> more in the terms of knowledge and how various signs represented
> totalities,
> but perhaps I oversimplified something? Because any discussion of
> representation often involves discussion of symbols and such, which is did
> of course, so perhaps that only adds to the confusion.
> How would any of you guys distinguish his account of the representative
> episteme from a general human cognitive capacity to think in terms of
> representation (which led to early art and perhaps spirituality).
>
> Looking forward to your comments.
>
>
> --
> Chetan Vemuri
> West Des Moines, IA
> aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> (319)-512-9318
> "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> world"
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>