Thought
The following passage comes from ‘Préface a l’ « Histoire de la sexualité »
‘Par « pensée », j’entends ce qui instaure, dans diverses formes possible, le jeu du vrai et du faux et qui, par conséquent, constitue l’être humain comme sujet de connaissance ; ce qui fonde l’acceptation ou le refus de la règle et constitue l’être humain comme sujet social et juridique ; ce qui instaure le rapport avec soi-même et avec les autres, et constitue l’être humain comme sujet éthique’ (DEII : 1398).
The published English translation of this passage reads:
‘By “thought,” I mean what establishes, in a variety of possible forms, the play of true and false, and consequently [which as a consequence] constitutes the human being as knowing subject [a subject of learning]; in other words, it is the basis for accepting or refusing rules, and constitutes human beings as social and juridical subjects; it is what establishes the relationship with oneself and others, and constitutes human beings as ethical subject’ (EW1: 200 [Foucault Reader: 334]).
My rendition of this passage is as follows:
By “thought”, I mean that which establishes, in various possible forms, the play of truth and false and which, consequently, constitutes the human being as subject of knowledge (knowing subject); that which sets up (fuses together - fonde) the acceptance or refusal of rules and constitutes the human being as social and juridical subject; that which establishes the relationship with oneself and with the others, and constitutes the human being as ethical subject.
(A) The wording of the published English translation of this passage make it sound like what Foucault meant by “thought” was the play of true and false, and that it is “thought,” understood thus, which, on the one hand, is the basis for the acceptance or refusal of rules, and, on the other, establishes the relation to oneself and others.
That is to say, on this reading, it is the constitution of the knowing subject which is the basis both for the constitution of the social and juridical subject and for the constitution of the ethical subject. That is to say, the constitution of the subject of knowledge by way of the play of true and false is seen as being both prior to and as acting as the basis for (the inclusion of “in other words” in the published English translation) the constitution of the social and juridical subject by way of the acceptance and refusal of rules, and the constitution of the ethical subject by way of the relation to oneself and others. Stated simply, the first axis is not only given more weight that the other two, it is seen as their condition of possibility.
(B) In my revised translation, each axes is given equal weight it that what Foucault meant by thought was that which (1) establishes the play of true and false, (2) founds the acceptance and refusal or rules, and (3) establishes the relation with oneself and others. And it is thought, understood thus, that constitutes (1) the subject of knowledge, (2) the social and juridical subject, and (3) the ethical subject.
In the first reading (A), thought is identified with one of the axes under discussion (true and false – subject of knowledge); in the second reading (B), thought is understood to be exterior to each axis in that it is what establishes each of them and constitutes the subject in different ways relative to each axis. Thus, thought is not identified with the first axis, which is then taken to be the condition of possibility for the second and third axes; thought is simply understood to be the condition of possibility for all three axes.
I was wondering what people thought of the English translation, my revised translation, and the subsequent readings of the two passages.
Regards,
Kevin.
The following passage comes from ‘Préface a l’ « Histoire de la sexualité »
‘Par « pensée », j’entends ce qui instaure, dans diverses formes possible, le jeu du vrai et du faux et qui, par conséquent, constitue l’être humain comme sujet de connaissance ; ce qui fonde l’acceptation ou le refus de la règle et constitue l’être humain comme sujet social et juridique ; ce qui instaure le rapport avec soi-même et avec les autres, et constitue l’être humain comme sujet éthique’ (DEII : 1398).
The published English translation of this passage reads:
‘By “thought,” I mean what establishes, in a variety of possible forms, the play of true and false, and consequently [which as a consequence] constitutes the human being as knowing subject [a subject of learning]; in other words, it is the basis for accepting or refusing rules, and constitutes human beings as social and juridical subjects; it is what establishes the relationship with oneself and others, and constitutes human beings as ethical subject’ (EW1: 200 [Foucault Reader: 334]).
My rendition of this passage is as follows:
By “thought”, I mean that which establishes, in various possible forms, the play of truth and false and which, consequently, constitutes the human being as subject of knowledge (knowing subject); that which sets up (fuses together - fonde) the acceptance or refusal of rules and constitutes the human being as social and juridical subject; that which establishes the relationship with oneself and with the others, and constitutes the human being as ethical subject.
(A) The wording of the published English translation of this passage make it sound like what Foucault meant by “thought” was the play of true and false, and that it is “thought,” understood thus, which, on the one hand, is the basis for the acceptance or refusal of rules, and, on the other, establishes the relation to oneself and others.
That is to say, on this reading, it is the constitution of the knowing subject which is the basis both for the constitution of the social and juridical subject and for the constitution of the ethical subject. That is to say, the constitution of the subject of knowledge by way of the play of true and false is seen as being both prior to and as acting as the basis for (the inclusion of “in other words” in the published English translation) the constitution of the social and juridical subject by way of the acceptance and refusal of rules, and the constitution of the ethical subject by way of the relation to oneself and others. Stated simply, the first axis is not only given more weight that the other two, it is seen as their condition of possibility.
(B) In my revised translation, each axes is given equal weight it that what Foucault meant by thought was that which (1) establishes the play of true and false, (2) founds the acceptance and refusal or rules, and (3) establishes the relation with oneself and others. And it is thought, understood thus, that constitutes (1) the subject of knowledge, (2) the social and juridical subject, and (3) the ethical subject.
In the first reading (A), thought is identified with one of the axes under discussion (true and false – subject of knowledge); in the second reading (B), thought is understood to be exterior to each axis in that it is what establishes each of them and constitutes the subject in different ways relative to each axis. Thus, thought is not identified with the first axis, which is then taken to be the condition of possibility for the second and third axes; thought is simply understood to be the condition of possibility for all three axes.
I was wondering what people thought of the English translation, my revised translation, and the subsequent readings of the two passages.
Regards,
Kevin.